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EDITOR'S NOTE
On April 19, 1999 in a suburb of Denver, Colorado, a most fright-
ening kind of violence took place. Two teenage boys, Dylan Kleebold
and Eric Harris, killed eleven of their high school classmates, a teacher at
the school, and themselves. They committed these murders with intent,
with calm execution, with guns designed for warfare. Theirs was not a
random act of violence. The violence they unleashed that day was a thor-
oughly planned act of terrorism. Terrorism from teenagers-teenagers
who were from upper middle class families, good schools, and a good
neighborhood-teenagers from a segment of society where "it wouldn't
happen."
Since the massacre took place at Columbine High School, everyone
has sought answers. People have blamed the boys, society, video games,
the boys' parents, the schools, the teachers at the schools, the police,
music, jocks at the school, gun control laws, the principal . . . the list
could go on and on-and regardless of who or what is blamed, it is im-
possible to know what caused the two boys to do this terrible act. Grand
fingers of blame point to society: the decline of the family unit. More
pointed fingers of blame point to individuals: the boys, their parents, the
police. At the end of the day, the finger of blame is useless.
Certainly, it would easier to resolve this problem if we knew the
source of the problem-which, optimistically, is why such blame is be-
ing laid. If we knew that the source of the violence was a certain movie,
we could simply ban the movie. If we had evidence that it was the bullies
who pushed Kleebold and Harris to their horrible acts, we could simply
institute a 12-step bully recovery program. These resolutions are ridicu-
lous, not because they wouldn't work-they might-they are ridiculous
because the problem of youth violence is bigger than any one cause.
Thus, the problem of youth violence can only be resolved by more than
one response.
The act of violence at Columbine High School affected all of us in
the Denver community, and students at the University of Denver College
of Law have responded in many ways. In this issue, we at the Denver
University Law Review are responding in a way uniquely possible for a
law review to respond. Each year, we publish an interdisciplinary sym-
posium on law and policy relating to a specific issue. In light of the
tragic events in our community, we have dedicated this issue to an inter-
disciplinary examination of the law and policy surrounding youth vio-
lence. We invited politicians, community leaders, and academic scholars
from various disciplines including law, social sciences, media, and com-
munications to contribute. Broadly, the articles address what happened at
Columbine, what factors contributed to it, what legal and societal issues
are raised by it, and what to do now. Of course, the legal issues are
highlighted, but so are the societal factors, the role of government, and
the impact of the media. Our intent was to address the issues raised by
Columbine in a way that challenges the reader to reconsider both why
these things happen, and how to respond. Ultimately, our intent is to en-
courage response.
Because this is an interdisciplinary issue, many of the articles are
not in standard Bluebook format. As much as possible, the articles have
retained their original format and form of citation. The editors of the
Denver University Law Review would like to thank each person who
contributed to this Symposium, both the live symposium that was held in
the Spring of 2000 and the articles herein provide a thought provoking
and excellent examination of this sadly timely issue. More generally, the
editors of the Denver University Law Review would like to thank anyone
who responds.
WHEN THE UNTHINKABLE BECOMES ROUTINE
BY DIANA DEGETIT*
INTRODUCTION'
Firearm violence has become an everyday event, even expected in
some cities. The escalation of this violence is not measured merely in
terms of geography, race, or social class. Now, we are aware that many
of our children have embraced this violence, and many more children are
threatened by it.' One year ago, two students planned, initiated, and exe-
cuted a complex, systematic attack on their classmates at Columbine
High School. One year later, the shock of that event still reverberates
around the country and around the world.
We now know there are no safe zones.
A year ago, some said that Columbine was an isolated incident, the
result of a unique set of variables that would not be replicated elsewhere.
They were wrong. Students and their families in other states have con-
fronted their own tragedies when their schools become killing fields.
Those of us who harbored the illusion that children were somehow ex-
empt or protected from violence were blind. One study showed that one
in four young people report that they have been victims of violence.'
Another study found that children aged 12-17 are nearly three times
more likely than adults to be victims of violent crime and to experience a
crime-related injury.4
Of course, some would say that the use of guns in these violent as-
saults is a new phenomenon, making the death of children front-page
news. Approximately 14 children every day die in America from gunfire,
about one child every two hours.' Gunfire kills approximately 5,000
* Member, United States House of Representatives.
I. This article was adapted from remarks made at the Columbine Symposium held at the
University of Denver College of Law, March 25, 2000.
2. See Peter Slavin, Child. & Guns: Gun Violence Has Become a Child Welfare Issue, 9
CHILD. VOICE: THE CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM. 4-7, 36-37 (2000). See also, CHILD. DEF.
FUND, Juv. JUST. & YOUTH DEV., THE STATE OF AM. CHILD. Y.B. 107-28 (1999).
3. M. D. Resnick, et al., Protecting Adolescents From Harm: Findings From the Nat'l
Longitudinal Study on Adolescent Health, 278 JAMA 823-34 (1997).
4. MELISSA SICKMUND ET AL., CTR. FOR JuV. JUST., Juv. OFFENDERS & VICTIMs: 1997
UPDATE ON VIOLENCE 4 (1997).
5. "It shouldn't take a Columbine, a Jonesboro or an inner city drive-by shooting to make us
realize that American children are more at risk from firearms than the children of any other
industrialized nation. In one year, firearms killed no children in Japan. 19 in Great Britain, 57 in
Germany, 109 in France, 153 in Canada, and 5,285 in the United States." Handgun Control, The
School Shootings ... and Beyond: Kids & Guns in America, available at
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children annually, which is roughly equivalent to one Columbine tragedy
every day.
Others might argue that the major difference in the past year is that
children are using guns. In fact, guns are available to children and they
are using them. About 70 percent of the victims of juvenile homicide
offenders were killed with guns.6 Ten percent of the victims were family
members.7 Another 54 percent were acquaintances of the juveniles who
were using the weapons.' Juveniles who have been arrested are more
likely to have used a gun in committing a crime than adults who have
been arrested.9 That phenomenon is troubling and unacceptable, whether
it is new or not.
These statistics tell a story by giving us trends and analysis. Even
one death is too many. Underneath the statistics are horrifying stories
where tragedy overwhelms innocence, even for the very young. What do
we make of the death of six-year old Kayla Rolland, who was shot by a
classmate in a classroom? What do we tell the mother of my own six-
year-old daughter's classmate who asked for an explanation? What do we
tell that child? How do we explain the unthinkable?
We look for answers. We demand action. Parents and students have
made gun control a pervasive priority. The Columbine Clock, which you
can find on several congressional web sites, records the minutes and
hours since that tragedy. That clock is a symbolic statement of the impa-
tience and anger of people who want solutions.' ° Ultimately, as the min-
utes tick by, the anger turns to disappointment, which leads to feelings of
abandonment and cynicism.
http://www.handguncontroi.org/facts/ib/kidsnguns.asp. The Centers for Disease Control reports "For
every child killed with a gun [in the United States], four are wounded.... [Tihe rate of firearm death
of children 0-14 years old is nearly twelve times higher in the U. S. than in 25 other industrialized
nations combined." Id For the full scope of firearm violence in the United States. See NAT'L CTR.
FOR HEALTH STATS., HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 1998, Table 49, 256-58. The death rate for all ages
has remained constant from 1970-1996.
6. SICKMUND ET AL., supra note 4, at 12.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Deborah Prothrow-Stith, former Assistant Dean of Harvard School of Public Health has
noted, "When the Massachusetts Department of Public Health and the Boston Police Department
organized a task force to combat adolescent violence, kids bragged to the members how easy guns
are to obtain. They said they get guns 'at home - not surprising when half the households in the
nation contain firearms. The kids said they take guns off the top of their parents' dresser or out of the
bureau drawer. They said they borrow them, steal them, or buy them for twenty dollars." DEBORAH
PROTHROW-STITH, M.D. & MICHAELE WEISSMAN, DEADLY CONSEQUENCES 18 (Harper Collins
1991).
10. See website of Representative Rosa DeLauro (D-Conn.), at http:I/www.
house.gov/delauro.
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THESIS
I believe there are some common sense solutions that can change this
environment. We can change our culture of weapons and crime. We must
act together as a community, with each person doing his or her part. The
reasons for firearm violence are complex and intertwined. We cannot fit
every case into a pre-determined box, nor does each instance beg for one
clear-cut solution. There are dozens of factors that might contribute in
different ways to tragedy. For those engaged in the blame game, there is
enough blame to go around - which is another way of saying that blame
has been diffused and fractured enough to make any assessment impo-
tent. But blame won't help us craft legislation, heal our communities,
protect our children, or stop the Columbine Clock, which keeps on tick-
ing. It would be irresponsible and dangerous to try to shove each incident
of juvenile firearm violence into one or two convenient categories. We
must recognize that each person is part of the solution. Each of us has a
role to play and each one of us must search for every available way to
make a valuable contribution to safe schools and a safe community.
A. A Nation of Weapons
Solutions must embrace the entire community; otherwise, they will
surely fail. The odds against success are high, but I believe they can be
overcome.
Let me explain a sobering national reality. The Census Bureau is
now counting the number of American citizens for purposes of profiling
population trends, economic circumstances, and political representation.
You and I can conduct a similar census, a count of weapons. Licensed
firearms dealers sell 7.5 million guns annually, of which 3.5 million are
handguns." There are an estimated 30-50 million unregistered handguns
in this country.' 2 For those without weapons, there is a thriving black-
market with no background checks for guns from unregistered dealers, a
fact recently conceded by the National Rifle Association (NRA). Gun
shows provide another avenue of access to weapons. Then, there are
those adults who leave guns around for children to take and use on
classmates, friends, or relatives. There are television programs and mov-
ies that gorge us with violence, functioning as schools for the use and
abuse of weapons. There is a declining and fractured moral climate,
where many people are more motivated by self-interest than the public
interest, and worse, where some people have no morality at all and
11. Estimates provided to my office by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms.
12. The estimates vary widely. For example, Handgun Control estimates that there are 65
million privately owned handguns in the United States. Handgun Control, Firearm Facts, at
http://www.handguncontrol.org/research/progunfirefacts.asp. See also DIRECTORATE DEP'T OF
JUST. CANADA, A REV. OF FIREARM STATS. & REGS. IN SELECTED COUNTRIES: RES., STATS. &
EVAL. (April 25, 1995) ("According to data from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, there
were 222 million firearms in possession of citizens in the U.S. at the beginning of 1994. 76 million
of the firearms in circulation were handguns.")
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loudly condemn anyone who tries to learn right from wrong. Some par-
ents expect the schools or the churches to teach morality, while the
schools and churches claim they cannot effectively substitute for parents.
Everyone looks to legislators for solutions, but legislators can only pro-
vide a piece of the puzzle. It is almost a mathematical certainty that chil-
dren can acquire weapons and use them. Events like Columbine High
School become inevitable unless there are many strong countervailing
forces at work.
Consider, too, the legislative paralysis on gun control. The public is
demanding a legislative response, but strong lobbying efforts by the
NRA, the most potent and well-financed lobby in Washington, have
thwarted congressional attempts at common sense solutions, including
child safety locks, closing the gun show loopholes, 13 or banning impor-
tation of large capacity ammunition magazines.
I predict that we will see more acts of violence in and near schools,
and at an increasingly accelerated rate, unless we immediately take sub-
stantial actions to protect ourselves from these acts of violence.
While I agree with those who want policy makers to act, we are only
part of the solution. One parent or one act of Congress will not solve the
overwhelming odds of firearm violence by children. There must be a
concerted effort in the home, on the streets, in the churches, on televi-
sion, in movies, in Congress, in the schools, on the Internet, and any-
where else children might be influenced or guns might be made available
to those who want to engage in violence.
B. Common Ground
There is some common ground for those willing to engage in rational
choice. We all agree that the current laws must be vigorously, methodi-
cally, and comprehensively enforced. The NRA has recently stated that
we need to enforce the laws, "4 a self-evident fact. I agree. This is a pre-
condition to other actions, because all Americans assume that the laws
will be enforced.
However, enforcing current laws is not the only solution. Those laws
still contain significant loopholes, some created by NRA action and some
perpetuated by NRA opposition to background checks.15 These loopholes
must be closed. The NRA was, and remains, opposed to any kind of leg-
islation to register guns, control the sale of handguns, or restrict the use
of firearms. Their opposition is anchored in a steadfast belief that the
13. See Handgun Control, NRA Hypocrisy Exposed: New Report Details the NRA's Shameful
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Second Amendment provides support for their views.16 However, the
NRA understands that its position may be slowly eroded away, bit by bit,
as public opinion demands some legislative restrictions, and the courts
uphold those restrictions. Recently, the NRA asks us to forget that it
violently and categorically opposed this legislation and that it still does.
17
The NRA asks us to forget the loopholes in this legislation that make it
less effective. 8 The NRA asks us to forget the millions of unregistered
weapons and the misuse of registered handguns. The NRA even asks us
to forget about its long fight against funding enforcement of current laws
by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms. Rather, we are now to
place the burden for armed crime on prosecutors, police officers, and
judges, who now stand accused of not doing their jobs. I do not agree
that law enforcement officials have been negligent, but if they are, then,
yes, we must rigorously enforce the laws. That is imperative. But the
NRA cannot waiver from this position without exposing what might be
their true objective, blocking any attempt at new legislation.
The NRA and its critics have much common ground. We now agree
that guns should only be in the hands of responsible, fully licensed, legal
owners. Criminals and children should not own guns. We disagree on
solutions. In my view, guns should not be purchased without a back-
ground check, as now happens at gun shows. It also means that child
gunlocks make sense, because only the rightful owner should have the
key.
Given this disagreement, I have to ask: at what point will the NRA
recognize the need for further legislation? How many children must die?
How many Columbine High Schools? How many Kayla Rollands? What
is the threshold for recognizing that there are too many unregistered
guns? What would have to happen before safety locks are installed or
gun show loopholes are closed?
If the answer to these questions is that the NRA will never, under
any circumstances, work for positive change, then we know that their
advocacy for a nation of guns will continue at any price as they overlook
a horrible reality that is getting worse.
I would much prefer that the NRA and gun control groups expand
their common ground and work together. For example, I was heartened
by the cooperative efforts in Denver of Project Exile, a tough initiative to
enforce existing federal laws. I want to commend U.S. Attorney Tom
Strickland for initiating the first step. Mutual antagonism does not serve
16. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed" United States Constitution, Amendment H
[1791].
17. See Handgun Control, supra note 13.
18. See id.
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the public interest. It sets the stage for further tragedy, as each passing
day more of our children fall victim to firearm violence.
WHAT CAN BE DONE?
For those willing to work together, much can be done. Congress
must limit the availability of weapons to kids and criminals, and make
available weapons safer. Parents, neighbors, clergy, schools, student
leaders, public health officials, law enforcement personnel, and the entire
community have a role to play. Firearm manufacturers must be involved
too. Everyone must be involved. There are no easy answers, and all of
these answers will not stop every act of violence. But if we can minimize
the risk and reduce the probability of firearm violence, then we might
save one child, or ten, or a hundred, or a thousand each year. And, just
one child's life should motivate us.
A. Congress
Of course, Congress must undertake several actions, each of which
would be a valuable addition to the laws we already have. In combina-
tion with those laws, we would have a more effective and credible legal
bulwark against juvenile firearm violence.
We can accomplish much on the national level. For example, re-
authorizing the Juvenile Justice Act would address many of the causes of
violence, such as delinquency and juvenile violence. 9 The Act would
provide grants to states for housing of runaways, de-institutionalization
of status offenders (juveniles confined for offenses that would not be
punished if committed by an adult), provision of separate housing for
juvenile and adult offenders, and reduction of the disproportionate rate of
incarceration of minority juveniles.2° The Act provides funds for com-
munity policing, verification of probation, youth services programs,
broad-based community efforts to identify and assist at-risk youth, and
local reduction of juvenile firearm violence.2'
Congress should also pass common sense, gun safety legislation. I
have supported closing the loophole which allows the purchase of a
weapon at gun shows without a background check from unlicensed deal-
19. Juv. & Delinq. Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1109 (1974)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (1974)). See also SUZANNE CAVANAGH & DAVID
TEASLEY, CONG. RES. SERVICE, Juv. JUST. ACT REAUTHORIZATION: THE CURRENT DEBATE
(updated June 11, 1999). The Act expired on Sept. 30, 1996. Two bills have been introduced to
reauthorize the Act: S. 254 and H.R. 1150. The Senate passed an amended version of S. 254 on May
20, 1999 and, after removing the existing language of a third bill, H.R. 1501, inserted the language
of S. 254 into that bill. On June 17, 1999, the House passed H.R. 1501as amended. Both the House
and Senate versions appear to have died in conference.
20. Violent & Repeat Juv. Offenders Accountability Act of 1999, S. 254, 106th Cong.
21. A Bill to Regulate the Sale of Firearms at Gun Shows, H.R. 902, 106th Cong. (1999).
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ers.22 Many juveniles have purchased guns in this way. Some of the guns
used at Columbine were purchased at these shows. The loophole makes
no sense. The gun is just as deadly whether purchased at a shop or a
show. A criminal with a history of violence cannot legally buy a gun at a
pawnshop or a gun shop without a background check. Yet, that same
criminal can purchase a gun without a background check at a gun show
and walk out with the weapon that very day. We know the price for such
a loophole here in Colorado, so I have little patience with those who ar-
gue for this difference without a distinction.
Unfortunately, some manufacturers are more concerned with profits
than safety. In 1994, Congress banned the production of large-capacity,
assault-style magazines.23 These magazines, or clips, allow the shooter to
rapid-fire as many as 30 bullets without reloading. However, Congress
exempted high-capacity ammunition magazines manufactured before
September 1994.24 Manufacturers from China and Russia have sold these
magazines in the United States, contrary to the spirit of the legislation.
We need to put an end to these uncontrolled imports by banning them.
Along with California Senator Diane Feinstein, I introduced legislation
two years ago, and again this session, to establish such a ban.2s When the
legislation stalled, I launched a petition drive in Congress to bring this
resolution to a vote. I am still waiting for the vote and the Columbine
Clock is still ticking.
We should also pass legislation to require child-safety locks on guns.
This low-tech and inexpensive device would render a gun inoperable
without the key. Locks should be required for all newly manufactured
firearms; privately owned guns that can use such a device should be ret-
rofitted.
Also, there is much that can be done on the state level. The Colorado
legislature should act now to pass common sense gun safety legislation.26
22. Id.
23. Violent Crime Control & Law Enforcement Act of 1994, § 110103, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
24. Id.
25. A Bill to Ban the Importation of Large Capacity Ammunition Feeding Devices, and to
Extend the Ban on Transferring Such Devices to Those That Were Manufactured Before the Ban
Became Law, H.R. 1037, 106th Cong. (1999). The legislation was referred to House Subcommittee
on March 18, 1999.
26. For example, the Colorado State Legislature could pass A Bill for an Act Concerning
Prohibition of the Negligent Storage of Firearms, H.B. 1197, 62nd Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess.
(Colo.); A Bill for an Act Concerning the Prohibition of the Purchase of Handguns at Gun Shows by
Persons Under Twenty-one Years of Age, and Making an Appropriation in Connection Therewith,
H.B. 1220, 62nd Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo.); or A Bill for an Act Concerning a
Requirement of Criminal History Background Checks in Connection with the Transfer of Firearms
at Gun Shows, H.B. 1242, 62nd Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo.). Each of these bills was
introduced in January 2000 but none has been passed by the Legislature, despite bipartisan support.
[Editor's Note: Colorado voters approved a measure closing the gun show loophole in Colorado by
referendum on Nov. 7, 2000.]
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They can follow the example of Pennsylvania, where the state legislature
enacted a law requiring all guns purchased from licensed dealers to be
equipped with trigger locks.27 California has passed bills to limit handgun
sales and strengthen the assault weapons ban.28
B. Parents
However, Congress can only do so much. This problem is bigger
than Congress' ability to legislate a solution. We must look to everyone
in the community for active assistance. For example, parents must be
more than just stewards, housekeepers, chauffeurs, or roommates. We
must be parents. Parents have a responsibility to supervise, educate,
guide, and mold their children. They must know where their kids are,
what they are doing, and where they are spending their money. This is a
greater challenge now that the Internet provides an unlimited number of
opportunities to purchase items that were relatively difficult to get ten
years ago. In the last half of the previous century, parents abandoned
their children to the wasteland of television. In our new century, we must
not make the same mistake with the arid regions of the Internet. Parents
must also teach values, morals, and ethics to their children. They must
credibly and persuasively stress non-violent resolution to conflicts. All of
these demands place greater pressure on parents, but parents are the most
important deterrent to violent crime by children.
C. Neighbors
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. once said that "We are all caught in an
inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny.
Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly."29 That is why our
friends and neighbors are also vital players in creating safe havens for
our children. A neighborhood is a collection of families. When one fam-
ily fails to supervise their children, other children might be caught in the
riptide of social and criminal problems that result. We can be good
neighbors by looking out for the safety of each child, by offering advice
to children in need, and by working to keep the neighborhood clean from
drug use, alcohol abuse, and crime.
City governments can also work to provide young people with posi-
tive options that promote education and personal growth. We have all
heard of the success of "Midnight Basketball" leagues sponsored by city
and county governments. A wider variety of options would also be help-
27. 1999 Pa. Laws 59.
28. A.B. 202, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 1999); and S.B. 23, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca.
1999). The former legislation concerns limitation of handgun sales; the latter deals with
strengthening the assault weapon ban.
29. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., A Christmas Sermon on Peace, December 24, 1967, in A
TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS & SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 253,
254 (James Melville Washington ed., Harper & Row 1986).
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ful, such as those that promote computer skills, job-oriented education,
critical thinking skills, and non-violent conflict resolution.
D. Clergy
Our clergy are opinion leaders and shepherds in our communities.
They are often the strongest advocates against firearm violence. The
clergy understand the dangers lurking in our neighborhoods and the im-
mense pressures on our children and parents. They can continue to unite
our neighborhoods against firearm use and violence, and the community
can provide more forums for clergy to deliver this important message. I
have often told my colleagues that politics requires use of the "bully pul-
pit." More to the point, this is one issue where anti-gun advocates and the
clergy have a common cause. We must forge a stronger, more vocal alli-
ance between gun control advocates and the clergy to provide a powerful
message against firearm violence.
E. Schools
Our schools have been the focus of much discussion in the last year.
While some of the criticism leveled against our schools has been unfair,
parents and taxpayers must expect certain standards. First, our schools
must be safe for students. If they are not, then we must make them safe.3"
It takes courage for an administrator to admit the infiltration of drugs,
alcohol, guns, or gangs, but there is a paradox here. If a school adminis-
trator admits the school is less than safe, parents often retaliate against
the messenger and not the message. I would argue that we should simply
assume that every school has the same concerns and take the appropriate
steps to root out these problems. School administrators and teachers
should ensure that adult gang members, drug dealers, and weapons sales-
people are not allowed to prey on our children at school.
F. School Leaders
Students themselves also have a role to play. Many high school stu-
dents admit that the threat of violence hangs over their school. Many
students know and fear gang leaders. Many students know those who
have guns or claim to have access to guns. Student leaders and student
councils can suggest and implement actions to create non-violent alter-
natives.
Any student initiative must involve all ethnic and socio-economic
groups. Students must reach out to those who are isolated or outcast
among their classmates. Friendship and understanding might be our most
30. See generally TANGELA G. ROE, CONG. RES. SERVICE, SCH. VIOLENCE & SECURITY:
SELECTED REFERENCES (updated October 9, 1997) (citing references related to the problem of
school violence).
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important steps in preventing school violence. Peer support programs can
be among the most effective ways to identify and dissipate conflict.
Lawmakers will listen to students, if students are organized and dili-
gent. I was pleased to see 94 students from Colorado, including some
from Columbine, come to Washington to discuss gun control with mem-
bers of Congress. Their eloquence and commitment made a lasting im-
pression on lawmakers, even on those who disagreed with them or re-
fused to meet with them. Their presence spoke volumes.
G. Health Professionals
The American College of Pediatrics recently asked its members to
talk to young patients about gun availability in the home and to counsel
against using firearms.3 I applaud that action. The United States De-
partment of Health and Human Services and a succession of Surgeon
Generals have argued for years that firearm violence is a public health
problem of epidemic proportions.32 I agree. We need to enlist doctors,
nurses, physician assistants, medical educators, and others to speak out
against firearm violence and to aggressively address the causes of vio-
lence. Addressing poor health, illegal drug use, alcohol abuse, poor diet,
substandard living conditions, poor parenting, and other factors might
eliminate the need or motivation for violence. In addition, we must give
children appropriate psychological services. Many studies show that run-
aways and victims of violence in the home experience a variety of psy-
chological challenges. We need to make certain that such services are
available to children in need and that parents are not afraid to enter their
children in these services.
I have advocated even more research on drug addiction and mental
health services within the National Institutes of Health and the Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. We have a public
duty to support this research and make the results widely available to
parents and the medical community.
H. Law Enforcement Officials
Community policing has proven to be a deterrent to crime, but the
physical presence of police officials in the community is of greater value.
When a police officer is known and respected by neighbors, there is a
greater sense of community and neighborhood pride. Children learn to
admire and to listen to police officers. They also learn respect for the
law. But, in neighborhoods abandoned to criminals, children learn to
admire car thieves, drug dealers, and others who break the law. I know
31. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, AAP Addresses Firearm-Related Injuries Involving Children,
issued April 3, 2000, available at http://www.aap.org/advocacy/releases/aprfir.htm.
32. See, e.g., Louis Sullivan, Violence as a Public Health Issue, 265 JAMA 2778 (1991), and
Antonia Novello, et al., A Medical Response to Violence, 267 JAMA 3007 (1992).
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one friend who lived on Capitol Hill in Washington. He asked his neigh-
bor's child, "What do you want to be when you grow up?" The child
answered, "I want to fence stolen goods, like Bob." Bob was the neigh-
borhood fence. Children need to interact with police officers to see them
as admirable, human, and caring. Otherwise, children will merely see
these officers and the laws they enforce as "the enemy."
I. Community Initiatives
Questions remain about whether these individual and collective ac-
tions are effective. Examples indicate community initiatives are a posi-
tive step in the right direction. In Boston, collaborative efforts among the
clergy, law enforcement personnel, and school officials reduced the
number of juveniles killed by guns from ten a year to zero over an 18-
month period.33 In Los Angeles, comprehensive efforts to reduce gun
violence resulted in the number of homicides dropping by 29.3 percent in
the first six months of 1998 compared to the same six months in 1997. 3
In cities in northern California, an anti-violence alliance between law
enforcement officials and school districts had a startling impact.35 In
Richmond, the number of homicides dropped by 75 percent between
1992 and 1998.36 In Oakland neighborhoods participating in a gun
abatement program, the number of homicides dropped by 50 percent
over a five-year period between 1993 and 1998. 37
J. Weapons Manufacturers
Weapons manufacturers could do much more to ensure safer use of
their product. While no impediment is foolproof, some actions would
make it much harder to use guns to commit violent crime. For example:
* Signature guns could only be fired by the owner whose finger-
prints are recorded in the handle.
* Magazine locks on automatic pistols block the loading mecha-
nism.
* Electromagnetic locks require time delays and personalized
codes.
* Magnetic locks need the owner's special ring to remove the
blocking device inside the grip panel.
* Key locks are cheap and effective, provided the owner keeps the
key away from children.
33. "Child.'s Def. Fund, Lowest American Gun Death Toll for Children Since 1989. 19 CDF
REP., Oct. 1998, at 2.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 16.
36. Id. at 14.
37. Id. at 16.
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* Combination locks are even safer.
Technology might help address many of the issues we confront to-
day. Until we see what kinds of weapons are made in the future, we must
assume that the actions under discussion today will remain relevant for
the foreseeable future. Some claim that so-called "smart guns" are a way
out of the "gun impasse."38 An estimated 500,000 weapons are stolen
every year.39 Smart technology would render these weapons harder, if not
impossible, to use.4
I was pleased to see that Smith & Wesson agreed in March 2000 to a
broad package of safety measures and restrictions on gun sales.41 The
company has agreed to provide, within 60 days, external locking devices
with all the guns it sells.42 They agreed to design handguns within 12
months that children under six cannot readily operate.43 Smith & Wesson
also agreed to include, within 36 months, authorized user technology,
such as fingerprint action in all new model firearms.' This technology
would not include collector and curio types of guns.45
Other gun manufacturers might follow the example set by Smith &
Wesson.46 According to the Washington Post, this is the "first time that a
major player in the nation's gun industry has voluntarily entered into an
accord with the government and accepted specific obligations and re-
strictions in its activities. '47 This responsible and unprecedented move is
most welcome and encouraging. I strongly urge other gun manufacturers
to work to introduce smart technology. Such an action would serve both
their own best interests and those of our children.
CONCLUSION
We face a profound and deadly problem. I fear that we will fail to
address it adequately as a nation. Guns are available, the culture prizes
violence, there is a political blame game, and Congress is unable to pass
adequate measures to halt the flow of guns and ammunition. These fac-
tors indicate that we might lack the will to overcome the powerful forces
that threaten the safety of our children.
38. See Lorraine Adams, Technology: A Way Out of Gun Impasse?, WASH. POST, March 19,
2000, at A3.; and Edward Walsh & David A. Vise, U.S. Gunmakers Strike a Deal; Smith & Wesson
Plans Safety, Sales Steps; Suit Threats Dropped, WASH. POST, March 18, 2000, at Al.








47. Editorial, Smith & Wesson's Smart Move, WASH. POST, March 19, 2000, at B6.
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But, we can have some hope if we can energize and unite our citi-
zens in an unprecedented political force for common sense gun legisla-
tion. Commitment to this objective will require us to find the will, the
courage, and the vision to set aside the differences that divide us. We
must stress the over-riding commitment we have to our children's safety.
We need more than simple, one-dimensional solutions. We need to look
beyond Congress. We need an effort from the entire community.
Aristotle was the first great student of politics. He often discussed
our inherent need to form social institutions and to craft a polity, a politi-
cal institution that involves all citizens. He noted that a polity only works
when it reaches out to every citizen, using the art and skill of each person
and leaving no one behind.48 Aristotle said that a city must be "temper-
ate, and brave, and able to endure." '9 It must have justice, virtue, and
harmony. It must prize rationality and virtue.5° It must do this because
the city must provide a peaceful environment for leisure, philosophy, and
the raising of children.5 Aristotle warned that "anger and wishing and
desire are implanted in children from birth, but reason and understanding
are developed as they grow older."52 So a city must offer protection and
guidance for children, leading them to wisdom and compassion.53 These
goals can be accomplished only when each citizen assumes a responsible
role in the polity. 4
We know that Colorado has become the epicenter of this debate af-
ter the shattering, seismographic events at Columbine High School. We
can emerge from the devastating horror of this event and lead Colorado
and the nation toward a safer, saner environment for our children.
48. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, BK. VII, CH. 15, at 1299
(Richard McKeon ed. & Benjamin Jowett trans., Random House 1941).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1300.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See J. L. ACKRILL, ARISTOTLE THE PHILOSOPHER 155 (Oxford University Press 1981),
and JUDITH A. SWANSON, THE PUBLIC & PRIVATE IN ARISTOTLE'S POL. PHIL. 205-06 (Comell
University Press 1992) (discussing the need for individuals to use the resources of both the public
and private realms for the good of the public order).
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INTRODUCTION
The dramatic increase in the rate of youth violence in the U.S. be-
tween 1987 and 1994 has received considerable attention from legal ex-
perts, public officials, and the national and international press (Zimring,
1998). This increase followed several decades of relatively stable rates.
The proliferation of juvenile gangs and youth involvement in crack co-
caine and handgun use have been suggested as primary factors affecting
the increase in violence in the late 1980s (Blumstein, 1995; Spergel,
1995; Thomberry, 1998).
A welcome reversal of nearly a decade-long trend in rising rates of
youth aggression appeared in 1995. Unfortunately, this decline has been
overshadowed by several recent acts of violence in the nation's public
schools. School shootings have led to renewed discussion of the causes
of violence and of the strategies necessary to prevent the onset of aggres-
sive behavior. Once largely confined to inner-city neighborhoods, vio-
lence has also become an expression of the deep frustration held by some
adolescents residing in middle- and upper-class American suburbs.
No single incident better illustrates adolescent frustration and rage
than the 1999 school shootings in Littleton, Colorado (Brooke, 1999).
On April 20, 1999, two heavily-armed adolescents entered Columbine
High School in Littleton intent on killing students and destroying the
building. The two perpetrators, 17- and 18-year old boys enrolled in the
school, were motivated by a desire for vengeance which they attributed
to the rejection they felt from popular student athletes. Negative racial
attitudes expressed by the perpetrators appeared to be a motivation for at
least one of the murders. The boys' mission ended in suicide and left a
stunned nation searching for answers to explain the magnitude of such a
horrific act.
The aftershock of Columbine has led to myriad responses. Some
elected officials and citizens favor tougher sanctions for offenders; others
* An earlier version of this paper appeared in Jenson, J.M., & Howard, M.O. (1999). Youth
violence: Current research and recent practice innovations. Washington, D.C.: National
Association of Social Workers Press.
** Professor, Graduate School of Social Work, University of Denver, Denver, Colorado.
***" Assistant Professor, George Warren Brown School of Social Work, Washington
University, St. Louis Missouri
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advocate for greater funding to establish broad-based prevention pro-
grams in schools and communities. All agree that far too little is known
about the causes of youth violence.
Violence is difficult to understand. Knowledge of the unique indi-
vidual and social conditions that cause young people to engage in vio-
lence is limited. Even less is known about the way in which these factors
coalesce to create a propensity toward violent conduct. As recent school
shootings illustrate, perpetrators often do not appear to be overtly dan-
gerous to parents, teachers, peers, or neighbors prior to the commission
of a violent act. This makes the prediction and prevention of violent
behavior difficult.
Despite such limitations, there have been important advances in our
knowledge of the causes of youth violence over the past several decades.
Longitudinal studies assessing the effects of broad-based and targeted
prevention programs have also identified promising strategies to prevent
childhood aggression and youth violence. This paper reviews empirical
evidence of risk factors for youth violence and identifies effective ap-
proaches to preventing violence in family, school, and community set-
tings.
A. Understanding the Causes of Youth Violence
Efforts to understand youth violence can be divided into two general
strategies. One approach to explaining violent behavior is case study
analysis. Using historical evidence and witness accounts, a number of
writers have attempted to portray the backgrounds and prior experiences
of violent perpetrators. These detailed analyses and personal accounts
are intended to help readers understand the factors and characteristics in
an individual's life that contributed to the commission of a violent act.
One famous case study analysis is Sereny's (1998) account of Mary
Bell, an intelligent and attractive eleven year-old girl convicted for mur-
dering two toddlers in Newcastle, England in 1968. Sereny's analysis of
Mary's case, based on extensive follow-up interviews with Mary and
others, has received critical acclaim for its careful depiction of the child-
hood abuse experienced by Mary (Sereny, 1998). Sereny's case study is
highly detailed and painstakingly researched. Yet the reader is still left
wondering how the effects of horrific early life experiences and other
predisposing factors coalesced in one young girl at one point in time to
create a murderer.
A second approach to understanding violence assumes a social sci-
ence perspective. Using this approach, investigators seek to identify
broad factors that are consistently associated with the occurrence of vio-
lence in diverse populations. Scientific studies of violence provide less
information pertaining to a specific violent episode or person than do
case studies. Rather, they seek to promote better understanding of the
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factors that contribute to violence among individuals generally. Knowl-
edge of these factors is then used to design empirically-based prevention
and treatment interventions.
There are a large number of studies addressing youth violence in the
social science literature. Unfortunately, the integration of literature
across social science disciplines has been relatively weak. Few interdis-
ciplinary studies of violence have been undertaken. In most cases, re-
searchers have implicitly adopted either a biological or sociological ex-
planatory framework and have ignored other sources of potentially im-
portant factors.
The presence of a poorly integrated literature and consequent utility
for the purposes of designing effective prevention or treatment interven-
tions has led to the development of "risk factor" models of youth vio-
lence (Hawkins, Herrenkohl, Farrington, Brewer, Catalano, & Hirachi ,
1998). The earliest risk factor models were primarily "lists" of the
known correlates of youth violence. These models were adapted from
previous research that identified risk factors for adolescent problem be-
haviors such as substance abuse (Hawkins, Catalano, Miller, 1992) and
delinquency (Hawkins, Jenson, Catalano, Lishner, 1988). Early models
failed to consider the temporal relationship of risk factors to the occur-
rence of violence or to examine the additive and interactive effects of
risk factors. Recent reviews of risk factors for youth violence (e.g.,
Thornberry, 1998) have improved on earlier efforts by limiting their se-
lection of studies to those in which the risk factor clearly preceded vio-
lent offending. Investigators have also conducted longitudinal studies to
better understand the processes by which risk factors influence behavior
over the course of childhood and adolescence (e.g., Loeber, Farrington,
Stouthamer-Loeber, & Van Kammen, 1998).
Risk factors for youth violence are presented by individual, situ-
ational, neighborhood, and community levels of effect below. We begin
our review with a discussion of population indicators associated with
youth violence.
B. Risk Factors for Youth Violence
1. Population Indicators
Variables such as gender and ethnicity are frequently included in
risk factor models. The identification of such characteristics in models
of violence has been the topic of considerable debate. We concur with
Earls (1994) who has argued that it may be inappropriate to consider
factors such as gender, age, or ethnicity as causes of violence or delin-
quency. We, therefore, label such variables as "population indicators"
and include them in this review for the purpose of informing efforts to
identify and help populations at high-risk for involvement in violent be-
havior.
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Gender. Male gender has long-been associated with violence. Offi-
cial arrest records and victim surveys indicate that between 85 percent
and 90 percent of all violent offenders are male (Sampson & Lauritsen,
1994). Males are particularly over represented in robbery, rape, and man-
slaughter rates (Hill & Harris, 1981). Although there is some evidence
for recent reductions in the male-to-female ratios for selected categories
of violent crimes, violence continues to be a predominantly male phe-
nomenon (Sampson & Lauritsen, 1994).
Age. Most violent acts are committed by perpetrators ages 17 to 25,
suggesting that late adolescence and early adulthood are high-risk devel-
opmental periods for violence (Earls, 1994). Arrests for violent crime
peak in late adolescence-early adulthood (Tolan & Gorman-Smith,
1998). In general, violent crime rates among youth 14 or younger are
quite low. Data from the 1990 Uniform Crime Reports for males indi-
cated that only 3 and 8 of every 100,000 youth age 14 or younger were
arrested for murder/nonnegligent manslaughter or rape, respectively.
Thus, most crime appears to be committed during a relatively brief de-
velopmental window spanning mid-to-late adolescence and early adult-
hood.
Race and Ethnicity. Studies using official records, victim surveys,
and surveys of self-reported violence consistently identify racial differ-
ences in rates of violent offending (Hawkins, Laub, & Lauritsen, 1998).
Uniform Crime Reports data indicated that African-American youth con-
stituted 57.7 percent, 44.6 percent, 60.2 percent, and 41.7 percent of all
juvenile arrestees in 1995 for the crimes of murder/nonnegligent man-
slaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault, respectively.
African-American youth comprise 15 percent of the U.S. juvenile popu-
lation, and thus, were substantially over represented in the official arrest
records.
Studies asking youth to self-report violent behavior identify rela-
tively high rates of violent offending among African-American youth
(Elliott & Ageton, 1980), but the black: white differential is usually
smaller than that identified in studies using official records (Elliott,
1994). Victim surveys similarly support significant differences in black:
white rates of violent offending. National Crime Victimization Survey
data indicated that 41% and 51% of juveniles identified by victims were
black and white youth, respectively (D.F. Hawkins et al., 1998).
Despite current contention concerning the role of race in violence
"quite surprisingly, criminologists have conducted only a few studies that
explore the extent to which socioeconomic disparity accounts for the
well-documented differences in rates of violence shown for blacks and
whites" (D.F. Hawkins et al., 1998, p. 40). Further, D.F. Hawkins et al.
argued that purely individual-level theories, which have largely charac-
terized the field to date, have poorly accounted for ecological factors that
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might explain racial differences in rates of violence. In addition to pov-
erty and other macrocontextual factors, situational factors such as drug
trafficking, which flow from macro-level conditions, may explain some
portion of the black-white differential in rates of violence (D. F. Hawkins
et al., 1998).
Socioeconomic Status. A recent meta-analysis of 34 longitudinal
studies of serious or violent delinquency found family socioeconomic
status to be one of the strongest predictors of offending between ages 6-
11, although family socioeconomic status was a much weaker predictor
of offending at ages 12-14 (Lipsey & Derzon, 1998).




African- or Hispanic-American race/ethnicity
Low socioeconomic status
2. Individual-Level Factors
Individual-level factors include biological traits, psychological
characteristics, and family, school, and peer factors.
a. Biological Factors
Heredity. Studies have demonstrated significant differences be-
tween various strains of rodents vis-A-vis aggressive behavior for more
than 50 years. However, the role of genetic factors in human aggression
is much less clear. Early efforts to identify a possible Mendelian mode
of inheritance of aggression were not fruitful nor were studies attempting
to relate violence among some males to the presence of an extra Y chro-
mosome (Miczek, Mirsky, Carey, DeBold, & Raine, 1994). Twin and
adoption studies support a genetic contribution to important tempera-
mental correlates of aggression, although the findings are more compel-
ling for adults than for adolescents. Early twin and adoption studies pro-
vided "strong evidence for a family environment effect on juvenile anti-
social behavior [but later] studies suggest that genetics cannot be ignored
during this period" (Carey, 1994, p. 31).
In summarizing the results of his review of the genetics of violence,
Carey (1994) concluded that "together the data do not support a strong
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role for heredity in violence. On the one hand, the positive correlations
between violence in biological parents and alcohol abuse in adopted sons
and the trends of the twin correlations suggest a genetic effect. On the
other hand, the failure in adoption studies to detect a significant relation-
ship between violent offending and other indices of crime in separated
relatives is evidence that any putative genetic factor is weak" (p. 41).
Moreover, the mechanisms by which genetic effects on violence are
transmitted are highly complex and nonspecific-that is, genetic influ-
ences do not appear to predispose directly to violence, but rather, to anti-
social behavior more generally.
Hormones. The notion that hormonal levels, particularly androgens
like testosterone, are associated with violence among young men is
widespread though controversial. Archer, Biring, and Wu (1998) exam-
ined the findings of eighteen studies via meta-analysis and concluded
that there was a statistically significant positive association between tes-
tosterone levels and direct measures of aggression.
Neurochemistry. The literature addressing the role of neurotrans-
mitters in aggression has grown substantially in recent years. A number
of studies (e.g., Linnoila, DeJong, & Virkkunen, 1989; Virkkunen, De-
Jong, Barko, Goodwin, & Linnoila, 1989) indicate that low levels of
serotonin in the blood or cerebrospinal fluid are related to aggression,
suicide, and impulsivity. Recognition of the role of norepinephrine in the
"flight or fight" reaction has also stimulated research addressing its ef-
fects on violence. In general, investigation of the neuroanatomical and
neurophysiological correlates of youth violence is in its infancy, but may
yield clinically useful findings in the coming decades.
b. Psychological Factors
Numerous psychological and psychiatric characteristics, including
hyperactivity, impulsitivity, and sensation-seeking are associated with
violence.
Impulsivity and Hyperactivity. Childhood hyperactivity is related to
later violence in adulthood (Maguin, Hawkins, Catalano, Hill, Abbott, &
Herrenkohl, 1995). Restlessness, poor concentration, impulsivity, and
risk-taking in childhood also predict later violence (Farrington, 1989 a, b;
Maguin et al., 1995).
Early Aggressiveness and Involvement in Problem Behaviors.
Youth who exhibit aggressive behavior in adolescence are at substantial
risk for continuing this behavior into adulthood (Farrington, 1989 a, b;
McCord & Emsinger, 1995; Olweus, 1977), particularly those with an
early onset of aggressive and delinquent behavior and alcoholism
(Cloninger, 1987; White, 1992).
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Violent adults often have childhood histories characterized by early
engagement in sexual intercourse, drug sales, and other acts involving
overt disobedience and deviance (Farrington, 1989 a, b; Maguin et al.,
1995). Antisocial conduct often occurs in conjunction with deceitful or
manipulative behavior and as an expression of hostility toward authori-
ties (Ageton, 1983; Elliott, 1994; Williams, 1994).
Mental Health. Anxiety, depression and related childhood condi-
tions, such as excessive worrying, appear to be weakly inversely related
to risk for later violent offending (Farrington, 1989 a, b; Mitchell &
Rosa, 1979). Howard, Kivlahan, and Walker (1996) concluded that in-
ternalizing disorders in youth were not related to the age of onset of sub-
stance use, but were associated with the intensity of substance use; thus,
internalizing disorders might have indirect effects on violence through
intensity of substance use.
Characteristics of the social environment are consistently related to
violence. Risk factors from family, school, and peer group settings are
reviewed below.
c. Family Factors
Parental Criminality. Baker and Mednick (1984) found a signifi-
cant positive association between paternal criminality and the likelihood
of later violent offending among young Danish men. Farrington (1989a;
b) noted that parents' arrests prior to their son's tenth birthday were as-
sociated with the son's self-reported and officially recorded rates of vio-
lent crime in early adulthood. However, Moffitt (1987) and McCord
(1979) failed to find an association between parental criminality and
rates of violent offending by offspring. A recent study of risk factors for
gang membership in Seattle identified a significant positive relationship
between parental proviolence attitudes and the likelihood of youth later
joining a gang (Maguin et al., 1995).
Child Abuse and Neglect. Several evaluations suggest a positive,
though weak, association of child abuse with later violent offending
(Smith & Thornberry, 1995; Zingraff, Leiter, Myers, & Johnson, 1993).
Child sexual abuse was found to be inversely associated with the likeli-
hood of later violent offending (Widom, 1989; Zingraff et al., 1993).
Child neglect appears to be more strongly related (positively) to later
violence than child physical or sexual abuse (J. D. Hawkins et al., 1998).
Family Conflict. Domestic conflict among family members is con-
sistently related to youth violence. Marital and family discord were posi-
tively associated with youth violence in studies conducted by Farrington
(1989a, b), McCord, McCord, and Zola (1959), and Maguin et al. (1995).
Parent-Child Interaction and Family Bonding. Several investiga-
tions underscore the protective role of high levels of parent-child inter-
action on youth violence. Farrington (1989 a, b) found that the more in-
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volved fathers were in their son's education at age 18, the lower the like-
lihood of violence by sons at mid-life. Williams (1994) reported that
higher levels of family involvement and interaction when youth were age
14, were associated with lower levels of self-reported violence at age 16.
Few studies have examined associations between family bonding
and youth violence, other than Ageton's (1983) investigation of the ef-
fects of negative family labeling on boys' commission of sexual assaults
between ages 13 and 19. Thornberry (1998) discussed several investiga-
tions indicating that low family involvement (Friedman, Mann, &
Friedman, 1975; LeBlanc & Lanctot, in press) and poor parent-child
emotional relationships (Campbell, 1990; Moore, 1991) increased
youths' risk of joining a gang.
Family Management Practices. Excessively punitive or permissive
parental disciplinary practices are associated with later youth violence.
Authoritarian (Farrington, 1989 a, b), punitive (McCord et al., 1959,
Wells & Rankin, 1988) and aggressive (McCord, 1979) parenting styles
have been implicated in the development of youth violence; conversely,
lax (McCord et al., 1959), passive (Farrington, 1989 a, b), and inconsis-
tent (Maguin et al., 1995) family management practices also increase the
risk of later youth violence. Poor family management practices increase
the risk for gang membership (Moore, 1991; Virgil, 1988; Winfree,
Backstrom, & Mays, 1994), which itself is an important risk factor for
later violent offending.
Other Family Factors. Several other family factors have been asso-
ciated with violence. Leaving home before age 16 increased youths' risk
for later violence in one study (McCord & Emsinger, 1995). Similarly,
childhood separation from one or more parents early in life predicts later
violence among youth (Farrington, 1989 a, b; Henry, Avshalom, Moffitt,
& Silva, 1996; Wadsworth, 1976). Frequency of residential changes by
age 16 was associated with rates of self-reported violence by age 18
among youth participating in a school-based prevention program in Se-
attle (Maguin et al., 1995).
d. School Factors
The many school factors associated with violence include truancy,
dropping out, school failure, low attachment and commitment to school,
number of schools attended, and enrollment in a school attended by a
comparatively large number of delinquents (Denno, 1990; Farrington,
1989 a, b; Maguin et al., 1995). Research indicates that low levels of
commitment to school, poor school performance, and other indicators of
poor adaptation to school demands pose risks for later violence. Studies
of risk factors for gang affiliation identify low academic expectations and
self-esteem vis-A-vis school performance, having gang members as stu-
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dent peers, and educational frustration and stress as important concomi-
tants of gang membership (Curry & Spergel, 1992).
e. Peer Factors
Delinquent peers and siblings increase the risk of later violent of-
fences (Ageton, 1983; Farrington, 1989 a, b; Williams, 1994). Gang
membership, in particular, has potent effects on risks for later violent
offending. Thornberry (1998) observed that rates of youth violence were
high during periods of gang membership, and declined notably following
termination of gang affiliation. The facilitation effect of gang member-
ship on youth violence was not due simply to the effects of associating
with highly delinquent peers, but was largely attributable to the effects of
gang membership per se.
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3. Situational Factors and Macrocontextual
a. Situational Factors
Situational factors, are circumstances that contribute to the onset or
outcome of violent acts. A discussion of situational factors based on the
explanatory framework used in the seminal review by Sampson and Lau-
ritsen (1994) follows.
Perpetrator- Victim Relationship. It has long been recognized that
the victims and perpetrators of violence tend to have common demo-
graphic features and may even be significantly overlapping populations
(Wolfgang, 1958). There are several reasons why violent offending
might increase the risk of victimization, and in turn, why victimization
might increase the risk of violent offending. Victims of violent crime
may retaliate against perpetrators if subcultural norms support such a
response, particularly if they view offenders as unlikely to call, or to be
aided by, the police. Association with other offenders and involvement in
deviant lifestyles, also increases the likelihood of victimization.
Substance Abuse. Substance abuse is commonly associated with
violent events, but the causal nature of the drug-violence relationship is
still a matter of heated debate. Drugs may directly dispose to the com-
mission of violent acts via neurological effects. Conversely, violent
crimes may be committed to obtain funds with which to buy drugs. Be-
cause drug use occurs most frequently in subcultural contexts where
violence is comparatively common (Miczek, DeBold, Haney, Tidey,
Vivian, & Weerts, 1994), some level of association between these be-
haviors would be expected even if they were causally independent.
Whatever the causal association between substance use and vio-
lence, different drugs appear to exert widely varying effects on the pro-
pensity to violence. Miczek, DeBold, et al. (1994) concluded that mari-
juana and hallucinogens do not appear to instigate violent acts. Con-
versely, there is widespread agreement that alcohol abuse is strongly
associated with violence (National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alco-
holism, 1997). Tinklenber and Ochberg (1981) reported, for example,
that 61% of the adolescent homicide offenders they studied were alcohol
abusers.
At present, traditional accounts of drug-use effects suggest that
stimulants, such as cocaine and amphetamines, increase the likelihood of
violence, whereas depressants, such as heroin and benzodiazepines, tend
to decrease violence (Miczek, DeBold, et al., 1994). Studies examining
dose-response relationships and acute versus chronic drug administration
effects in different subject populations are rare in the violence area. Ad-
ditional research on the endocrinological, neurobiological, pharmacol-
ogical, and environmental determinants of drug use, and the effects of
different doses and dosage schedules on different client populations vis-
639
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A-vis violence are needed to better inform current public policy and clini-
cal practice.
Availability of Weapons. The presence of a weapon in a particular
setting, whether held by the perpetrator or potential victim, may signifi-
cantly influence the outcome of an altercation. Lowry, Powell, Kann,
Collins, and Kolbe (1998) examined the prevalence of, and relationship
between, weapon-carrying and physical fighting among more than
10,000 participants ages 12-21 in the Youth Risk Behavior Survey.
Nearly 15 percent of youth reported carrying a weapon in the previous 30
days (23.7 percent of males) and approximately 39 percent had been in a
fight within the past 12 months. Adolescents who carried a weapon were
more likely to have been involved in a physical fight within the past year
than youth who did not carry a weapon. Further, youth who carried a
handgun were significantly more apt, controlling for demographic vari-
ables and frequency of fighting, to have received medical care for fight-
related injuries. Thus, although many youth feel that carrying a weapon
is helpful in avoiding a fight, these data and others (e.g., Cook, 1983;
Saltzman, Mercy, O'Carroll, Rosenberg, & Rhoades, 1992) suggest that
carrying a weapon is associated with a greater likelihood of physical
fighting and injury.
b. Macrocontextual Factors
Macrocontextual factors are characteristics such as poverty and
community disorganization that have the capacity to exert both direct and
indirect influences on violence.
Poverty. Studies of neighborhood poverty and violent crime gener-
ally have reported positive associations. Seminal research by Shaw and
McKay (1942) identified ethnic heterogeneity, poverty, and residential
mobility as important factors explaining variations in Chicago neighbor-
hood delinquency rates. Shaw and McKay (1942) found that neighbor-
hood rates of delinquency remained stable, even following significant
changes in the ethnic populations comprising an area over time. Later
studies further supported an association between indicators of low socio-
economic status and rates of violent crime (e.g., Bensing & Schroeder,
1960; Bullock, 1955, Schmid, 1960). In Chicago, Block (1979) found
that measures of the percent of area families living in poverty or headed
by a woman were significantly associated with neighborhood homicide
and assault rates; similar findings have been reported for other major
metropolitan areas (Beasley & Antunes, 1974; Messner & Tardiff, 1986).
Although findings suggest that community characteristics in gen-
eral, and poverty specifically, are related to rates of violent crime among
youth and adults, they still do "not explain how they are related to pov-
erty and, in turn, how they increase violence. And they do not explain
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why racial differences in violent crimes tend to disappear when poverty
is included as an explanation" (Reiss & Roth, 1993, p. 132).
Population Density. Substantial evidence supports the notion that
population density is positively associated with rates of violent crime.
Areas with a high percentage of housing units that are multiunit dwell-
ings, that have a relatively large number of persons living within a de-
fined area, or a large proportion of rented as opposed to owned, housing
units tend to evidence comparatively high rates of violence.
Residential Mobility. Cross-sectional studies relating levels of
neighborhood residential mobility to violent crime (e.g., Block, 1979;
Smith & Jarjoura, 1988; Sampson, 1985 a, b), and longitudinal studies of
the effects of neighborhood changes on rates of violent crime (e.g., Tay-
lor & Covington, 1988), generally report consistent findings. High rates
of mobility are positively associated with violence victimization rates,
whereas measures of neighborhood stability are inversely related to the
prevalence and incidence of violent events.
Community Disorganization. Several studies suggest that commu-
nity disarray is predictive of increased levels of youth violence. Maguin
et al. (1995) reported that low attachment to the neighborhood and meas-
ures of community disorganization were positively associated with self-
reported violence at age 18. Frequency of exposure to neighborhood
violence and racial discrimination (McCord & Ensminger, 1995) have
also been related to violence among persons in late adolescence and early
adulthood.
Media Influences. Numerous governmental and professional com-
missions have examined the impact of media portrayals of violence
(American Medical Association, 1996; American Psychological Asso-
ciation, 1993; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1991). In
general, "these investigations have documented consistently that expo-
sure to media violence.., contributes to aggressive behavior in viewers
and may influence their perceptions about violence in the real world"
(Smith & Donnerstein, 1998, p. 175).
The most comprehensive examination of media violence heretofore
conducted, the National Television Violence Study (Kunkel, Wilson,
Donnerstein, Linz, Smith, Blumenthal, Gray, & Potter, 1995; Kunkel,
Wilson, Linz, Potter, Donnerstein, Smith, Blumenthal, & Gray, 1996)
conclusively established that modem television in the U.S. is saturated
with violence. A majority (57%) of the more than 5000 programs evalu-
ated over the two viewing seasons contained violence. The violence pre-
sented was largely sanitized; 86% of all violent episodes depicted no
blood or bodily damage and 74% included no punishment or criticism of
violence. Television violence is an important social concern because
youth (and adults) watch so much television; 98% of American homes
have a television and two-thirds of these also subscribe to cable TV
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and/or have a VCR. American 12-17 year-olds watch an average of 20
hours of TV a week, making it one of their principal life activities.
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Summary
Although numerous risk factors for violence have been identified in
prospective, longitudinal studies of youth, including those operating at
the individual, micro, and macrocontextual levels, the study of violence
is still in its infancy. More research and more sophisticated statistical and
methodological techniques are needed to model a phenomenon as com-
plex and multiply-determined as youth violence. However, as the review
above indicates, we do possess enough information currently to argue
that media portrayals of violence should be curtailed and the child-
rearing practices of many parents improved. Prevention and early inter-
vention strategies with youth who are high risk for violent offending and
victimization should be guided by these and other research findings
identified in this review.
C. Effective Violence Prevention Strategies
Risk-factor models of youth violence have a significant utility for
preventing violence. In one application of the model, practitioners iden-
tify risk factors as "intermediate" targets in efforts to reduce youth vio-
lence. For example, our review indicates that poor family management
practices are associated with adolescent violence. Thus, an appropriate
violence prevention strategy might include a parent training component
that improves parents' capacity to effectively discipline their children.
Effective family management skills (the intermediate target) may in turn,
reduce a child's risk for involvement in violence during adolescence.
Longitudinal studies have begun to identify effective violence pre-
vention programs. Effective programs target known risk factors for vio-
lence and strive to empower youth and parents with the social and cogni-
tive skills necessary to make positive and pro-social life decisions. Ef-
fective program types are identified in Table 4 and described briefly be-
low. Comprehensive reviews of these programs are found in Catalano,
Arthur, Hawkins, Berglund, and Olson (1998), Elliott (1999), and
Wasserman and Miller (1998).
1. Prenatal, Early Childhood, and Family Support Programs
Prenatal and infancy home visitation programs provide support to
parents and infants during the first years of a child's life. These programs
target risk factors for violence such as parent-child attachment, family
management skills, and poverty. Interventions such as the Prenatal and
Early Childhood Nurse Home Visitation Program (Olds, Hill, Mihalic, &
O'Brien, 1998) offer in-home services to women during pregnancy and
the first two years following the birth of a child. The program seeks to
improve the health status of women and children by providing parenting
skills to high-risk families. The long-term goal of the program is to re-
duce delinquency, substance use, and violence among children whose
parents received intervention services. Evaluations of the program have
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yielded fewer reports of child abuse and neglect and significantly less
delinquency among participants than among control group subjects (Olds
et al., 1998).
Family support programs such as the Yale Child Welfare Project
(Seitz & Apfel, 1994) seek to enhance attachment between parents and
infants by providing adequate medical, educational, and psychological
services to family members. Program components include routine home
visits with parents and pediatric care, high-quality daycare, and medical
exams for children. Controlled investigations of the program revealed
significantly fewer school adjustment problems and lower levels of
teacher-rated aggression among experimental group subjects than among
control group subjects.
Early childhood education strategies target school risk factors for
violence by involving high-risk children in preschool and academic tu-
toring programs. One of the most rigorously evaluated early childhood
education -programs is the Perry Preschool Program (Schweinhart,
Barnes, & Weikart, 1993). The program includes child enrollment in a
structured preschool program and weekly home visits by preschool
teachers. Longitudinal evaluations of the program have found signifi-
cantly less delinquency and self-reported violent behaviors among pro-
gram participants than among control group subjects (Schweinhart et al.,
1993).
2. School-Based Programs
Anti-bullying strategies seek to reduce and prevent bully and victim
problems in classroom and school settings. Anti-bullying programs target
risk factors of early antisocial behavior and peer rejection by establishing
school norms about the inappropriateness of bullying behavior. Such
programs have increased considerably following school shootings in
Littleton, Colorado and elsewhere. The most widely-used anti-bullying
intervention model is based on a bullying prevention program developed
by Olweus (1991). Evaluations of this Norwegian program revealed sig-
nificant reductions in general delinquency and aggressive behavior
among experimental subjects relative to controls (Olweus, 1991).
Structured school-based prevention curricula for youth and parents
comprise a variety of techniques designed to reduce aggressive behavior
and violence by reducing school risk factors for antisocial behavior.
Programs such as the Seattle Social Development Project (SSDP) (Haw-
kins, Catalano, Morrison, O'Donnell, Abbot, & Day, 1992), Promoting
Alternative Thinking Strategies (PATHS) (Greenberg, Kusche, Cook, &
Quamma, 1995), the Baltimore Prevention Study (Kellam & Rebok,
1992), and Positive Action through Holistic Education (PATHE)
(Gottfredson, 1986) employ structured curricula to enhance academic
performance and increase children's commitment to school. Many pro-
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grams emphasize skill development and strengthening relationships with
pro-social peers. Some programs also teach parents effective strategies
for helping their children to achieve academic success. Evaluations of
these programs have found significantly less aggressive behavior and
higher levels of attachment and commitment to school among experi-
mental subjects than control subjects.
The school organization and classroom management approach, ad-
dressing individual learning styles, classroom structure, and student in-
volvement in decision-making has also been used effectively in preven-
tion contexts. The SSDP has experimented successfully with cooperative
learning, a strategy designed to foster peer-to-peer education. The proj-
ect has also demonstrated success in training teachers how to work with
multiple levels of academic ability in a single classroom. School map-
ping, a relatively new prevention strategy, involves students in a school-
wide process intended to identify the location of violent events in their
school. Following identification, strategies are designed to diffuse the
conditions leading to aggression or violence in specific parts of the
school (Astor, Vargas, Pitner, & Meyer, 1999). Although preliminary
evaluations of mapping strategies appear promising, controlled evalua-
tions of the approach have not yet been conducted.
3. Social, Behavioral, and Cognitive Skills Training Programs for
Children and Parents
Social and behavioral skills training has been used widely in vio-
lence and substance abuse prevention programs. Skills training curricula
use the behavioral strategies of modeling, practice, and reenforcement to
teach children and youth social, consequential thinking, and anger or
impulse control skills. Skills training prevention programs seek to in-
crease youths' cognitive abilities to recognize high-risk situations and to
develop prosocial responses to such situations.
A number of investigators have developed and tested the effects of
skills-based programs on preventing general delinquency, substance
abuse, and aggressive behaviors (e.g., Conduct Problems Research
Group, 1992; Guerra, Eron, Huesmann, Tolam, & Van Acker, 1996).
Among the most tested and effective interventions is Life Skills Train-
ing, a school-based program developed by Botvin and colleagues (Botvin
& Botvin, 1992; Botvin & Eng, 1982; Botvin, Schinke, Epstein, & Diaz,
1994).
Life Skills Training (LST) is a skills-based curriculum designed to
prevent drug use, aggressive behaviors, and other conduct problems in
young children. The LST program was developed to reduce positive sub-
stance use-related expectancies, teach skills for resisting social influ-
ences to participate in deviant activities, and promote the development of
personal self-management and social skills. LST is delivered using tradi-
tional didactic teaching methods, group discussion, classroom demon-
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strations, and cognitive-behavioral skills training. The skills training
component is designed to help students improve communication and
social skills such as initiating social interactions and engaging in conver-
sation. Skills related to boy-girl relationships and verbal and nonverbal
assertiveness are also addressed. A rigorous evaluation of the program
was conducted in a randomized prevention trial with 5,000 seventh-grade
students from 56 schools in New York State (Botvin, Baker, Dusenbury,
Tortu, & Botvin, 1990). Subjects in the experimental group used signifi-
cantly less marijuana and were significantly less likely to engage in
problem drinking and delinquency than subjects in the control group at
28- and 40-month follow-up.
4. Family-Based Programs
Family-based programs go beyond working only with children and
include one or both parents in intervention efforts. Family approaches
typically involve changing parenting practices, increasing parent-child
bonding, reducing family conflict, and developing appropriate parental
attitudes towards violence.
Parent training interventions are one type of effective family-based
prevention program. Webster-Stratton (1998) developed an innovative
program called Strengthening Parenting Competencies that targets moth-
ers and teachers of Head Start children. The first component of the pro-
gram teaches mothers positive discipline strategies and effective parent-
ing skills. Mothers also learn ways to enhance their children's social
skills and prosocial behaviors. The second program component trains
teachers and teacher aides to modify their classroom management to be
consistent with the skills being learned by the mothers. Effects of the
program on parenting competencies, level of parental involvement in
school, and children's social competencies and conduct problems have
been evaluated by Webster-Stratton (1998). Based on self-reported and
observational data, mothers in the intervention group significantly in-
creased their ability to discipline and praise their children and signifi-
cantly decreased their use of harsh and critical behavior, commands, and
negative affect following participation in the program. Teachers reported
significant increases in parental involvement in their children's education
and in contact with school officials. Children in the program significantly
reduced their deviant and noncompliant behaviors, negative affect, mis-
behavior, and antisocial conduct at twelve and eighteen month follow-up.
A second family-based intervention that has received much atten-
tion in the prevention field is the Strengthening Families Program (SFP)
developed by Kumpfer and colleagues (Kumpfer, Molgaard, & Spoth,
1996). SFP offers parent training and children's skill building compo-
nents. Parent training focuses on enhancing positive child behaviors by
increasing attention and reinforcement, setting behavioral goals, and
teaching differential attention, communication, problem-solving, and
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limit-setting skills. The parent program also includes alcohol and drug
education. The children's skills program includes training that targets
understanding feelings and increasing behavioral, communication, prob-
lem-solving, resisting peer pressure, compliance, and anger management
skills. SFP was recently tested in a clinical research trial with middle-
school children and their families in nineteen economically disadvan-
taged counties in rural Iowa (Kumpfer et al., 1996). Significant im-
provements in children's problem-solving ability, emotional status, and
pro-social skills and significant reductions in family conflicts among
participants were reported (Kumpfer et al., 1996).
5. Community-Wide Prevention Programs
Community-wide efforts involving multiple programs and partici-
pants include (a) intensive and sustained programs targeting youth with
demonstrated antisocial behavior; (b) specific but less intensive services
focused on high-risk youth populations; and (c) universal prevention
interventions aimed at the whole community (Mrazek & Haggerty,
1994). Examples of these program types are reviewed below.
One universal community-level prevention program is the Midwest-
ern Prevention Project (Pentz, Dwyer, MacKinnon, Flay, Hansen, Wang,
& Johnson, 1989). Program components include (a) school-based resis-
tance skills training for sixth and seventh graders, (b) homework requir-
ing role-playing between parents and family members, (c) a parent or-
ganization that reviews school prevention policy and trains parents in
positive parent-child communication skills, (d) training sessions for
community leaders involved in prevention, and (e) mass media coverage.
Controlled evaluations of the program have been conducted in forty Kan-
sas City schools and in fifty-seven Indianapolis schools (Johnson, Pentz,
Weber, Dwyer, Baer, MacKinnon, Hansen, & Flay, 1990; Pentz et al.,
1989). Outcomes to date have primarily examined substance use among
participants. Rates of cigarette, alcohol, and marijuana use were signifi-
cantly lower among youth in the intervention group than among youth in
the comparison group after the first year of the project. After three years
of intervention, there were significantly lower rates of cigarette and
marijuana use for the intervention group compared to comparison group
subjects. Additional evaluations of the program's effect on aggressive
behavior and violence are needed.
An intervention that uses a combination of classroom, parent in-
volvement and community-based approaches is Project Northland (Wil-
liams & Perry, 1998). This program was implemented in several small
communities in northeastern Minnesota that were targeted because of a
high prevalence of alcohol-related problems. Twenty-four school dis-
tricts were randomly assigned to either intervention or delayed interven-
tion conditions. This longitudinal study followed the same group of
2,351 students from sixth grade to high school graduation. The first
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phase of the project included three years of behavioral curricula, peer
leadership, parent involvement, and community task forces to initiate
community level changes. At the end of the first three years, the inter-
vention group demonstrated statistically significant reductions in onset
and prevalence of drinking. These effects were attributed to changes in
peer norms concerning the acceptability of underage drinking, parent-
child communication that reinforced non-drinking, increased perceptions
of the adverse consequences of drinking, and increased resistance skills
(Williams & Perry, 1998).
Hawkins, Catalano, and associates (1992) developed a program that
incorporates community involvement in the developmental phases of
prevention. The Communities That Care (CTC) program is a comprehen-
sive community intervention that includes three phases. In phase one,
key community leaders take part in an intensive orientation that intro-
duces them to risk factors for substance abuse and violence. During this
phase leaders become part of an oversight body for the program and are
encouraged to use their knowledge of the community to develop a pre-
vention board. In phase two, prevention board members are trained to
conduct a community risk and resource assessment. Board members
carry out the assessment and then design prevention strategies based on a
menu of approaches that have been shown to be effective in preventing
substance abuse. The third phase involves the implementation and
evaluation of the prevention strategy. Community task forces are in-
volved actively in implementation and evaluation. This model has un-
dergone both pilot testing and implementation in several communities. It
appears that the CTC process works best when there is ongoing and pro-
active technical assistance during the early stages of community mobili-
zation (Hawkins, Arthur, & Olson, 1997). Process evaluations have
shown positive community involvement across all three phases (Manger,
Hawkins, Haggerty, & Catalano, 1992); controlled evaluations are
needed to assess the impact of the approach on violence.
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6. Characteristics of Effective Programs
A number of investigators (e.g., Dryfoos, 1998; Elliott, 1999; Jen-
son & Howard, 1998; 1999) have identified elements that appear to be
present in effective prevention programs. Listed below, these program
characteristics offer a set of guiding principles for family, school, and
community-based efforts to prevent youth violence.
Effective violence prevention programs:
" Target known risk factors for youth violence
* Involve youth, parents, teachers, and community members
* Monitor the implementation of program components
* Use culturally-relevant, gender-specific, and developmentally-
appropriate strategies
" Establish high standards and expectations for staff and partici-
pants
" Provide comprehensive and ongoing interventions
Practitioners and administrators developing youth violence preven-
tion programs should consider these characteristics when designing and
implementing interventions.
CONCLUSIONS
The aftermath of Columbine and other American school shootings
has left a number of unanswered questions about the nature of youth
violence. Among the most compelling questions are those concerning
causes of violence and the identification of effective ways to prevent
violence. What are the individual, social, and environmental factors that
coalesce in young people prior to the commission of a violent act? Can
future acts of youth violence be prevented? This paper has addressed
these questions by reviewing risk factors for violence and identifying
prevention programs that have demonstrated positive effects in prevent-
ing violence.
Risk factor models for understanding and preventing violence offer
a guiding framework for the design and evaluation of universal and tar-
geted prevention programs. Our review suggests that some programs are
successful in reducing aggression, violence, and other problem behaviors
during adolescence. These programs should be replicated in schools and
communities across the U.S.
Prevention is an important component of an overall social policy
designed to reduce youth violence. However, policy directives are also
needed to support a continuum of early intervention and treatment serv-
ices aimed at reducing violence. Policies and enforcement practices to
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protect youth from exposure to media violence and legislation which
reduces youth access to handguns and other weapons must be enacted.
Parent and community involvement in finding solutions to youth vio-
lence should be encouraged. Finally, mental health and social work
services in school settings should be increased to booster prevention ef-
forts and to assist youth who are victims of violence at home or in the
community.
Knowledge of how risk factors for violence interact to create violent
behavior is limited. Additional longitudinal studies examining the devel-
opmental processes associated with violence are therefore a high priority.
Comparative studies of the processes that increase or decrease the likeli-
hood of violence among different ethnic groups should also be con-
ducted. Investigations are also needed to examine causes of violence
among girls and young women.
Public concern about violence has never been greater. The concerted
efforts of practitioners, researchers, legal experts, elected officials, and
the community are needed to continue the constructive dialog about the
causes of youth violence. Understanding and preventing youth violence
must become a long-term aim and overriding priority of politicians, poli-
cymakers, and practitioners if continued progress is to be made in this
area.
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MAKING YOUTH VIOLENCE VISIBLE:
THE NEWS MEDIA AND THE SUMMER OF VIOLENCE
PAUL COLOMY AND LAURA ROSS GREINER*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, youth violence has become a prominent issue on the
public agenda. The president and congressional representatives alike
have proposed legislation targeting juvenile crime. Across the country,
states have made it easier to charge and try juveniles as adults. They have
underwritten the construction of no-nonsense, youth prisons while man-
dating that juvenile courts consider public safety as well as the child's
best interests. At the local level, schools have instituted zero-tolerance
policies, with seemingly minor (or unintended) infractions of the new
rules resulting in immediate suspension or expulsion. For many social
scientists, public intellectuals, and policymakers, the impetus for these
initiatives is painfully obvious: an unprecedented rise in serious youth
crime has propelled this issue into the public spotlight. As Barry Field
notes, "the backdrop for public concerns about youth crime" is the "rapid
escalation in juvenile violence in the mid-1980s, arrests of increasingly
younger juveniles for violence, and especially the dramatic rise in homi-
cide arrests [of juveniles]."'
An increase in serious juvenile offenses is indeed a crucial back-
drop, but it alone cannot account for the heightened visibility of this
problem. We maintain that the news media have played a critical role in
making youth violence a salient public issue. They have not done so by
merely broadcasting numeric data on crime reported to police, arrest
figures, or the results of victimization surveys; rather, the press has
brought attention to this issue by offering continuous and prominent cov-
erage of purported epidemics of youth violence, selectively focusing on
highly unusual incidents, and providing (melo)dramatic accounts of these
atypical cases. Among other things, this pattern of reporting has "democ-
ratized the risk" associated with youth violence, suggesting that anyone
Paul Colomy (Ph.D., UCLA) is professor and Chair of Sociology at the University of
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in American society--regardless of class rank, moral standing, or demo-
graphic profile-is a potential victim.
We substantiate this argument through a case study of the "Summer
of Violence," which occurred in Denver and Colorado during the sum-
mer months of 1993. 3 In response to an apparent upsurge of street crime,
Governor Roy Romer convened a special session of the state legislature
to address the problem of youth violence.4 At the conclusion of this spe-
cial session, Romer signed into law a spate of bills aimed at controlling
what was then perceived as an unprecedented outbreak of serious juve-
nile crime. These measures included what a local newspaper heralded as
a "landmark gun control bill.",6 Another measure established the Youthful
Offender System ("YOS"), a new tier in the correctional apparatus de-
signed to house 480 serious juvenile offenders.7 Both bills signaled Colo-
rado's commitment to a decidedly tougher stance against violent juve-
niles.' As Governor Romer explained during a bill signing ceremony,
"This state is going to be very tough and very disciplined about these
youthful offenders who are professional, tough, repeated [sic], violent,
organized criminals."9
Though the Centennial State was hardly alone in getting tough on
transgressing adolescents, 0 these measures were far from an artless re-
sponse to a plainly evident social problem or the inevitable product of an
irresistible isomorphism. In fact, the juvenile gun control and YOS bills
were, when initially proposed, regarded as dubious propositions." Dur-
ing its regular session, which concluded in mid-May 1993, the state leg-
2. JOEL BEST, THREATENED CHILDREN: RHETORIC AND CONCERN ABOUT
CHILD-VICTIMS 29-31 (1990).
3. See Steve Lipsher, Denver's Summer of Violence, DENV. POST, Aug. 8, 1993, Al
4. See Jennifer Bavin & Steve Lipsher, Gun Bill Passes as Session Closes, DENV. POST,
Sept. 12, 1993, at Al.
5. See John Sanko, Romer Signs 10 Bills to Curb Youth Violence, ROCKY MNTN NEWS,
Sept. 14, 1993, at A12.
6. See Jennifer Bavin & Steve Lipsher, Gun Bill Passes as Session Closes, DENV. POST,
Sept. 12, 1993, at Al.
7. See John Sanko, Romer Signs 10 Bills to Curb Youth Violence, ROCKY MNTN NEWS,
Sept. 14, 1993, at A12.
8. Id.
9. See John Sanko, Romer Signs 10 Bills to Curb Youth Violence, ROCKY MNTN NEWS,
Sept. 14, 1993, at A12.
10. See generally PATRICIA TORBET, ET AL., NATIONAL CTR. FOR JUVINILE
JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME XV (1996)
(discussing the fact that from 1992 to 1995, forty-eight of fifty-one state legislatures (including the
District of Columbia) enacted laws targeting serious juvenile offenders. In all but ten states these
statutes make it easier to prosecute juveniles in adult, criminal courts; in twenty-five states, new
legislation gives judges additional sentencing options to incarcerate young lawbreakers for longer
periods of time; and in twenty-three states new laws created alternative and invariably more punitive
correctional programs for juveniles).
11. See Session in Brief: What Passed and What Died, DENV. POST, Aug. 8, 1993, at A1.
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islature had rejected bills that closely resembled, or were moderate ver-
sions of, these two measures.'" Writing in early August, shortly after the
special session had been announced, but a month before it opened, and
distressed by the likelihood of a fruitless legislative repeat performance,
a reporter predicted that, "Lawmakers will have a sense of deja vu, al-
ready having considered-and killed-many of the issues expected to
come before them again in the special session." The Colorado Assem-
bly had, for example, repudiated a "half-dozen gun control bills," 4 in-
cluding a measure virtually identical to the "landmark gun control bill"
passed four months later in the special session." The prospects for not
merely adding prison cells, but authorizing an entirely new tier in the
correctional system, appeared even more dismal. 6 In the regular session,
the legislature had rebuffed a provision that would have asked voters to
consider a one-quarter cent increase in the state's sales tax to generate
additional revenue for prison construction." Another proposal recom-
mended expanding "the seriously overcrowded Colorado Division of
Youth Services." 8 However, while lawmakers approved the plan, they
refused to fund it, thereby, rendering the legislation an empty gesture. 19
Ironically, a cost-cutting statute approved in the regular session reduced
sentences for some crimes in order to slow the growth of prisons. 2 The
governor, however, was not dissuaded by the seemingly long odds. Intu-
iting a fateful change, he sensed that similar, and even more costly and
controversial, renditions of measures rejected in May were "'more likely
to pass' in September.2 "'There is a different atmosphere now than there
was in the spring when the session was here,"' the governor assured the
worried journalist, and in this altered environment there was "'a much
more radical need for action.'
2
The governor was right. Between May and August, 1993, a signifi-
cant transformation had occurred, and there was mounting pressure on
local and state officials to "do something" about street violence.* The
news media played a crucial role in this transformation. From May 2,
12. Id.
13. See Steve Lipsher, Denver's Summer of Violence, DENV. POST, Aug. 8, 1993, Al.
14. See Session in Brief: What Passed and What Died, DENV. POST, Aug. 8, 1993, at Al.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Proposal to Raise State Sales Tax for Prisons Shot Down, ROCKY MNTN. NEWS,
May 7, 1993, at A20.
18. See, Dick Foster, Lesgisators Block Juvenile Proposal, ROCKY MNTN. NEWS, May 31,
1993, at A 10.
19. See Dick Foster, Lesgislators Block Juvenile Proposal, ROCKY MNTN. NEWS, May 3 1,
1993, at A8.
20. See John Sanko, A Look at the Results of the 1993 Legislative Session, ROCKY MNTN.
NEWS, May 16, 1993, at A28.
21. See Steve Lipsher, Denver's Summerof Violence, DENV. POST, Aug. 8, 1993, Al.
22. ld
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when a baby at the Denver Zoo was struck by a stray bullet23, to August
2, when an elementary school teacher was murdered in a suburban park-
ing lot 4, print and electronic media gave extensive coverage to several
"high profile," violent crimes, a number of which were allegedly com-S • 25
mitted by gang-affiliated juveniles. These incidents becane the center-
piece of an unfolding media event, eventually dubbed "The Summer of
Violence" by the local press, that continued until mid-September when
26lawmakers concluded their deliberations. The unremitting coverage of
this putative crime wave heightened fear of violence, prompting some
residents to flee the supposedly deadly environs of Denver for the allur-
ing (but ultimately elusive) safety of the suburbs. 7 Others organized
marches to "take back the streets" or badgered public officials to "crack
down" on violent youth. This was the "different atmosphere" in which
the governor divined "a much more radical need for action" and con-
vened the special session.
We use content analysis and a qualitative assessment of the print
media's coverage of the "Summer of Violence" to elucidate a crucial
feature of the proximate environment of action in which the call for a
special session was issued. Preceding that analysis and assessment, a
brief theoretical discussion argues that the contemporary media some-
time function, in effect, as a primary claimant group, casting a powerful
spotlight on ostensibly troublesome social conditions. The media's glare
is not, however, always successful in catapulting purportedly problematic
conditions to the forefront of the public agenda. Consequently, we also
examine how the responses of citizens, opinion leaders, and policymak-
ers lent additional credence to media claims about an apparent surge in
youth violence.
II. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST THEORY, THE NEWS MEDIA, AND
THE VISIBILITY OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS
Social constructionist theory, the analytic framework adopted here,
disputes the presumption that social problems are objective conditions
whose "intrinsically harmful or malignant nature, 28 necessarily com-
mands a forceful societal response. This common-sense view is belied by
the prevalence of objectively harmful conditions-e.g., gender inequal-
ity, child abuse, and poverty-that have existed for centuries without
being ratified as social problems. It is more accurate, constructionists
contend, to portray social problems as the result of a process of collective
23. See Steve Lipsher, Denver's Summer of Violence, DENV. POST, Aug. 8, 1993, A16.
24. Id
25. See Steve Lipsher, Denver's Summer of Violence, DENV. POST, Aug. 8, 1993, Al.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Herbert Blumer, Social Problems as Collective Behavior, 18 SOC. PROBLEMS 298 (1971).
[Vol. 77:4
MAKING YOUTH VIOLENCE VISIBLE
definition "in which a given condition is picked out and identified' '29 as
undesirable.
No invisible hand operates in the social problems marketplace 0 to
insure that arrangements and practices posing the greatest threat to the
community or society are pushed to the top of the policy agenda. Instead,
a condition's visibility often reflects the efforts of concerned citizens,
reformers, and/or entrenched interest groups to draw attention to a par-
ticular issue. Highlighting the crucial role mobilized citizens and groups
play in determining "which condition is picked out and identified"'" as a
pressing public issue, sociologists have dubbed these activists "claims-
makers," "claimants," or "social problems entrepreneurs. 3 2 Any single
claimant group must compete for the attention of policymakers and the
public with a large number of other claimsmakers equally adamant about
the pernicious character of a wide variety of different conditions. In this
highly competitive marketplace, an advantage accrues to claimants who
attract the news media to their cause.33 Media coverage often awakens
public concern and lends credibility and legitimacy to claimants' griev-
ances, brings resources and recruits to the claimant group, and pressures•. 34
policymakers to respond to problematic conditions. The media have a
"finite carrying capacity," however, and cannot provide the publicity
sought by all claimants. In the fierce competition for media attention,
resource-rich, social problems entrepreneurs often hire professionals with
expertise in packaging claims for the press,36 while resource-poor claim-
ants are compelled to rely on rhetorical tropes (e.g., atrocity tales,37 sci-
entific evidence, 3' and moral outrage 3 ) or well-orchestrated protests-toelicit media interest.
29. Seeld.at301.
30. Stephen Hilgartner and Charles L. Bosk, The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A Public
Arenas Model, 94 AM. J. OF SOC. 53-78 (1998).
31. See Blumer, supra note 28, at 301.
32. Malcolm Spector and John Kitsuse, Social Problems: A Re-formulation 21 SOC. PROBLEMS
149 (1973); see also MALCOLM SPECTOR AND JOHN KITSUSE, CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL
PROBLEMS 23-31 (1977) (discussing the fundamental tenets of social constructionist theory).
33. JOEL BEST, THREATENED CHILDREN: RHETORIC AND CONCERN ABOUT
CHILD-VICTIMS 14-15 (1990).
34. Id. at 14.
35. See Stephen Hilgartner & Charles L. Bosk, The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A
Public Arenas Model, 94 AM. J. SOC. at 67.
36. See JOEL BEST, THREATENED CHILDREN: RHETORIC AND CONCERN ABOUT
CHILD-VICTIMS 29-30 (1990); see also John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, Resource
Mobilization and Social Movements, 82 AM.J. OF SOC. 1212-1241 (1977) (discussing strategies
employed by professional social movement activists for mobilizing a variety of resources, including
news media coverage).
37. See BEST, supra note 2, at 28-29.
38. See JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, THE CULTURE OF PUBLIC PROBLEMS: DRINKING-
DRIVING AND THE SYMBOLIC ORDER 27-28 (1981).
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The logic of this argument suggests that the construction of .many
social problems depends on a "division of definitional labor."4  The
work begins with "primary claimsmakers, who air grievances about a
variety of conditions in a social problems marketplace. The media then
sift and sort through these competing claims, identifying a small subset
meriting coverage. The media do not simply "repeat primary claims and
transmit them to a larger audience," ' however. These initial claims are
refracted across "the conventions and constraints , inhering in media
organizations, a process that "transforms and translates" 44 the original
grievances into news. In the construction of social problems, therefore,
the media frequently function as a "secondary claimsmaker. 45
Though this division of labor is readily apparent in the construction
of many social problems, there are important instances where the media
46act, in effect, as a primary claimant. Few other claimsmakers can match
the press's ability (or its resources) to define a condition as a matter "war-
ranting public concern ' 47 and official action. Consequently, when acting
as a primary claimant, news agencies play "a crucial role in formulating
public issues and events.4a John Johnson,49 for example, contends that
media-relayed "horror stories"5° about the maltreatment of children "set
the stage for making a public issue of child abuse, '"" while Gladys Engel
Lang and Kurt Lang characterize the press as "a prime mover '5 2 in the
initial expose of the Watergate burglary and attempted cover-ups that,
39. Joseph Schneider, Social Problems Theory: The Constructionist View, 11 SOC. PROB
209-229.
40. See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF 9 (1959).
41. See BEST, supra note 2, at 87.




46. See, e.g., Joel Best, "Road Warriors" on "Hair-Trigger Highways:" Cultural Resources
and the Media's Construction of the 1987 Freeway Shootings Problem, 61 SOC. INQUIRY 327-345
(1991); Mark Fishman, Crime Waves as Ideology, 25 SOC. PROBLEMS 531-543 (1978); Kathleen
S. Lowney and Joel Best, Stalking Strangers and Loves: Changing Media Typifications of a New
Crime, in IMAGES OF ISSUES: TYPIFYING CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 33-57
(Joel Best ed., 2d ed. 1995).
47. See BEST, supra note 2, at 108.
48. See Fishman, supra note 46, at 542.
49. See John Johnson, Media Manslaughter, in 9 STUDIES IN SYMBOLIC INTERACTION
201-208 (1988); see also John Johnson, Horror Stories and the Construction of Child Abuse, in
TYPIFYING CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 17-31 (Joel Best, ed., 2d ed. 1995).
50. Johnson, Media Manslaughter, supra note 21, at 207.
51. ld
52. GLADYS E. LANG & KURT LANG, THE BA'ITLE FOR PUBLIC OPINION: THE
PRESIDENT, THE PRESS AND THE POLLS DURING WATERGATE 302 (1983).
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subsequently, became critical elements in a highly-charged, symbolic
crisis about democratic governance."
III. METHODS AND DATA
Our investigation of the news media's claimsmaking activity in
Denver's (and Colorado's) (1993) summer of violence relies on several
sources of data. We use quantitative content analysis to estimate the sali-
ence of juvenile crime coverage, counting the number of youth and vio-
lent crime stories54 published in the Denver Post" ("Post") during the
summer months (June, July, and August) of 1992, 1993, and 1994. This
coverage is also evaluated in terms of the placement and length of youth
crime articles and the number, placement, and size of photographs ac-
companying these articles.16 This content analysis-presented in the fol-
lowing section-discloses a dramatic surge in the Post's coverage of
juvenile and violent crime during the summer of 1993. To determine
whether the increased coverage simply reflected a corresponding rise in
the incidence of serious crime, we consulted the official monthly reports
of the metro area's two largest police departments (Denver and Aurora)
that are forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and summa-
rized in its annually published Crime in the United States: The Uniform
Crime Report. These monthly reports were used to calculate the amount
of violent crime and the number of juvenile arrests for violent offenses in
these two cities during the summer months of 1992, 1993, and 1994.
The meanings conveyed by the print media's coverage were identi-
fied through a qualitative assessment of recurring themes. This involved
inspecting all youth and violent crime and "summer of violence" stories
printed during the summer months57 oi 1993 in the Post and the Rocky
53. Id.
54. Youth and violent crime articles were identified through the Denver Post Index using
several topical categories: crime, crime prevention, criminal law, criminal sentences, detention
centers, gangs, juvenile delinquency, murder and murder attempts, victims of crime, violent crime,
and violence. Every story in the category of juvenile delinquency was included in the sample. For
the category "gangs," every story was included with the exception of articles describing adult,
mobster gangs. Stories for all other categories were included only if the Index indicated that the
article contained one or more of the following phrases: youth/juvenile violence; youth/juvenile
offender; epidemic of violence; crime wave; town meetings/marches/protests/press
conferences/church sermons on crime/violence; correctional facilities for youth; criminal/juvenile
system and youth; gangs; gang prevention; random violence; reports on
pattems/distributions/trends/rates of crime/violence; fear of crime/violence; and
funds/resources/personnel allocated to crime/violence prevention programs.
55. We selected the Denver Post because it had (in 1993 and today) the largest circulation of
any newspaper in the state.
56. We focus on youth and violent crime because this topic, more so than any other, fueled
local media coverage of the summer of violence.
57. This analysis revealed that the summer of violence, as portrayed by the local media,
actually commenced on May 2, 1993, when an infant visiting the Denver Zoo was struck by a stray
bullet. See Steve Lipsher, Denver's Summer of Violence, DENV. POST, Aug. 8, 1993, 16A.
Consequently, our exploration of news themes begins with the "zoo shooting" in early May and
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Mountain News ("News")-both mainstream, highly competitive, daily
newspapers published in the Denver metro area and circulated through-
out the state-and probing these reports for their manifest content and
latent symbolic codes.58 Interviews with 23 reporters, columnists, and
editors 9 involved in writing about youth crime for the two papers during
the 1993 summer supplemented the qualitative assessment of news
themes. While recognizing that media accounts are polysemic and sub-
ject to divergent interpretations by various audiences, we designed these
interviews to elicit the "preferred meaning[s] and point[s] of view" re-
porters were "inviting" their readers to accept.6° The interviews were
semi-structured and organized around two dozen, open-ended questions
we had prepared before meeting with reporters. We often asked respon-
dents for clarification and elaboration, and consequently most interviews
had a conversational quality, requiring from twenty minutes to two hours-
to complete. We also interviewed three local television reporters, a local
talk-radio show host, and a reporter employed by Westword, an alterna-
61tive Denver newspaper.
IV. CONTINUOUS AND PROMINENT COVERAGE OF YOUTH AND VIOLENT
CRIME
Newspapers are divided into sections and pages, and placing a story
on a specific page and section-like the decisions about a story's appro-
priate length and whether it should be accompanied by a photograph-
reflects a professional judgement about the story's newsworthiness. And
since journalists place a premium on novelty, frequent reports about the
same issue-particularly when they appear on the paper's front pages
and its editorial section-also signal an assessment about the issue's sig-
nificance. When the press plays, in effect, an initiating role in identifying
a pressing public problem it typically does so by devoting continuous
concludes with the closing ceremonies of the Colorado General Assembly's Special Session on
Youth Violence in mid-September, 1993. See John Sanko, Romer Signs 10 Bills to Curb Youth
Violence, ROCKY MNTN NEWS, Sept. 14, 1993, at A12.
58. We also acquired footage of a local television station's coverage of several violent crimes
featured in both print and electronic media reports during the summer of violence. Our discussion of
news themes occasionally draws on this televised coverage.
59. Though we interviewed reporters, columnists, and editors, we will subsequently
characterize all respondents generically as either journalists or reporters. We do this to protect the
confidentiality we promised those who spoke to us. Similar concerns preclude using gender, age,
race, or ethnicity to describe particular reporters.
60. William A. Gamson, ET AL., Media Images and the Social Construction of Reality, 18
ANN. REV. SOC. 388 (1992).
61. For a related project, we conducted interviews with five high-ranking officials in the
Denver (and Colorado) juvenile justice systems; a half-dozen metro area, law enforcement officers;
two members of the Denver mayor's administration; three members of the Colorado Governor's
administration; two Denver gang intervention workers; and four state legislators. We occasionally
draw on these interviews to clarify and extend our interpretation of the print media's coverage of the
summer of violence.
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and prominent coverage to a particular issue. This was clearly the case in
Denver (and Colorado) during the summer of 1993, when both the print
and electronic media gave extensive coverage to the problem of juvenile
and violent crime.
Table One presents data generated from a content analysis of the
Denver Post (hereafter the Post), the newspaper with the largest circula-
tion in Denver and Colorado. These data indicate that, depending on the
particular indicator employed, juvenile and violent crime received from
two to over ten times more coverage in the Post during the 1993 summer
than in either the previous or subsequent summer. For example, with 196
stories on youth violent crime, the 1993 summer clearly outpaced both
the 1992 summer, during which 73 such articles were published, and the
1994 summer's publication of 61 stories. In addition, 44 front page sto-
ries on juvenile and violent crime were published during the summer of
1993, while in the summers of 1992 and 1994 only 2 and 6 such stories,
respectively, made the front page. Editorials about youth and violent
crime were also much more common during the 1993 summer; similarly,
the juvenile and violent crime articles printed in the 1993 summer were
more likely to be accompanied by photographs, and these photographs
were much more likely to appear on the front page.
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TABLE 1 - NUMBER, PLACEMENT, AND LENGTH OF YOUTH AND
VIOLENT CRIME STORIES AND ACCOMPANYING PHOTOGRAPHS




Total stories 73 196 61
Front page stories 2 44 6
Section A stories 2 73 10
Editorial page stories 3 48 5
Length of all stories' 1512.65 5606.87 1615.98
PHOTOGRAPHS
Total photographs 29 106 32
Front page photographs 0 32 3
Length of all photographsb 177.89 1153 495.89
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The extensive news coverage of youth and violent crime in the
summer of 1993 was not due to a dramatic rise in the incidence of seri-
ous offenses. We consulted the official monthly reports of the Denver
metro area's two largest police departments (Denver and Aurora) that are
forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and summarized in its
annually published Crime in the United States: The Uniform Crime Re-
ports. We used these monthly reports to calculate the amount of violent
crime and the number of juvenile arrests for violent offenses in these two
cities during the summer months of 1992, 1993, and 1994. The reports
disclose a small but unspectacular upturn in violence during the summer
of 1993. In the 1993 summer, Denver and Aurora police recorded two
more homicides than they did in the summer of 1992 and three more than
in the summer of 1994. The number of non-lethal, violent offenses (i.e.,
forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault) in the summer of 1993 were
approximately 3.5% higher than in the 1992 summer and roughly 5% to
10% higher than in the 1994 summer. It appears highly improbable,
however, that this modest increase in serious crime (including the slight
increment in homicides) during the 1993 summer can fully account for
the remarkable surge in media coverage which occurred that summer.
The available data on juvenile (which both Denver and Aurora po-
lice departments defines youth under 18-years-old) arrests belie the no-
tion that the metro area experienced an explosion of youth crime in the
1993 summer. The monthly reports indicate that 5 juveniles were ar-
rested by the two departments for homicide in the 1992 summer; 2 in the
1993 summer; and 1 in the 1994 summer. During the summer of 1992,
Denver and Aurora police arrested 128 juveniles for other serious, non-
lethal violent offenses; 159 juvenile arrests were made for these offenses
in the 1993 summer, while in 1994's summer 186 juveniles were arrested
for these crimes. This steady increase in juveniles arrested for serious,
non-lethal crimes coupled with the steady decline in juveniles appre-
hended for homocide over the three summers stands in stark contrast to
the undulating pattern of media coverage, with the relatively small num-
ber (and low priority) of news articles published in the summers of 1992
and 1994 interrupted by the dramatic spike of prominent juvenile crime
stories in 1993.
V. NARRATING THE SUMMER OF VIOLENCE
Like the sheer volume of salience of media coverage, the actual
content of reports written and broadcast during the 1993 summer height-
ened the visibility of juvenile violence. Journalists narrated an unfoldling
story, drawing meaningful, Gestalt-like links between what could easily
be construed as unrelated or merely coincidental crimes and articulating
general, overarching themes that attempted to make sense of the sum-
mer's violence. Four themes were central to the media's narration of the
summer of violence: innocent victims, unprecedented violence, en-
croaching violence, and random violence.
2000]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Innocent victims. The perceived innocence of select victims injured
or killed by gun-toting assailants, many of them allegedly juveniles, was
the anchoring theme in the media's coverage. Seven high profile violent
crimes, which received front-page coverage immediately after they oc-
curred and, subsequently, were frequently mentioned, and briefly reca-
pitulated, in reporters', columnists', and editorial writers' summary char-
acterizations of the summer's violence, figured prominently in the elabo-
ration of this theme. In four of these incidents, children, ranging in age-
from ten-months to six-years, were victimized. In the other cases, four
"exemplary adults" were killed or seriously injured.
The Denver press presented these crimes in graphic detail, convey-
ing, to the extent that words, photographs and videotape can, their de-
structive immediacy. Reporters described how a woman stood by help-
lessly as her husband was murdered and moments later, after "falling to
her knees," suffered a "savage beating" that caused her head to swell to
twice its normal size.62 They described how a bullet struck a young boy in
the cheek and traveled to the back of his throat,6 ' and how a man, shot in
the side three times while driving home in the early morning hours, died
after his car stopped on a corner lawn. 64 Journalists offered their de-
scriptions of these crimes as eye-grabbing and gut-wrenching illustra-
tions of the problem of street crime.
The victims' cultural-moral status made the violence appear even
more ominous. Unequivocally innocent victims of street crime are rare.
Many victims contribute, unwittingly or not, to the sequence of events
that results in their injury or death, and they are not easily differentiated
from those who attack or kill them.6' Reporters are keenly attuned to
moral character, and estimates about a victim's moral standing figure into
their calculations about a crime's newsworthiness. In journalists' eyes, the
children and adults attacked in the high profile cases closely approxi-
mated the folk concept of the "ideal victim:" 66 these victims were inno-
cent not merely in a technical, legal sense, but in a morally and socio-
logically compelling sense. The media were particularly sympathetic to
the child victims, who they regarded as morally pure and whose victimi-
zation qualified as eminently newsworthy. As one reporter told us,
The children. That was why there was so much coverage [of
violent crime in the summer of 1993]. Little kids getting shot and
62. DENVER POST, July 24, 1993, at IA, 15A; DENVER POST, July 31, 1993, at 18A; ROCKY
MNT NEWS, July 24, 1993 at I A, 2A, 4A; ROCKY MNT NEWS, July 28, 1993 at 16A.
63. See Stacey Baca et al., 2 Tots Wounded, DENVER POST, July 28, 1993, at IA.
64. See Stacey Baca & Marilyn Robinson, Shots kill man driving in Park Hill, DENVER POST,
July 29, 1993, at IA.
65. NILS CHRISTIE, The Ideal Victim, in FROM CRIME POLICY TO VICTIM POLICY:
REORIENTING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 17-30 (Ezzat A. Fattah ed. 1986); David F. Luckenbill, Criminal
Homicide as a Situated Transaction, 25 SOC. PROBS. 176-186 (1977).
66. See Christie, supra note 65.
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killed. That put [violence] on an entirely different level. Innocent
blood. That's a tabloid statement, but it's true... Children and animals
are innocent. It brings outrage when this type of thing is done to in-
nocents.
Given the reigning Western conception of childhood, 67 the young
victims' moral innocence could simply be assumed, both by the press and
the public. The moral standing of the adult victims, however, could not
be taken for granted, and some interpretive work was required to affirm
these men's and women's innocence. Quoting liberally from testimonials
offered by these victims' families, friends, and colleagues, reporters con-
structed idealized mini-narratives attesting to these adults' exemplary
character. For example, neighbors described an adult victim "as 'easy-
going' and 'as nice as can be. ' 68 He volunteered as a Big Brother, and a
friend recollected an occasion when he "had taken one of his charges to
buy fishing equipment. The kid swiped some items. [The man] forced
him to go back into the store, return the stolen goods and apologize.
Then he bought the kid the stuff he stole., 69 His boss described him as "a
gentle guy who was very dependable and was the most likable cable
marketer he ever had. 70
The press used "typifying examples" to portray the high profile in-
cidents of violence.7' In fact, the victims described by the Denver media
were socially and demographically strikingly different from the majority
of those injured or killed in Colorado during the summer of 1993. Statis-
tically, the "average victim of youth violence" was "a Hispanic male,
17.7-years-old," who was also a gang member, "a high school drop out,
and [himself] a perpetuator of youth violence.7 2 The four child victims'
ethnicity and race -- three were Latino, the other African American --
were similar to the average victim (73% of those victimized by juvenile
violence were either Latino or African American), but the children dif-
fered markedly along nearly every other meaningful social attribute. The
four exemplary adults, who ranged in age from 27 to 43 and who were
all white, middle-class, college-educated, and residing in purportedly
"good" city neighborhoods or in "nice" metro-area suburbs, were also
starkly unrepresentative of those most likely to be victimized by street
67. See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD (1984).
68. Lynn Bartels, Slaying shocks Park Hill: Residents say they realize they can't run from crime,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 30,1993, at 16A.
69. John C. Ensslin, Wife mourns 'best friend,' Park Hill man found slain also 'fishing
buddy,' she says, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 31, 1993, at 5A.
70. Ed Morrow & Marilyn Robinson, Slaying Part of Violent Scene, DENVER POST, July 30,
1993, at IA.
71. See BEST, supra note 2, at 28-29 (describing how journalists start stories with examples to
define the problem of violent crime, draw the reader's attention, and "shape perceptions of the
problem").
72. Greg Lopez, Average victim leaving the cycle of gang violence, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
Dec. 19, 1993, at 45A.
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violence. The media gave little attention to the statistically average vic-
tims, while granting exhaustive coverage to these ideal victims. Conse-
quently, despite their singular character, high profile incidents power-
fully shape the community's and official's "perceptions of the problem"
of youth violence.73
Unprecedented Violence. Though lacking corroborating statistical
data, the local media claimed that violence in Colorado was rising at an
alarming rate during the 1993 summer. In the place of credible numeric
evidence, journalists buttressed this claim by turning to presumably
knowledgeable public officials and, uncritically quoting and paraphras-
ing their remarks, passed off their rough approximations and instinctual
impressions as fact. In the wake of the first high profile crime which oc-
curred in early May, 1993, the Denver police chief, while conceding that
he did not have statistical proof, nonetheless told reporters that "he be-
lieves violence is on the rise in Denver .... ,,7' Drawing on interviews
with several officers and gang intervention workers, a front-page article,
entitled "Police: Violence escalating," asserted that the number of guns
possessed by juveniles, the number of drive-by shootings, and the num-
ber of gang members were all on the rise. 5
Reporters kept a running tabulation of the high profile cases, a form
of counting that, unlike a single summary statement of the crime rate,
justified meticulous accounts of each new incident. Explicitly connecting
each high profile event to the others, this running tab also implied that
they cohered into a meaningful pattern and that the summer's violence
represented something greater than the sum of its individual crimes. For
instance, an article reporting the shooting of a six-year-old began, "[y]et
another young child was fighting for his life last night .... 76 Similarly, a
story about the killing of an elementary school teacher opened with the
line, "[i]n what has become a deadly ritual in the metro area, yet another
",77innocent victim was fatally shot ....
Using disquieting imagery and analogies, reporters dramatized the
threat that violence posed to the city and state. For example, medical
personnel interviewed by the press analogized the city's and state's street
crime to international and civil wars. A Denver trauma surgeon com-
pared "the recent sharp increase in [violent] incidents" to "a battle zone,"
adding that, "'[t]his is like Korea . . .. , Other reports insinuated that
73. See Best, supra note 2, at 28-29.
74. Christopher Lopez, Mayor urged to organize a task force, DENVER POST, May 5, 1993, at IA.
75. See Marilyn Robinson. Police: Violence escalating, DENVER POST, June 11, 1993, at IA.
76. Steve Lipsher, Park Hill boy wounded in head, DENVER POST, June 10, 1993, at IA.
77. Marilyn Robinson & Tracy Seipel, Teacher, 27, slain driving in parking lot, DENVER POST,
Aug. 3, 1993, at IA.
78. Ann Schrader, Trauma surgeon finds himself in 'battle zone', DENVER POST, June 11,
1993, at IA.
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Denver was a city under siege. One of these articles appeared beneath the
heading, "City a hostage to violence?" '79 A full page editorial about Den-
ver's street violence was entitled, "Under Siege: Living with barbarians at
the gate." 80 Other journalists characterized the summer's violence with
such emotionally-charged images as "urban terrorism,"'" "a seemingly
endless, senseless plague of wanton violence,"82 and a "city ... teetering
on the edge of a murderous abyss."83
Characterizing the high profile victims not only as individuals but
also as symbols of community life, the press alluded to another dimen-
sion of the summer's ostensibly unprecedented violence. Durkheim's
classic analysis of Aboriginal totems and other religious objects notes
that they are "among the most preeminently sacred things," and, as a
result, are bound up with "the collective fate of the entire clan. '" 4 In the
summer of 1993, the local media transfigured the child and adult victims,
in their injuries and deaths, into emblems of Denver's and Colorado's
communal life. For instance, after applauding the "overwhelming" public
response to "the bounty fund" he had established to "persuade someone
to turn in the punks who shot a 6-year-old boy," a columnist explained
the child's totemic status:
You [those who contributed to the fund] understood that the
moment that bullet penetrated [the boy's] brain he became all of our
sons, all our children, brown and yellow, pink and red, rich and poor.
He was our hope for a better tomorrow, our dreams and our as-
pirations for a better world. And you understood we couldn't sit by
85
passively while the thugs stole that from us.
With the media spotlight brightly focused on the high profile cases,
reporters suggested that what distinguished the summer of violence was a
succession of assaults against cherished icons. The media intimated that
these desecrations constituted "a disaster, the greatest misfortune that can
befall a group., 86 Amplifying the language of communal crisis, disorder,
and dissolution, journalists conveyed the notion that transgressions
79. Lopez, supra note 74.
80. Clifford D. May, Under Seige: Living with barbarians at the gate, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
Aug. 8, 1993, at 86A.
81. Diane Carman, Urban terrorism requires more than just cops, prisons, DENVER POST, July 31,
1993, at IE.
82. Craig Bowman, Violence begins before the gun is ever drawn, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug.
12 1993, at 62A.
83. Ken Hamblin, Where are our leaders as Denver dies?, DENVER POST, Aug. 5, 1993, at 9B.
84. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMs OF REUGIOUS LIFE 118,120 (1995).
85. Ken Hamblin, Fund targets punks who shot Broderick Bell, DENVER POST, July 13, 1993, at
7B.
86. See DURKHEIM, supra note 84, at 120.
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against a community's quintessentially sacred objects represent, symboli-
cally, "a retrogression to chaos."87
Encroaching Violence. During the summer of 1993, news agencies
regularly remarked on the apparent movement of violence from the
"streets" to purportedly idyllic social space. The media frequently joined
this sense of encroaching violence to the distinction many make between
ostensibly "good" and "bad" parts of town, and the complementary ex-
pectation that serious, violent crime will be concentrated in a commu-
nity's less reputable areas. Journalists hold a similar folk concept, tend-
ing to regard as commonplace the violence that occurs in what is re-
garded as the socially disorganized inner-city. More novel and news-
worthy is the presence of street crime in presumably "nice" residential
neighborhoods or sacrosanct public space.
Reports elaborated the notion of violence invading safe, inviolate
space, suggesting that violent crime had escaped its traditional confines
and was erupting in urban enclaves and suburban areas that heretofore
had been relatively unscathed by street violence. A state legislator, re-
flecting on the summer's shootings, succinctly summarized this senti-
ment: "'I think we assumed for a long time that some neighborhoods are
safe and some aren't .... We can't assume that anymore."'88 This invidi-
ous differentiation of inner city and suburban space infused newspaper
and television coverage of several high profile cases. At the same time,
the more generalized motif of violence radiating from corrupt centers to
pristine peripheries appeared in stories decrying the spread of street vio-
lence from Denver to its suburbs and smaller cities throughout the state.
Press reports noted that drive-by shootings had occurred in Colorado
Springs, Durango, and Grand Junction. 9
The juxtaposition of encroaching violence with morally coded con-
ceptions of social space was reiterated in other ways. Several articles
deplored the spread of street violence to revered social institutions, in-
cluding churches and schools, once regarded as sanctuaries safely se-
questered from the tumult and dangers of the profane world. The Denver
zoo is not a sacred place, but its representational value as an emblem of
civic pride and its powerful association with family outings renders it a
potent symbol of public space. An editorial characterized the shooting of
an infant, who was sitting in front of the zoo's celebrated polar bear ex-
hibit, as a riveting reminder that no public or private space or institution
is inviolate:
87. Mircea Eliade, The Sacred And The Profane: The Nature Of Religion 47-48 (Willard R.
Trask trans., 1959).
88. Jennifer Gavin & Marilyn Robinson, Romer urges fast action by lawmakers to halt
violence, DENVER POST, July 28, 1993, at 13A.
89. Jennifer Gavin, Romer says not just guns on agenda, DENVER POST, June 23, 1993, at IA.
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[T]he bullet that sent the youngster to Denver General Hospital.
•. could serve as a metaphor for how violence robs this city's soul of
its collective peace. . . .No citizen is safe anywhere as long as a
predilection to violence remains prevalent. . . .Drive-by shootings
can happen anywhere an automobile can travel, and that includes any
street in the core -city or its suburbs. Gangs, drugs, and guns can infest
any school, whether it is located in the inner city or in an upscale en-
clave. The failure of the city, the state, and the nation to cope with
violence has come to haunt every comer of society -- even the polar
bear exhibit at the local zoo.90
Random Violence. Continually pointing to the seemingly unpredict-
able character of the seven high profile incidents, reporters suggested
that random violence threatened the entire community. Underscoring this
theme, one article observed, "[w]ith tiny children shot, men murdered,
women beaten and the specter of random violence taking center stage
this summer, Denver residents say they're wary but not terrified.' 9' Sev-
eral distinct meanings attached to the theme of random violence, but per-
haps the most salient was its unpredictable or patternless character, the
unnerving sense that "anyone could be the next victim. ' 92 A local talk-
radio host emphasized this element of random violence:
[the violence occurring in the summer of 1993] wasn't predictable. It
could happen anywhere for no apparent reason, all of a sudden, out of
the blue. People don't like that. If you've got a problem that people
can identify and isolate, then they can adjust to it. You can't adjust to
random violence.
The threat of random violence becomes psychologically salient only
when the perception that "anyone could be the next victim" is interpreted
as meaning "the next victim could be me or someone close about whom I
care." Personal identification with recent, actual victims of apparently
random violence fostered this heightened sense of vulnerability. The
print media suggested that many citizens identified strongly with one or
more of the victims described in the high profile cases. For example,
shortly after the shooting at the zoo, a reporter interviewed a 14-year-old
relaxing in City Park, which is immediately adjacent to the Denver Zoo.
The boy said, "[m]y mom's starting to worry about me. She's real hyper
about this, real hesitant since the gun shots. She says that little kid [who
was shot at the zoo] coulda [sic] been me." 93
Several of the journalists we interviewed remarked that the high
profile incidents supplied readers with abundant opportunities for intuit-
90. Zoo Shooting is tragic metaphor for violence, DENVER POST, May 4, 1993, at 6B.
91. Mark Eddy et a., Denver neighborhood abuzz with caution, but not terror, DENVER POST,
Aug. 1, 1993, at 4C.
92. Al Knight, First a diagnosis, then a cure, DENVER PoST, Aug. 8, 1993, at ID.
93. Kevin Simpson, A walk in the park: 'Put the angels around you and pray', DENVER POST,
May 6, 1993, at lB.
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ing connections between themselves, or their immediate social circle,
and the victims. Proximity, whether calculated in terms of sheer physical
space or social networks, frequently elicits identification with a victim of
crime. As one reporter said, "[wihen it's somebody that your mother
knows or it's two blocks from your home and he got shot in your neigh-
borhood, suddenly it could be said, 'That could be me.'
Common social and demographic attributes, like age, class, ethnic-
ity, race, gender, and marital status, can spark a vivid recognition of the
self-in-the-other. The media portrayed the "savagely beaten" wife and
her murdered husband as a dynamic, popular, loving and handsome
young couple, recently married with a newly acquired apartment of their
own, and working hard to launch a successful business venture. They
embodied a social identity and trajectory which mirrored the aspirations
of many young adults in Colorado while eliciting the nodding approval
of older residents.
One can hypothesize that the print media's idealized representations
of victims resonated with the way many people like to think about them-
selves and encouraged members of the public to see a crucial similarity
between themselves and the high profile victims. The following conjec-
ture, ventured by a reporter, describes the folk reasoning that may have
connected readers to Ann Temple, the slain elementary school teacher:
[a] teacher, who is from [a small mountain town, roughly 75 miles
west of Denver], comes down to take a job in Denver. And it's her
dream to teach in the school and everything. And she is staying with a
girlfriend. She goes out to dinner and then drives to Safeway and gets
something. And some gang members scope her and kill her in a
parking lot as they try to rob her pocketbook. So here is another inno-
cent victim, like you and I, killed in quote our safe neighborhoods of
Denver. (Emphasis in original).
VI. BEYOND DELINQUENCY: ARTICULATING A NEW TYPE OF
TRANSGRESSING ADOLESCENT
The press's narration of the summer of violence identified the agents
and conditions allegedly responsible for "the mayhem," highlighting the
culpability of a purportedly new type of young lawbreaker. Relying
heavily on interviews with select state legislators, juvenile court judges,
public defenders, and district attorneys, the print media distinguished the
juveniles blamed for the summer's violence from conventional delin-
quents. In fact, the word "delinquent" rarely appeared in news reports. In
the over 500 youth and crime stories published by the Denver Post and
the Rocky Mountain News between May and mid-September 1993, the
terms delinquent and delinquency appear less than two dozen times.
When employed, these words were dubbed anachronisms. Reporters im-
plied that "delinquent" and "delinquency" conjured up forms of adoles-
cent transgression characteristic of an earlier, more innocent time. Play-
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ing cultural entrepreneur, reporters coined dozens of clever catchwords
to characterize the ostensibly new type of juvenile offender. They de-
scribed them as "criminal kids," "kid gangsters," "hard-core juvenile of-
fenders," "scary and dangerous youths," "young thugs preying on their
fellow citizens," "the state's nastiest young felons," "kids doing the
criminal work of adults," "greedy, self-serving, predatory street punks,"
"an infestation of teenage evil," and "tiny terrorists."
A rough sketch differentiating this hyper-threatening juvenile from
the traditional delinquent complemented the slogans. First, this invidious
comparison held that the new breed of youthful offender committed more
serious crimes and engaged in more chronic lawbreaking, whereas delin-
quents of the past engaged in more trivial acts of rebellion.
94
A second contrast underscored the youthful offenders' debased
moral character. In the early decades of the twentieth century, Denver
had been the site for a remarkably compassionate characterization of the
delinquent.9 Consistently affirming the delinquents' basic humanity and
fundamental child-like innocence, Judge Ben B. Lindsey, the leading
figure of the early Denver juvenile court, passionately proclaimed that
the sins of young lawbreakers paled in significance when compared to
the sins committed against them by negligent parents and/or a corrupt,
hypocritical social order. In the summer of 1993, the Denver media re-
pudiated this sympathetic conception of transgressing youth as senti-
mental, mushy-headed nostalgia. As an influential state representative
observed,
'[wie have a tendency to believe the Father Flanagan/Spencer Tracy
'Boys' Town' thing, that there's no such thing as a bad boy. But that's
a movie. Our reality today is that Spencer Tracy wasn't right.'
96
The governor's chief legal counsel added that "'really bad kids"' exist.
97
Lacking essential moral attitudes and emotions, these bad kids
struck journalists and public officials as not quite fully human. Denver's
chief juvenile court justice told a reporter, "'I see, in the youths who are
appearing in court, a lack of valuation of life, a lack of respect for life...
some scary, scary kids."'98 News articles reported that the contemporary
young offender is incapable of empathy or compassion. A former public
94. See Open up Juvenile Records, The Issue: The Arrest Records of Juveniles, Our view: It's
time they were opened to the public, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug. 4, 1993, at 32A.
95. Paul Colomy & Martin Kretzmann, Projects and Institution Building: Judge Ben B.
Lindsey and the Juvenile Court Movement, 42 SOC. PROBS. 191, 199 (1995).
96. Fred Brown, Majority favors banning guns from juveniles, DENVER POST, July 12, 1993,
at IA.
97. Clifford D. May, Kids and crime, What can special session do to solve Denver area's
dilemma?, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 5, 1993, at 93A.
98. Jennifer Gavin, New breed of juveniles test legislative action, DENVER POST, Sept. I,
1993, at IF.
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defender observed that, "'[t]here is just a different attitude among the
kids now. It's not just that they have no social conscience. It's almost like
there is no morality. There is not any feeling toward other people."' 99
Third, the News and the Post reconceptualized the link between age
and crime. In the traditional conception of delinquency, age largely dic-
tated the meanings assigned to children's and adolescents' violations of
criminal law. This concept held that juveniles committed delinquencies
not crimes. In the 1993 summer, press stories and editorials reckoned
that by virtue of committing serious crimes, exuding contempt for human
life, and exhibiting not "one iota of emotion or remorse"'' ° for what they
have done, contemporary youth who are chronologically juveniles forfeit
any legitimate claim to be recognized and treated as such by the commu-
nity and courts. Attempting to articulate clearly the moment's sometimes
confusing sentiments, a district attorney proposed an alternative to the
relationship between age and law-breaking behavior posited by the tradi-
tional idea of delinquency: "'[1]et's differentiate juveniles on the basis of
their conduct, not [on] the basis of their age.'
Resonant cultural motifs buttressed the press's portrait of the youth-
ful offender. Accounts of the high profile cases, for instance, assigned
religious-like features to the juveniles suspected of injuring or killing the
"ideal" child and adult victims.
Durkheim argued that modern Western societies are permeated by a
"religion of humanity," which constitutes the "human person" as "sacred
in the ritual sense of the word," and imbues the individual in general with
"the transcendent majesty that churches of all time lend to their gods."'' 2
Partaking of the sacred, each person is entitled to a measure of respect,
dignity, and deference. This system of beliefs, like more orthodox forms
of religiosity, gravitates around two poles, the sacred and the anti-sacred,
with the latter viewed as "evil and impure powers, bringers of disorder,
causes of death and sickness, instigators of sacrilege."'03 In this quasi-
religious sense, Nils Christie contends that ideal victims and ideal of-
fenders constitute a compelling antinomy: "Ideal victims need-and cre-
ate-ideal offenders... The more ideal a victim is, the more ideal be-
comes the offender."'0 Ideal victims personify innocence, and so ideal
offenders embody evil; the ideal offender "is, morally speaking, black
99. DENVER POST, Sept. 9, 1993 at 7B.
100. Penelope Purdy, What makes a kid kill a cop in cold blood?, DENVER POST, Sept. 5, 1993,
at 3D.
101. Steve Lipsher, Romer shrugs off key rewrite, DENVER POST, Sept. 10, 1993, at IA.
102. Emile Durkheim, Individualism and the Intellectuals, in EMILE DURKHEIM: ON MORALITY
AND SOCIETY 46 (Robert N. Bellah ed., 1973).
103. DURKHEIM, supra note 84, at 412-414.
104. See CHRISTIE, supra note 65, at 25.
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against the white victim. ' 5 Ideal offenders are not integral members of
the community; they are outsiders, strangers, foreigners, aliens, intruders.
"The more foreign the better," according to Christie, who adds that the
ideal offender "is a dangerous man coming from far away."'06 Ideal of-
fenders, moreover, lack qualities essential for being regarded as fully
human: the ideal offender "is a human being close to not being one."1 °7
In addition to the symbolic contrast between ideal victims and ideal
offenders, another cultural theme infused the media's socio-moral profile
of these threatening. teens. There is abundant evidence suggesting that
"mainstream America," particularly white mainstream America, associ-
ates (and has long associated) African American and Latino male adoles-
cents and young adults with violence, danger, and disorder.1°8 There can
be little doubt that this association, powerfully reinforced by continuous
coverage of the high profile assaults on children and exemplary (white)
adults-attacks the media attributed explicitly and exclusively to young
Latinos and African American males-figured significantly in the crea-
tion of a more ominous category of transgressing adolescent. This asso-
ciation, it is reasonable to surmise, also served as a potent subtext for key
themes in the print media's account of the summer of violence, with the
themes of a unprecedented, encroaching and random violence animated
by the frightening imagery of African American and Latino youth
wrecking havoc on middle-class, Anglo lives and neighborhoods, and the
public space Anglos share with other groups.
Despite incorporating the symbolic opposition between the ideal
victim and the ideal offender and the widespread stereotype linking mi-
nority males to street crime, media accounts did not depict juvenile of-
fenders as unequivocal embodiments of evil. Rather, these accounts were
infused with considerable ambivalence: while an assuredly more forbid-
ding figure than the joyriding, hubcap stealing delinquent of yesteryear,
the contemporary young offender was not (yet) a "hardened adult crimi-
nal." Journalists, like the officials and experts they interviewed, were
unwilling to abandon completely the cultural precept that youthfulness
mitigates, to an extent, the culpability of young offenders. Nor were they
inclined to jettison entirely belief in the presumed malleability of youth,
a conviction which sustains hope that juvenile lawbreakers, even violent
ones, can be redeemed. The youthfulness of the new type of transgress-
ing adolescent did not prevent some columnists and reporters from lik-
ening violent juveniles to "bringers of disorder," but it also generated a
nearly equal number of columns and reports which counterbalanced this
105. Id at 26.
106. Id. at 26, 28.
107. Id at 26.
108. ELUAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE: RACE, CLASS AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN COMMUNITY
(1990); Robert J. Sampson and John H. Laub, Structural Variations in Juvenile Court Processing:
Inequality, the Underclass, and Social Control, 27 LAW & SOC. 285-311(1994).
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demonology by describing the conditions-largely of familial, social,
economic and moral breakdown-that purportedly propel "our young
people" to act "with so little regard for human life." As portrayed by the
local print media during the summer of violence, youthful offenders were
not, as a group, completely credible icons of "dangerous men coming
from far away."
VII. AFFIRMING THE MEDIA'S PRIMARY CLAIMSMAKING
By arguing that the local news media figured prominently in high-
lighting the problem of youth violence in Denver and Colorado during
the summer of 1993, we imply that news agencies are exceedingly influ-
ential claimants. There are important limits to the press' influence, how-
ever, and a comprehensive conception of the media as a claimant group
must consider how news organizations' claimsmaking diverges from the
stance other claimants typically take. First, when acting as a primary
claimsmaker, the media cannot long endure audience apathy. Fortified by
faith, moral conviction, and/or the more pedestrian pursuit of wealth,
prestige, authority and/or symbolic vindication, many conventional so-
cial problems entrepreneurs persist in advancing their claims despite
prolonged periods of public and policymaker indifference or disdain. The
media, by contrast, rarely demonstrate comparable tenacity (or hardhead-
edness). As profit-oriented enterprises whose revenues (particularly from
advertisers) depend on attracting consistently large audiences, '°9 the me-
dia are keenly attuned to the public's abbreviated "issue attention
cycle."" 0 In an important sense, as Anthony Downs and Marshall
McLuhan suggest, the public "'manages the news' by maintaining or
losing interest in a given subject."' And when "the media realize that
their emphasis" on a particular problem "is threatening many people and
boring even more, they will shift their focus to some 'new' problem."
'"2
Second, news organizations usually reject ownership of social
problems. While the media, like other primary claimants, attempt "to
influence the public definition of a problem,"'"3 they customarily eschew
exclusive control of an issue. They rarely insist on the right to offer a
definitive characterization of the undesirable condition in the same fash-
ion that nineteenth-century Protestant churches claimed ownership over
drunkenness ' 4 or contemporary medical research asserts its prerogative
in defining the nature of cancer. If they succeed in bringing visibility to a
troublesome social condition or practice, the media are predisposed to
109. See Gamson et al., supra note 60, at 375-380.
110. Anthony Downs, Up and Down with Ecology -- The "Issue-Attention Cycle," 23 PUBLIC
INTEREST 38-50 (1972).
111. Id. at 42.
112. Id.at42.
113. See Gusfield, supra note 38, at 10.
114. Id. at 10-13.
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concede ownership to other claimsmakers, commonly exhibiting a pref-
erence for respected, legitimate institutions or their officers over insur-
gents, radicals, and outsiders.'15 The media's propensity to acknowledge
established institutions' authority to describe, explain, and interpret harm-
ful conditions falling within their respective domains does not preclude
the discriminating appraisal of statements and policies proffered by a
particular institutional spokesperson or representative. Still, these critical
assessments seldom prompt the media to question an institution's right to
own problems consistent with its "license and mandate."
' 16
Third, whereas other primary claimsmakers frequently aspire to
"effective control over social policy" '17 aimed at redressing a grievous
state of affairs, the media usually refuse "political responsibility" for the
deleterious conditions their coverage highlights."8 Instead of assuming
an obligation "to eradicate or alleviate the harmful situation," the media's
tack more commonly revolves around identifying "the responsible office
or person" and assigning that party the chore of doing something about
the problem, often using follow-up reports to hold the designated author-
ity accountable for fulfilling that charge."9 Practicing a "trickle-up prin-
ciple," journalists generally assign responsibility to individuals holding
high-ranking positions in the pertinent public or private institution, espe-
cially when a problematic incident is alleged to have occurred "during
their watch." 120
In the context of Denver's (and Colorado's) summer of violence,
these considerations raise a crucial question: how did the public and
policymakers respond to the media's coverage? Despite occasional dis-
sent, the response was overwhelmingly affirmative, with many citizens
and public officials alike treating the coverage as a more or less accurate
reflection of a serious social problem and insisting that "something must
be done" about the problem of youth violence. At the grass roots level,
for example, frightened citizens, anxious about their public safety, began
purchasing handguns and instruction in their use. 2 ' Others altered the
routes they drove to and from work; suspended their daily jog; mowed
their lawns in the early morning hours; refrained from sitting on the
porch after dark; installed bars across the windows of their homes; put
their young children to sleep in the bathtub to avoid stray bullets; im-
posed what their teenage children regarded as outrageously restrictive
115. See Todd Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and
Unmaking of the New Left (1980).
116. Everett Cherrington Hughes, Men and their Work 78-87 (1958).
117. See Best, supra note 2, at 12.
118. See Gusfield, supra note 38, at 13-16.
119. Id. at 14.
120. Robert A. Stallings, Media Discourse and the Social Construction of Risk, 21 SOC. PROB.
90 (1990).
121. See Guy Kelly, Now, There's No Rest for the Wary Shootings Inject Fear Into the Hearts
of Law-Abiding, Ordinary Metro-Area People. ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 29, 1993, at 20A.
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curfews; considered moving to safer locales; or took more precautions
about locking car doors and looking over their shoulders while walking
city streets."' And as "Coloradans [grew increasingly] fed up with gangs• • ,123
... [and] youth violence" , these matters also became, an issue in a bur-
geoning public debate, with many concerned citizens sending letters to
newspapers, calling local talk-radio programs, participating in town
meetings, organizing protest marches to decry the violence, and contact-
ing city and state officials, urging them to "do something" about the/1 124
problem. A Denver Post/[Television] News 4 poll revealed that adult
Coloradans supported the governor's call for a special legislative session
on youth violence by an overwhelming margin: almost four-to-one.
125
The pronouncements and activities of officials, community groups,
and opinion leaders also confirmed the essential thrust of Denver report-
ers' primary claimsmaking. All five candidates vying for a seat on the
Denver city council narrowed the focus of their debate to stopping gang
126and youth violence , while the Colorado legislature gave permission to
a special legislative committee to study youth violence in Colorado com-S • • 127
prehensively. On the eve of the Colorado General Assembly's special
session on youth violence, state and city luminaries in the business and
professional communities paid for and signed a full-page advertisement
that appeared in both the Rocky Mountain News"' and the Denver
Post. 129 The ad urged citizens to call their state representatives (and listed
several phone numbers where leading legislators could be contacted),
warning that it was "time to take action" against juvenile violence or "all
that will be left to do is take cover. '13 When President Bill Clinton
stopped briefly in Denver for a wilderness bill signing ceremony, the
122. See DENVER POST, July 29, 1993 at 9A; Aug. 1, 1993 at 4C; Aug. 4, 1993 at IA, 4A, 6A;
John Sanko, Lawmaker Urges Use of Emergency State Fund Sen. Groff of Denver Says Money
Could Help Beef Up Police Patrols in City's Most-Violent Areas, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, June
11, 1993, at 26A; Guy Kelly, Now, There's No Rest for the Wary Shootings Inject Fear Into the
Hearts of Law-Abiding, Ordinary Metro-Area People, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 29, 1993, at
20A.
123. John Sanko, Coloradans Fed Up With Gangs, Violence: Shootings of Tot at Zoo, 6-Year-
Old in N. Park Hill by Gang Members Pushed People Past Boiling Point, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
July 22, 1993 at 16A.
124. DENVER POST, June 15, 1993 at IA, 4A; June 17, 1993 at IA, 27A; Aug. 2, 1993 at IA;
Laurence Washington, About 200 Rally, March to Protest Gang Violence: A Generation is Being
Lost, Participant Says, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 17, 1993, at 5A; Lynn Bartels, Crowd Seeks
Solutions, Sympathy: Students, Residents Among the Attendees Hoping to make Change in Gang-
Ridden Areas, July 25, 1993, at 26A.
125. Fred Brown, Special Session Favored 4 to 1, DENVER POST, Sep. 6, 1993 at IA.
126. Christopher Lopez, Candidates Focus on Gangs Five Denver Council Contenders Tout
Ways to End Violence, DENVER POST, June 14, 1993 at 2B.
127. DENVER POST, June 15, 1993 at 14A; John C. Ensslin, Coloradans Tackle Gangs, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 15, 1993, at 6A.
128. ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sep. 7, 1993, at 4A, 35A.
129. DENVER POST, Sep. 7, 1993 at 12A.
130. Id.
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mayor met with him and later told reporters, "I talked to him [President
Clinton] about the rash of violence we've had in Denver."'' A priest be-
gan fasting to spotlight youth violence, while the archbishop of Denver
called for an end to "the violence that has swept the area in recent
weeks."'33 The archbishop also promised to ask Pope John Paul II "to
address the issue during his visit here [Denver] next month [August]" to
celebrate World Youth Day. 34 And when the Pope, who had requested
and received "daily dispatches" from Denver,'35 delivered a speech" de-
plor[ing] America's urban violence," the Post commented, beneath the
front- and top-of-the-page headline-"Pope condemns violence"-that
"[tihe pontiff s remarks on violence hold particular meaning for Denver,
where random killings and assorted shootings in the past weeks have
prompted Gov. Roy Romer to convene a special legislative session next
month." 36
The deeply-felt urge to "do something" spawned dozens of propos-
als and programs aimed at reducing youth violence. Several Denver-area
teens formed a group, Helping Young People Educate (HYPE), to assist
adolescents and their families in coping with the threat of youth
violence. '1 A charismatic community activist and former gang member,
a city councilman, and several gang leaders attempted to negotiate a
truce between rival gangs, an effort they called Operation Reconstruc-
tion. '38 Metro-area educators took steps-e.g., closing off the streets bor-
dering a school during lunch periods to prevent drive-by shootings and
encouraging school administrators to accompany students as they go to
lunch off campus-to protect students from violent crime. 9 A 30-
member committee, appointed by the Denver Mayor and the Denver City
Council President, was asked to devise a plan to combat youth
violence.' 4° District attorneys representing Denver and seven nearby
counties announced plans to "make violent crimes involving weapons
131. Jennifer Gavin, Webb asks Clinton for gang funds, DENVER POST, Aug. 14, 1993 at 21A.
132. Ed Morrow, Priest fasts to spotlight youth violence, DENVER POST, July 13, 1993 at 3B.
133. Sarah Ellis, Archbishop will ask pope to address issue of violence, DENVER POST, July 30,
1993 at IA.
134. Id.
135. Gary Massaro, Pope Wants Gang Peace in Denver, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug. 10,
1993, at 12A.
136. Paul Hutchinson, Pope Condemns Violence John Paul Urges Media, Urban Areas to Join
Hands, DENVER POST, Aug. 15, 1993 at IA.
137. Jennifer Gavin, Teens Join War Against Gang Threat HYPE Hopes to Help Kids, DENVER
POST, June 23, 1993 at 4B.
138. John C. Ensslin, Gangs Converge on Park to Talk About a Truce: Optimistic City Official
Says Gathering was Inconclusive, but more Meetings are Expected, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, June
24, 1993, at 4A.
139. Leroy Williams, Jr., Safety Stressed After Violent Summer Metro-Area: Educators Take
Steps to Prevent Crime, Violence and to Keep Students Safe, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sep. 5,
1993, at 20A.
140. Christopher Lopez, Panel Begins Study of Youth Violence, DENVER POST, July 31, 1993 at
16A.
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'our highest priority.'" 14 1 United States Representative Bill Armstrong
(from Colorado) argued that fighting juvenile and gang violence would
require more money to hire additional police officers. Representative
Pat Schroeder (also from Colorado) sought $4.4 million from Congress
to fund a military-style program aimed at "reclaim[ing] America's
youth." 
43
The Denver Mayor and the Colorado Governor, more so than any
other social problem entrepreneurs, made the most effective claims to
ownership and responsibility for the problem of youth violence. At a
press conference, Mayor Webb outlined his own 6-point plan, heavy on
increased law enforcement, to combat gang violence.'" The mayor also
anted up $1.1 million to fund special police impact units.1
45
The governor's plan was even more ambitious. Governor Romer
advanced a 14-point strategy to curtail violent youth crime. 46 Character-
izing his plan as "an 'iron fist' against outlaw gangs and a 'helping hand'
for Coloradans fighting to take back their neighborhoods," the governor
urged swift prosecution of gangs and of youth charged with violent of-
fenses, targeted juveniles with guns, and proposed building the youthful
offender system while also expanding juvenile detention facilities. 147 He
also liberally dispensed no-nonsense rhetoric, including a classic, line-in-
the-sand ultimatum to gang members: "Get out, or we'll break you.
Colorado's not going to become another Los Angeles."' 48 Through tire-
less lobbying of a wide array of constituencies, the governor eventually
succeeded in mobilizing elite and popular support for the special session
he said was necessary to enact his plan.
149
The net and mutually reinforcing effect of these sometimes diver-
gent reactions, which themselves were circulated back into the media's
unfolding narrative about the summer of violence, was to magnify the
141. Jennifer Gavin, DAs Come Together to Stop Violence Area Prosecutors Have New
Priority, DENVER POST, July 30, 1993 at 12A.
142. Jennifer Gavin, Reno Gets Anti-Gang Invitation Schroeder Cites Poor Metro
Coordination, DENVER POST, July 3, 1993 at I B.
143. Stacey Baca, Guard Plan Could Help Dropouts Schroeder Seeks $4.4 Million for Military-
Style Colo. Camp, DENVER POST, Aug. 20, 1993 at lB.
144. Brian Weber, Fed-Up Webb Declares War on City Gangs Mayor Orders Increased Police
Patrols, Tough Prosecution to Stem Neighborhood Terrorism, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 1I,
1993, at 4A.
145. Brian Weber, Extra $1 Million, 50 Officers Sought For Denver War on Gangs: Public
Safety Officials Ask City Council to Approve Plan, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 7, 1993, at 5A.
146. John Sanko, Romer Unveils Proposal to Battle Gangs: Plan Targets Youths with Guns and
Seeks to Expand the Juvenile Justice System; It May Cost Up to $18 Million, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, July 23, 1993, at 4A.
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Day Visitors, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 30, 1993 at IA.
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visibility of youth violence and reaffirm the perception that it represented
a vitally serious public problem requiring immediate action. This widely
supported perception established a new environment of action where
policy and legislative initiatives that were rejected or nearly inconceiv-
able only four months earlier could now enjoy a broad base of support.
This media-spawned and socially affirmed construction of reality did not
dictate a specific plan of action, but it strongly loaded the dice in favor of
proposals promising a forceful, official response to the problem of youth
violence.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Denver media's prominent and continuous news coverage of
youth violence (in the summer of 1993) occurred toward the end of a
nearly ten year period that had witnessed a sharp increase in serious ju-
venile violence across the country. Data from the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation's Crime in the United States: The Uniform Crime Reports and
the Supplemental Homicide Report indicate that between 1985 and 1994
the nation saw "a significant decline in homicides committed by older
offenders" and a dramatic rise in "homicides committed by younger of-
fenders, ""5 with "the rate of murder committed by teens ages 14 to 17
more than doubl[ing]... from 7.0 to 19.1 per 100,000.''. This pattern of
rising lethal juvenile violence arrived in Denver and Colorado in 1988,
three years after it commenced elsewhere, and continued through 1995,
though this surge in serious youth crime was not nearly as pronounced in
Denver as it was in larger metropolitan areas (e.g., Los Angeles, New
York, and Chicago). 
152
But it is a mistake to presume that these rising rates of lethal juve-
nile violence, by themselves, made juvenile violence a visible social
problem. As social constructionists contend, there are innumerable in-
stances of rising rates of harmful conduct that go virtually unnoticed.
There are, in addition, countless ways in which statistical data can be
interpreted and even explained away. In the context of the summer of
violence, for example, we have noted that the heightened media coverage
of serious juvenile crime did not reflect an upsurge in the actual amount
of violence. Furthermore, in their interviews with us and in published
accounts, several reporters conceded their uncertainty about whether the
overall incidence of juvenile violent crime during the 1993 summer was
150. Alfred Blumstein & Daniel Cork, Linking Gun Availability to Youth Gun Violence, 59
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1996).
151. James Alan Fox, The Calm Before the Juvenile Crime Storm?, 24 POPULATION TODAY 4
(1996).
152. Laura Ross Greiner, Threatening Children; Mass Media and the Construction of a New
Breed of Violent Youth Offender (1997) (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology,
University of Denver.)
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higher or lower than it had been in previous summers. ' And Governor
Romer, the public official who took the lead in mobilizing support for
the special session and in securing passage of the session's most signifi-
cant legislation, offered this telling observation some five years after the
summer of violence: "'If you were here that summer, everyone in this
community was upset. We didn't read statistics, we read every event, and
they were dramatic. It was a dramatic summer.'
There is, moreover, little indication that the official recognition of
youth violence was the product of a cumulative effect, with citizens and
officials beleaguered year after year by mounting rates of juvenile vio-
lence finally conceding that a genuine problem existed. In fact, residents
in Denver neighborhoods where street violence is most heavily concen-
trated had complained for years, but these complaints were largely dis-
counted by public officials and were rarely heard or heeded by residents
living in other areas of the city and state. The official recognition of
youth violence in Denver and Colorado hinged on an unlikely series of
atypical crimes: the accidental woundings of four young children and
the murder and assaults of four exemplary adults. These highly improb-
able (and hence newsworthy) events focused the media spotlight on
youth violence and propelled this issue to the forefront of the policy
agenda.
The visibility of a social problem, in other words, in not a simple
function of its frequency or its objective harmfulness (however that
might be calculated). Rather, the process of making a problem visible
must be treated as a social phenomenon in its own right. The visibility of
youth violence in Denver and Colorado was largely contingent on the
claimsmaking efforts of the news media. By providing continuous and
prominent coverage of youth violence, by articulating a dramatic narra-
tive that proved compelling to citizens and officials alike, and by sharply
differentiating an ostensibly new type of transgressing adolescent from
the traditional delinquent, this powerful claimant group succeeded in
bringing enormous visibility to a problem in a way that mere references
to rising rates of offending never could.
153. See Jim Kirksey, Kids-with-guns crime up slightly, DENVER POST, June 15, 1993 at IA;
Marilyn Robinson, Crime Rate Dips in Colo. Popular Perception Belied, DENVER POST, Aug. 7,
1993 at IA; Steve Lipsher, Denver's Summer of Violence Irrational Shootings Spark Fear in Areas
Previously Untouched, DENVER POST, Aug. 8, 1993 at IA.
154. DENVER POST, May 3, 1993 at 23A.
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P.C. YOUTH VIOLENCE: "WHAT'S THE INTERNET OR
VIDEO GAMING GOT TO DO WITH IT?"1
ANNA EVERETr
In the wake of the Columbine High School massacre, an unfortunate
target is once again caught in the mediated cross hairs of our latest so-
cietal moral panic. That perpetual target is today's youth culture and its
preoccupation with the Internet and video games. Fueling much of our
national discontent over and distrust of P.C. (post-Columbine) youth
culture, besides a new millennial generation gap of sorts, is the tradi-
tional print and broadcast media's intense rivalry and paternalism toward
their new media counterparts. At issue is the Internet and video games'
captivation of that most coveted advertising demographic, the youth
market, with its newly designated "tween" segment.
Tweens are those youth aged 8 through 12, and due to their develop-
mental location between the stages of childhood and the teen years, they
have been given the new moniker "tweens." Intensifying this lucrative
market-share competition is the Internet's steady encroachment on TV's
and other traditional media's social gate-keeping function. Not unexpect-
edly, these new computer and digital media startup industries have begun
to significantly displace the power and influence of old teen-exploitation
media controlled by guardians of what Dick Hebdige terms the "parent
culture."2 Consequently, this new "digital dilemma"3 is exacerbating a
postmodern culture clash more familiarly described as "the culture
wars." It follows that in any war, identification and demonization of an
enemy are requisite. This escalating technoculture war, as I see it, is no
1. This title paraphrases popular song lyrics from Rock-n-Roll icon Tina Turner's hit single
"What's Love Got to do with it?" that appear on her comeback album Private Dancer. The inter-
generational appeal of this song makes its rhetorical narrative appropriate for this study. See TINA
TURNER, What's Love Got To Do With It?, on PRIVATE DANCER (JVC Records 1984).
2. For a thorough discussion of the antinomies ard conflicts between youth and parent
cultures, see DICK HEBDIGE, SUBCULTURE: THE MEANING OF STYLE (Routledge 1993).
3. The concept of the "digital dilemma" comes from a recently published study by the
National Research Council's Computer Science and Telecommunications Board. See THE DIGITAL
DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (Randall Davis, et al. eds., National
Academy Press 2000). They argue that, "[a]dvances in technology have produced radical shifts in
the ability to reproduce, distribute, control, and publish information." Id. at 3. Moreover, they insist
that the digital dilemma represents a nightmare for both publishers and authors, and for consumers.
Id. at 2. For publishers, "[t]heir nightmare is that ... the entire market can be extinguished by the
sale of the first electronic copy" of data or information due to the endless reproducibility of digital
texts. ld. They contend that, "The nightmare for consumers is that the attempt to preserve the
marketplaces leads to technical and legal protections that sharply reduce access to society's
intellectual and cultural heritage, the resource that [Thomas] Jefferson saw as crucial to democracy."
Id. at 2.
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different. For any cursory glance at hegemonic media representations of
vid-kids (kids who play video games), cyberpunks and hacktivists
(hacker-activists) betrays the generational divide and commercial biases
of many mainstream reports on the activities of these newly evolving
computer savvy youth subcultures. Although traditional media's hyper-
bolic discourse on the so-called "culture wars" functions to mask what
might more accurately be described as contemporary "media wars," this
discourse nonetheless fails to mask a more suspect agenda. Suspect here
is the fomenting of public hysteria over contemporary youths' involve-
ment with and mastery of the Internet, video games and other digital
media technologies.
I. Is PLAYING THE BLAME GAME MORE DANGEROUS THAN THE
INTERNET AND VIDEO GAMES?
Because the 1999 Columbine tragedy clearly traumatized our nation
amid an era of unprecedented economic growth and prosperity, and rela-
tive social stability, it has become a conduit for legislating some danger-
ously repressive civil liberty infringements (California's recent passage
of the so-called "juvenile justice" amendment is one particularly egre-
gious example). As horrific as the Littleton, Colorado tragedy is, I find
myself more concerned with the rhetoric of new media culpability in the
national news media establishments since the Internet and video games,
linked to one of the Columbine assailants, have been indicted as virtual
accomplices to the mass murder. Most distressing here is the easy use of
video games and the Internet as scapegoats in our national rush to assign
blame in this tragedy. Since these newest mass media threaten many
vested interests4 and strike terror in the hearts of many technophobes and
neo-Luddites, the Internet in general, and video games in particular, have
come under special scrutiny, and thus are particularly vulnerable to shrill
public calls for accountability, regulation and, ultimately, censorship.
As details of Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold's murderous rampage
surfaced in the popular media, almost immediately the Internet and video
games emerged as discursive objects of blame. To be sure, mass hysteria
over baleful media effects on human behavior is nothing new. From the
clergy's concerns about the Guttenberg printing press, to paternalists'
fears of romance novels, to electrical telegraph engineers' protective
guilds, to religious censorship efforts against the movies, comic books,
rock-n-roll music and television, to video games and the Internet more
4. In recent years, newspapers and TV have reported on the phenomenon of new media's
erosion of their lucrative audience base. See Leslie Helm, Surf s Down on the Net, Survey Says,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1996, at D1. Despite noting findings claiming "a lot less 'net surfing' taking
place than many had assumed, the article also revealed that "Internet users spend an average of 6.6
hours per week on the Net, usually cutting into their TV-watching time." Id. The study also found
long distance phone calls, video rentals, magazine and newspaper purchases and listening to the
radio were also significantly affected by the increasing popularity of the Net. Id.
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contemporaneously, the history of Western civilization is abundant with
moral panic episodes. A familiar point of contention here is the attempt
of powerful groups to maintain their structures of domination by over-
stating the case of dire media effects on susceptible or impressionable
segments of society. No one should be surprised that often it is the poor,
female, and youth populations who primarily get cast as mass culture
dupes in need of censorship's paternalistic protection.
II. THE NET GENERATION: "GROWING UP DIGITAL" WITH VIDEO
GAMES AND THE INTERNET
Driving much of the cacophonous media rhetoric condemning video
games and the Internet is our contemporary fear of a looming double
threat. First the familiar anxiety of an older generation threatened by the
ascendancy and inevitable dominance of its independent-minded off-
spring. Second is the threat posed by the mass media paradigm shift that
privileges the new interactive model of digital media like the Internet,
CD-ROMs and video games over the unidirectional information flow of
traditional media industries such as newspapers, magazines, movies, TV
and cable networks. Exacerbating the potency of this double threat is the
formidable cultural power engendered by the intersection of these two
unstoppable forces. In his new media study Growing up Digital: The
Rise of the Net Generation, Don Tapscott alerts us to the high stakes in-
forming these clashing intergenerational and intermedia wills to power.6
As Tapscott sees it, the "Net Generation" is different from all those that
preceded it because:
For the first time in history, children are more comfortable, knowl-
edgeable, and literate than their parents about an innovation central to
society. And it is through the use of the digital media that the N-
Generation will develop and superimpose its culture on the rest of so-
ciety. Boomers stand back. Already these kids are learning, playing,
communicating, working, and creating communities very differently
than their parents. They are a force for social transformation.7
Not only are youths today uniquely poised and competent leaders of one
of the most profound cultural revolutions in the history of western civili-
zation, but their vast numbers all but assure a long dure of their in-
creasing hegemonic sway.
5. In Carolyn Marvin's excellent work WHEN OLD TECHNOLOGIES WERE NEW, the gendered
discourse of expertise in electrical engineering and telegraphy is convincingly presented. Similarly,
Janice Radway's Reading the Romance alerts us to the masculinist condemnation of the female
dominated book of the month clubs that flourished in postwar American society. In 1930, the Payne
Fund studies attributed delinquency in youth to the influence of movies and comic books. For
further discussion of deleterious mass media effects outlined in the Payne Fund Studies, see
SHEARON A. LOWERY, ET AL., MILESTONES IN MASS COMMUNICATION RESEARCH 31-51 (1983).
6. DON TAPSCOTr, GROWING Up DIGITAL: THE RISE OF THE NET GENERATION 1-2 (1998).
7. Id.
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What complicates, frustrates and ultimately de-legitimates tradi-
tional media constructions of a retro 1960s-era generation gap glommed
onto today's generational divide is the untenable nature of the forced
equivalence. To begin, Tapscott finds that "for the most part kids [today]
think their parents are pretty cool. 'Nearly half of children think their
parents are 'up to date' on the music they like' . . .. The children sur-
veyed also say their parents' opinions matter most to them when it comes
to drinking, spending money . . sex and AIDS."8 Because today's vid-
kids (as video game analyst J.C. Hertz and others label them)9 not only
trust but admire adults over thirty, Tapscott cautions against believing
that "we're in some era of transgenerational bliss."'" Unlike parents in
the 1960s, parents today do not worry about their kids' embrace of
revolutionary an anti-establishment ethos; instead they are frightened by
their kids' mastery of revolutionary new technologies that they (the par-
ents) barely understand. While much of the previous era's ideological
schism between parents and youths has been bridged, the preponderance
of old media reportage emphasizing the "0.5 percent of online material
that is violent, racist, or sexual in nature"" still engenders a sort of gen-
erational divide that is no less alienating or profound. Most striking in
the televisual rhetoric of crisis, catastrophe and technological culpability
in the Columbine tragedy is how quickly the tropes of criminality
emerged and became entwined with new media in TV's round-the-clock
coverage.
In the early hours of the continual news flow of the Columbine High
School massacre, particularly on cable and broadcast television coverage,
the Internet and video games became easy targets of blame. MSNBC, the
first of what we now recognize as a new media convergence company,
led the onslaught. One lead-in to a hastily assembled segment on the role
of the Internet in this tragedy (presented by Mary Kathleen Flynn, the
cable company's newly created Internet expert) that was legitimized by
MSNBC news anchor Brian Williams is telling indeed. 2 In a concerned
tone Williams remarks, "there is no shortage of hate-filled Web sites on
the World Wide Web. But this one of course has attracted a lot of atten-
tion and it was jammed earlier today just by journalists and members of
the law enforcement community who were looking at it, trying to glean
some evidence from it." '" The fact that a plethora of "hate-filled" Web
sites exist on the net is hardly news, but Williams's revelation that the
website might constitute "evidence" certainly is noteworthy, and begs the
8. Id. at 43-44.
9. J.C. HERZ, JOYSTICK NATION: How VIDEOGAMES ATE OUR QUARTERS, WON OUR
HEARTS, AND REWIRED OUR MINDS (1997).
10. TAPSCOTr, supra note 6, at 44.
11. Id. at 44.





question, "evidence of what" exactly? Immediately, television viewers
are encouraged to view the program's ensuing Internet imagery as threat-
ening, at best, and criminal, at worst. For her part, Flynn begins by ob-
serving that first rule of journalism, authenticating her information
source (a local Colorado reporter), and legitimating his informant status
by noting this reporter's close proximity and access to the unfolding
news event. 4 Positioned next to a large but soothingly familiar TV
screen displaying a now-menacing website identified as belonging to one
of the then-suspects, Flynn fulfills her function as trustworthy Internet
de-mystifier and confident modem maven. Domesticating this latest
Internet threat, Flynn's segment consists of reading aloud the site's dis-
turbing boldface-type messages, interpreting a troubling scanned-in hand
drawing depicting combat signifiers of boy culture, and contrasting TV
journalism's self-restraint with the suggested dangers of the Internet's
unrestricted and too-often toxic content.
15
Plugging into society's distrust of the high-tech World Wide Web
apparatus' apparent hold on today's youth while championing, at once,
traditional keepers of the social good, was Williams's reassurance that
Flynn, other reporters and law enforcement easily located, accessed and
jammed this dangerous website. Additionally, Flynn's "discovery" that
the site featured disturbing content from KMDFM, a defunct Seattle in-
dustrial rock band, reactivates society's paranoia over the baleful influ-
ences of modem youth music culture that recalls the "legacy of fear'
16
and culture panics that rocked the parental world of the Eisenhower
1950s. That the site highlights the following disturbing lyrics from the
KMDFM song "Son of a Gun," only adds fire to adults' burning con-
tempt for present day youth's captivation by all things techno-centric.
The "Son of Gun" lyrics under scrutiny were, "Shockwave \ Massive
Attack \ Atomic Blasts \ Son of a Gun is Back \ Chaos-Panic \ No Resis-
tance \ Detonations in a Distance \ Apocalypse Now \ Walls of Flame \
Billowing Smoke \ Who's to Blame." Moving on to the drawings that fill
the next page of the site, and singling out another of the song's phrases,
Flynn points out "Anything I don't like, SUCKS." These lyrics are men-
tioned as an instructive and evidentiary summation of the website's dan-
gerous lure that contrasts unfavorably to broadcast journalism's implicit
socially responsible practices.
As Flynn navigated the site, she clicked on a linked file containing
disturbing drawings of violent symbols and iconography too frequently
associated with bad boy cultural expressions.17 The drawings' poor ren-
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. This idea centers on social scientific findings on the harmful effects of films on
children conducted in 1929 to 1932. A full discussion of the Payne Fund Studies appears in
SHEARON A. LOWERY, ET AL., MILESTONES IN MASS COMMUNICATION RESEARCH 31-51 (1983).
17. Brian Williams and Mary Kathleen Flynn, The News with Brian Williams (MSNBC
March 20, 1999).
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derings and their indecipherable scale necessitated Flynn's descriptive
voice-over as the TV camera zoomed in for close-ups on sketches of a
hand-drawn machine gun, a knife-wielding male figure atop a mound of
skulls, and more. Flynn's ability to make sense of the difficult to deci-
pher images foregrounds the segment's visual rhetoric that reasserts tele-
vision's primacy as public information agent bar none. 8 As if to under-
score mainstream journalism's deserved veneration and conscientious
reportage by juxtaposition, Flynn concludes her website critique by
stressing MSNBC's refusal to show a page of the site with pipe bomb
instructions because it divulges the identity of an unindicted suspect, or
innocent family member. 9 However, when Flynn verbally recounts some
of the bomb-making details found on the site, she compromises her claim
to journalistic integrity by broadcasting to a mass audience such puta-
tively destructive information.2" Notwithstanding this breach, MSNBC's
"liveness" and "crisis and catastrophe" discourses convey well its self-
authenticating message that management of national crises requires tele-
vision's ever-vigilant gaze and the responsible reporting of its trusted
cadre of unflappable, investigative journalists.
The following morning, as MSNBC settled into its cyclical rebroad-
casts of Flynn's cybersleuthing, ABC's Good Morning America (GMA)
program upped the rhetorical ante by bringing video games into the
heightened blame game. GMA co-host Diane Sawyer primed the ABC
network's morning audience for its day-after coverage of Columbine by
suggesting their show's uncovering of a new development in television's
over-saturated coverage. The unspectacular nature of the now-exhausted
suspect's text-based Web site visuals, and the diminished shock-value of
the all-too-familiar footage of terrorized Columbine High School teens
rushing into the streets with their arms over their heads underscored
GMA's more visually fresh images of digital media violence and may-
hem.
Distinguishing its more limited temporal engagement with the Col-
umbine story from that of MSNBC and CNN's more extensive catastro-
phe coverage, GMA augmented the narratives of its talking-head experts
on youth violence with difficult to ignore graphic and stylized images of
new media violence. In her influential article "Information, Crisis, Ca-
tastrophe," film scholar Mary Ann Doane informs us that "[tielevision
knowledge strains to make visible the invisible. While it acknowledges
the limits of empiricism, the limitations of the eye in relation to knowl-






lated visibility-'If it could be seen, this is what it would look like.
'' 21
What was "invisible" that GMA and Diane Sawyer "strained to make
visible" on the morning of March 21, 1999 was a tenable culprit to ex-
plain this latest act of school violence perpetuated by suburban white,
male youths. Drawing on latent social anxieties over the presumed
unique contribution of video games to what is widely regarded as post-
modem society's aesthetic culture of violence, GMA, its youth violence
experts, and Sawyer found an easy sell for its video game indictment,
because, again, to quote Doane, "Television deals in potentially visible
entities. 22 And given video games and digital media's spectacular spe-
cial effects, these "visible entities" can be counted on to grab the atten-
tion of groggy, early morning audiences stumbling toward that first cup
of coffee.
In our look at GMA's crisis and catastrophe rhetoric surrounding
Littleton, it is important to bear in mind the inter-media rivalries that
inform the subtext of one media's assessment of blame or culpability
against another. As you may recall, in the years leading up the rash of
schoolyard killings, the broadcast television networks were embroiled in
controversy over public denunciations of their own violent programming.
To stave off government regulation and threatened consumer boycotts,
the networks reluctantly agreed to a self-policing strategy23 to quell pub-
lic demands for accountability that included such parental guidance tools
as voluntary program content labeling analogous to, yet significantly
different from, that of the movie industry's ratings system. An additional
appeasement held out by the networks was a promise to engineer the V-
chip program-blocking device in all newly manufactured TV sets. With
this historical backstory, our discussion of network and cable TV's par-
ticipation in the blame game to explain the Columbine tragedy gains
some much-needed context. This stress on context is important to our
analysis because as Mary Anne Doane puts it, "television is the preemi-
nent machine of decontextualization. The only context for television is
itself-its own rigorous scheduling. Its strictest limitation, that of time,
information becomes measurable, quantifiable, through its relation to
temporality. 24 Or put more plainly, since time literally is money by
American commercial television standards, important and necessary
time-consuming explanations of complex issues too often are exchanged
for pithy platitudes, dramatic pictures and startling sound bytes.
Returning to GMA's day-after coverage of the Columbine tragedy as
a case in point, we refocus attention on the ABC network's rhetoric of
blame directed at the Internet and video games. After establishing its
21. See Mary Ann Doane, "Information, Crisis, Catastrophe," in Logics of Television: Essays
in Cultural Criticism. Ed. Patricia Mellencamp (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University
Press, 1990) at 222-239.
22. DOANE, supra note 16, at 226-27.
23. To this end, the TV executives borrowed a page from the 1930s film industry.
24. DOANE, supra note 16, at 225.
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ability to provide instantaneous coverage from various pertinent locales
in this story, GMA's live coverage shifts from that of co-anchor Charlie
Gibson's remote stand-up report from Columbine High School, to news
reporter Antonio Mora's update from the hospital caring for the young
victims, to Diane Sawyer's talking-heads interviews in the program's
New York headquarters. Situated within the tranquil yet authoritative
space of the familiar studio, Sawyer and her cadre of experts on violence
and youth buffer the program's strong visual appeals to fear by structur-
ing such self-serving questions and answers presumably on the minds of
traumatized early morning viewers. Among the questions Sawyer poses
are: 1) What can we learn about "the young men who committed the
terrible crime and then turned their weapons on themselves?" 2) "Who
could these young men be?" 3) What is known about "the outcast group
known as the 'Trenchcoat Mafia,' a suburban gang of sorts noted for
their dark clothing and dark disposition?" and 4) Sawyer's loaded ques-
tion that, "In a comfortable middle-class setting like Littleton, Colorado,
where do the young people find the models to form a gang based on an-
ger and violence?" With visual cues featuring concert footage from Rock
star, Marilyn Manson, hate sites from the Internet, disturbing scenes
from the films The Basketball Diaries and The Matrix, graphically vio-
lent segments from wildly popular video games such as Doom and
Quake, and Sawyer's editorializing remarks about society's failure of
"the disenfranchised students, the white, suburban, troubled boys,"
GMA's implicit indictment of contemporary youth culture toxins, disso-
ciated from TV messages, is stark.
For Good Morning America's Sawyer, it seemed important to sug-
gest, in hindsight, that these new, non-televisual symbols of male aliena-
tion somehow affected "this whole question of a culture of violence be-
ing a true cause" in the string of horrific schoolyard shootings gripping
the nation. Since Sawyer's gender-inflected concern about the represen-
tational extremes in present-day boy culture was situated in the very pre-
sentness of GMA's live broadcasts of still-unfolding events in Littleton,
her professionally controlled alarm seemed in step with and symptomatic
of our much-lamented postmodern condition', or our devolution to a
society of the spectacle. These views insist that our affective abilities (or
abilities to empathize or identify) vis-a-vis others' pain and suffering are
manipulated by the dictates of our hegemonic commercial media inter-
ests. In fact, television's preoccupation with liveness and instantaneity in
its news broadcasts often comes at a high price, the price of historical
memory. How different from Sawyer's plaintive remarks is the historical
utterance that follows: "Why is it that there must be a period in the lives
of boys when they should be spoken of as disagreeable cubs [or disen-
franchised youths in today's vernacular]? Why is a gentle, polite boy
25. See FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE
CAPITALISM (1991); GuY DUBORD, SOCIETY OF THE SPECTACLE (Black & Red 1983).
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such a rarity? ... If your parents are willing for you to be the 'Goths and
Vandals' of society, I shall protest against it. You have been outlaws
long enough, now I beg you will observe the rules." This "angry attack
on the boys of America," comes from popular, 1853 etiquette writer,
Mrs. Manners.26
While the experts, an FBI profiler and a child psychologist, were
careful in their discussions of media influence versus domestic environ-
ment as causal agents in youth violence episodes, the segment's powerful
visuals of the gun-play in the Matrix and the Basketball Diaries clips,
and the Doom video game sample shifted the rhetorical balance against
teen-oriented films and video games. Again, if public scrutiny is directed
at one scandalized media, its vigilant gaze on another is temporarily
averted. So, if we are worried about the stylized, and aestheticized fic-
tional violence in films and video games, the "if it bleeds, it leads"
charge leveled against television news shows and TV networks' other
violent programming drop from the public radar screens, at least for a
time. Displaced onto the threat of newer and deadlier media products,
fear of the ubiquitous television violence gets a reprieve. More impor-
tant, however, is that TV gets to define and disparage its competition
while laundering its own violent and sensational images through the
news and information departments. The endlessly recycled image of the
bloodied young man making a daring escape from a Columbine High
School window is but one sensational image that comes to mind.
In the same way, when we stop to consider the televisual flow of the
Columbine coverage, upcoming show promotions, and commercials, we
begin to recognize the old media's (particularly TV's) schizophrenic
discourse on its new Internet and video game media rivals. For instance,
even as MSNBC's round-the-clock, and the ABC network's Good
Morning America, Nightline, and 20/20 programming characterize the
Internet as responsible for corrupting youths at Columbine, it runs a
commercial featuring a young, professional male benefiting from the
Internet as a result of e-commerce. This commercial actor is placed in-
side an Internet icon frame, as the voice-over extols the saving-grace of
the Internet. Similarly, during ABC's 20/20 coverage of the "day-after"
news from Littleton, charges of video game violence were undermined
by the network's decision to run a Brisk iced-tea commercial that fea-
tures a violent, claymation spoof of a Bruce Lee martial arts film. Here
is TV's brand of stylized violence, targeted at a youth market, playing
alongside condemnations of the video game Doom. These examples il-
lustrate the point made earlier about the need for balanced and sober dis-
courses on the role of all media in this Colorado tragedy. This is not to
absolve the video game and film industries of responsibility in contrib-
26. E. Anthony Rotundo, Boy Culture, in THE CHILDREN'S CULTURE READER 337, 337
(Henry Jenkins ed., 1998).
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uting to the so-called culture of violence. The point, however, is to point
up the counterproductive nature of myopic blame games where the psy-
chosocial health of our youths and our larger society are concerned.
It is absolutely the case that the depiction of graphic violence in video
games is often alarming, gratuitous, and unsuitable for many segments of
our youth and adult populations. But I wonder why there is not as sus-
tained a focus on the myriad forms of other destructive influences that
plague and damage our culture, like the culture of domestic violence, the
culture of guns, the culture of racism, the culture of sexism, the culture of
classism, the culture of ageism, the culture of anti-intellectualism, the
anti-youth culture, the culture of anti-multiculturalism, and on, and on.
There are no easy answers or quick fixes to this devastating pathology
that has gripped our nation in recent years. But, if we get caught in the
crossfire of the media wars, our capacities for reasoned deliberations on
the issue of youth violence will be the true casualties.
In conclusion, it is important to note how the endless loops of tele-
visual footage of the Challenger explosion and the now-familiar of scene
of Columbine students fleeing the most infamous school killings enact
television critic Margaret Morse's suggestion that the past is not so much
remembered via narrative as it is through TV reruns embedded as undis-
puted archival cultural images.27 And it is these images that embody our
society's simultaneous fascination with and fear of our ever-increasing
technological present and future. The technology genie has been let out
the bottle, and we need to figure out a way to get our three wishes, an
end to youth violence, educational reform and workable gun control.
27. See Margaret Morse, An Ontology of Everyday Distraction: The Freeway, the Mall, and
Television, in LOGICS OF TELEVISION 193, 193-221 (Patricia Mellencamp ed., 1990).
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STUDENT EXPRESSION: THE LEGACY OF TINKER IN THE
WAKE OF COLUMBINE
EDWARD T. RAMEY
The proposition that the First Amendment protects expression by
students is neither a deeply rooted nor easily applied principle. At best,
the proposition finds its tentative roots in Supreme Court opinions back
as far as the 1940s,' and perhaps earlier, though it was not until 1969 that
the principle found its seminal, eloquent expression in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District.2 In many respects,
Tinker represents a predictable judicial response to the inevitable ex-
cesses of public school administrators accorded too much unquestioned
deference in matters touching upon individual liberties. Two high school
and one junior high student peaceably wore black armbands to school in
December 1965 as a "silent, passive"3 expression of protest against the
growing hostilities-or "conflagration"4 as Justice Fortas colorfully put
it-in Vietnam. In so doing, the students violated a school district regu-
lation adopted and directed pointedly and specifically at them.5 On the
evidence before the Court, the incident "was entirely divorced from actu-
1. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The Court in Barnette,
over a vigorous dissent by Justice Frankfurter, struck down a school board mandate compelling
students (who were Jehovah's Witnesses) to salute the American flag in contravention of their and
their families' religious beliefs. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. Lest this admittedly heroic judicial
stand at a time of popular patriotic fervor be deemed a far reaching and ringing endorsement of
student fights of affirmative expression, the issue in controversy involved compulsion of a pledge of
fealty (which the Court found to "invade[ ] the sphere of intellect and spirit"), overtones of
encroachment upon the free exercise of religion, and coercion of "both parent and child." Id. at 642,
631. Additionally, the Court ruled to the contrary on precisely the same issue, over the single dissent
of Justice Stone, a mere three years earlier. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600
(1940).
2. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The Court in Tinker cites Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923),
and Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923), as authority for the proposition that neither "students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. However, neither case stands for such a proposition. The Meyer opinion
was grounded in substantive due process considerations-in the soon to be vilified tradition of
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. The Meyer Court struck
down a law prohibiting the teaching of modem foreign languages as violative of the right of a
teacher to engage in his profession of teaching and "of parents to engage him so to instruct their
children." Id. at 400. The facts and reasoning in Bartels are to the same effect. See Bartels, 262
U.S. at 409. Similarly, Pierce v. Society of Sisters also cited by Tinker, striking down a requirement
that all children attend public schools, invokes Meyer in recognition of a purely substantive due
process "liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control." Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). These opinions have little,
if anything, to do with the rights of students themselves to engage in free expression.
3. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
4. Id. at 510.
5. See id. at 504.
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ally or potentially disruptive conduct by those participating in it."6 The
Court found there was no indication of "interference, actual or nascent,
with the schools' work or of collision with the rights of other students to
be secure and to be let alone; 7 there was "no indication that the work of
the schools or any class was disrupted;"8 there were "no threats or acts of
violence on school premises."9 The only "suggestions of fear of disorder"
arose from the fact some friends of a former student killed in Vietnam
were still in school and that students at another high school threatened to
wear armbands of other colors.' ° The district's own official memorandum
on the incident indicated that its regulation had been motivated by a be-
lief that schools simply were not appropriate places for
"demonstrations."'" Finally, the evidence showed that the schools were
engaging rampantly in viewpoint discrimination-permitting other stu-
dents to sport political campaign buttons and Iron Crosses ("traditionally
a symbol of Nazism"), 2 without objection. On these facts, the three stu-
dents were summarily suspended and refused readmission until they
would return without their armbands. 3
One does not have to impugn the "good faith"'4 of the Des Moines
school administrators to conclude, as did seven of the nine justices, that
their actions exceeded the bounds within which deference to their ad-
ministrative judgment remained appropriate. 5 Even a more conservative
6. Id. at 505.
7. Id. at 508. In dissent, Justice Black noted, however, that "the armbands did exactly what
the elected school officials and principals foresaw they would, that is, took the students' minds off
their class work and diverted them to thoughts about the highly emotional subject of the Vietnam
war." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 518 (Black, J., dissenting). In support, he noted that John Tinker had felt
"self-conscious," that a mathematics teacher "had his lesson period practically 'wrecked' chiefly by
disputes with [13 year old] Mary Beth Tinker," and that there were "comments," "warnings," and
"poking of fun" by other students. Id. at 517-18. Without even attempting to balance a school's
interest in avoiding such mild disruptions against whatever rights we may wish to accord students to
express themselves upon important issues of public concern, an even more basic inquiry may begin
with a recognition that mild diversions of this nature are a natural and common part of everyday life
in schools (and virtually anywhere else). It is difficult to imagine how one might eliminate them in a
viewpoint neutral and nondiscriminatory manner short of imposing the form of Spartan
regimentation rejected out of hand by the Court in Meyer. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401-0 2.
8. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 509 n.3.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 510.
13. See id. at 504.
14. ld. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The absence of anything in the record "which impugns
the good faith" of the school administrators was the sole determinative point for Justice Harlan, who
would accord those administrators "the widest authority in maintaining discipline and good order,"
and alone joined the more vehement Justice Black in dissent. Id.
15. There will always be a call to deference to school administrators in the area of their
presumptively superior general expertise, i.e., the administration of the schools under their
supervision. This should not prevent the courts from intervening at the margins, however,
particularly when basic civil liberties are implicated. As pointedly explained by Justice Jackson for
the Court in Barnette,
STUDENT EXPRESSION
body than the late Warren Court of 1969 would have had difficulty sus-
taining the actions of the administrators--or even sidestepping the is-
sue' 6-without effectively depriving students of any meaningful expres-
sive rights whatsoever (which of course was an option, though probably
not for that Court). Albeit through a rather pathetic veneer of post-hoc
justifications, the goal of the school authorities had been transparently to
keep even non-disruptive discourse on emotionally provocative contro-
versial issues completely off school property. This would have been a
difficult state of affairs to sustain as a'matter of constitutional principle.
Justice Fortas' opinion for the Court in Tinker is a powerful read,
more than making up in eloquence whatever it may have missed in terms
of consideration of the breadth of its practical implications. Noting the
amorphous fears of the school administrators, the Court reasoned:
[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance
is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any
departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any
variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word
spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates
from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a
disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk.., and
our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom-this kind of
openness-that is the basis of our national strength and of the inde-
pendence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this rela-
tively permissive, often disputatious, society.'
7
Noting that "state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarian-
ism,"" and that "students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients
Nor does our duty to apply the Bill of Rights to assertions of official authority depend
upon our possession of marked competence in the field where the invasion of rights
occurs.... [W]e act in these matters not by authority of our competence but by force of
our commissions. We cannot, because of modest estimates of our competence in such
specialties as public education, withhold the judgment that history authenticates as the
function of this Court when liberty is infringed.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639-40 (1943). Prior to Tinker, and in matters
principally involving teachers', rather than students', rights, the Warren Court had demonstrated a
willingness to go there. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (opinion for the Court by
Justice Fortas striking down a prohibition on the teaching of the Darwinian theory of evolution on
free exercise and establishment clause grounds); see also Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967) (striking down an anti-sedition law applicable to teachers on First Amendment and due
process grounds); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (striking down as a violation of
associational rights a requirement that teachers disclose all organizations to whom they have
contributed within the preceding five years).
16. Tinker may be seen as nudging into the zone where even an exercise of Professor
Alexander Bickel's celebrated "passive virtues" of avoiding controversial or premature judicial
pronouncements-i.e. by denying certiorari-would have had troublesome implications by virtue of
the message it would have sent. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 111-43 (1962).
17. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09.
18. Id. at 511.
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of only that which the State chooses to communicate,"' 9 the Court set the
standard that a student may express his or her opinion, even on contro-
versial subjects, essentially anywhere "on the campus during the author-
ized hours,"2° "if he does so without 'materially and substantially inter-
fer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation
of the school' and without colliding with the rights of others."
2'
Essentially, the rhetoric of Tinker was a manifestation of respect for
and confidence in our nation's young people. The Supreme Court case
was a ringing refusal to demean them as second-class citizens, or worse.
Scholars have compared Tinker, perhaps not altogether fairly, with the
propensity of Justice Scalia to refer interchangeably to "students," "chil-
dren," "children in school," and "schoolchildren" as explicitly distin-
guished from "free adults" in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton.
The same comparison could as readily be made with Justice White's
opinion for the Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O .23 To some degree, the
framing of the issue-i.e., are we dealing with "children" or "students"-
predetermines the outcome. However, even in the midst of the Court's
significant retrenchment from the analytical standard promulgated in
Tinker, the rhetoric of Tinker is still almost uniformly accorded defer-
ence.
24
The Court, however, has indeed retrenched as a matter practical
adjudication. Tinker was followed by uncertainty on the part of school
officials, litigiousness on the part of and on behalf of students, and some
measure of fear that Justice Black may have been right in his prognosti-
cations of students "running loose, conducting break-ins, sit-ins, lie-ins,
and smash-ins."2 5 While this fear was hardly realized, the conservatively-
shifting Court has taken the opportunity to seize upon factual scenarios
less compelling than that of John and Mary Beth Tinker as vehicles for
restoring a degree of judicial deference to administrative discretion in the
area of First Amendment rights as readily as it has done so in the context
19. Id.
20. Id. at 512-13.
21. Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
22. 515 U.S. 646, 654-56 (1995) (holding that urinalysis drug testing of school athletes did
not violate the Fourth Amendment). See also Nadine Strossen, Essay: Student Rights and How They
Are Wronged, 32 U. RICH L. REV. 457, 472 (1998). Strossen, who is both a law professor and
national president of the American Civil Liberties Union, makes the point that "if other people do
not respect the rights of young people, then young people are less likely to grow up respecting the
rights of other people." Id. at 458.
23. 469 U.S. 325, 327-33 (1985) (applying a "reasonableness" rather than "probable cause"
standard to on-campus student searches).
24. See, e.g., Justice Scalia in Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995).
25. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 525 (Black, J., dissenting). See also Stanley Ingber, Symposium:
Twenty-Five Years After Tinker: Balancing Students' Rights: Liberty and Authority: Two Facets of
the Inculcation of Virtue, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 421, 425-26 (1995).
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of the Fourth Amendment. 26 While these shifts have commenced uni-
formly with homage to Tinker, they have nevertheless narrowed the
broad sweep of Tinker's rhetoric.
Three opinions define the critical stages of the Court's shift. The
first, Board of Education v. Pico,27 involved a student challenge to a
school board's removal of certain books from high school and junior high
school libraries which it characterized as "anti-American, anti-Christian,
anti-[Semitic], and just plain filthy., 28 A fractured and uneasy plurality of
the Court held that the board's actions had violated the First Amendment
rights of the students, and that courts may intervene and override admin-
istrative decisions when such basic constitutional values are implicated.29
Despite Justice Blackmun's lament that the "particularly complex prob-
lem" was being taken up by the Court at all,3" and Justice White's refusal
to address the constitutional issue pending a trial on remand,3 the Court
explicitly restricted its holding to the narrow subject of removal of books
already on the library shelves,32 as distinguished from their placement
there in the first place. Dissents ranged from pleas for deference on such
issues to democratically elected (and parent influenced) school boards
and administrators,33 to dissertations on the varying roles of government
as sovereign and as educator, 34 to accusations of "debilitating encroach-
ment upon the institutions of a free people. 35 Justice Powell's dissenting
opinion was accompanied by an appendix of colorful-and out of con-
text-quotations from the books in question (presumably to lend cre-
dence to the reasonableness of the school board's decisions). 36 The Pico
opinions, for all their volume and discord, are uniformly unhelpful and
for the most part manifestly unprincipled. Disparate positions are taken
vis a vie deference to school administrators with minimal, and in some
cases no, attention to their boundaries. There is no cohesive theme about
much of anything. What is evident is a shifting and floundering Court,
one less comfortable with Tinker's broad license to override the judg-
26. See generally, Acton, 515 U.S. at 654-66 (upholding scheme of suspicionless drug testing
of student-athletes under special needs doctrine); T.LO., 469 U.S. at 337-45 (permitting warrantless
search of student's purse grounded in reasonable suspicion of presence of cigarettes).
27. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
28. Pico, 457 U.S. at 857. The books included Slaughter House Five, by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.;
The Naked Ape, by Desmond Morris; Down These Mean Streets, by Piri Thomas; Best Stories of
Negro Writers, edited by Langston Hughes... ; Soul on Ice, by Eldridge Cleaver, and others. Id. at
857 n.3. The removal had been sparked by a demand by a politically conservative parent's
organization. See id. at 856.
29. See id. at 866-67.
30. Id. at 876 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
31. See id. at 883-84 (White, J., concurring).
32. See id. at 871-72.
33. See id. at 885-93 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 921 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
34. See id. at 909 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 897 (Powell, J., dissenting).
36. See id. at 897-903.
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ments of school administrators yet unprepared to address the frontiers of
their discretion.
The second case,* Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser 7 indi-
cates a second stage in the Court's shift. In Fraser, the Court took the
opportunity to review a two-day suspension of a high school student
who, over the direct advice of his teachers, had given a sexually sugges-
tive nominating speech at a school assembly (with no apparent repercus-
sions other than some mild embarrassment and bewilderment among the
listeners).38 One may suggest that there was no particular reason to take
this case on certiorari at all, except possibly to repair some of the mess
left in the wake of Pico. What resulted was a lecture on behalf of seven
of the justices by Chief Justice Burger on society's "interest in teaching
students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.' 39 Only Justices
Marshall and Stevens dissented. Justice Marshall argued the record did
not demonstrate that the speech had been disruptive,4" and Justice Stev-
ens objected on essentially procedural due process grounds.4' Even Jus-
tices Brennan and Blackmun joined the majority.42 Most tellingly, there
was no objection from any quarter to Chief Justice Burger's pronounce-
ment that "the constitutional rights of students in public school are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings....
'the First Amendment gives a high school student the classroom right to
wear Tinker's armband, but not Cohen's jacket.'
43
In Cohen v. California,44 Cohen's jacket bore the epithet "Fuck the
Draft" and the Court held in 1971 that he could not be punished for dis-
turbing the peace for wearing it in the corridor of the Los Angeles court-
house.45 In an opinion by Justice Harlan, the Court had declined to find
the expression "obscene" in the context it was used,' and had not found
it "inherently likely to provoke violent reaction"'' or directed to a par-
ticular person within the parameters of the "fighting words" doctrine of
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.48 The Court found that Cohen's prosecu-
tion reflected at best an "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of distur-
bance [which] is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expres-
sion."'" The Cohen Court noted particularly that communication encom-
37. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
38. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677-79.
39. Fraser, 478 at 681.
40. See id. at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
41. See id. at 691-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. See id. at 687-90.
43. Id. at 682 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979)).
44. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
45. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 15, 26 (1971).
46. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
47. Id.
48. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
49. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 23 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
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passed an "emotive function" as distinct from-and perhaps even more
important than-purely "cognitive content," and that the government
must not be permitted to "seize upon the censorship of particular words
as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views."50
The distinction between Tinker's armband and Cohen's jacket may
not be as readily apparent as Chief Justice Burger would have us believe.
It is not at all clear, for example, that the latter would be any more inva-
sive of or susceptible to collision with the rights of other students than
the former, or that one would necessarily be more or less disruptive of
the school's work. In the context of Fraser, the import of the Chief Jus-
tice's comment is that school administrators may now be entrusted to
determine what is and is not "socially appropriate behavior"5 on campus
(use of the word "fuck" apparently illustrating that which is not accept-
able). Viewed solely as a case about "lewd" speech, Fraser is not par-
ticularly troublesome. Viewed as a broader and unconstrained license to
school officials to impose subjective standards of "social appropriate-
ness" upon student speech, Fraser becomes extremely troublesome from
a civil liberties perspective for precisely the reasons noted by Justice
Harlan in Cohen-this degree of unchecked regulatory discretion is pat-
ently susceptible to use "as a convenient guise for banning the expression
of unpopular views. '5 2 This standard does not fit with the "hazardous
freedom"53 of Tinker, if indeed it can be viewed as a standard at all.
The last case in the trilogy of the practical shift away from Tinker
was Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.14 In Kuhlmeier, three stu-
dent staff members of a high school newspaper sued over their principal's
decision to delete from the final edition of the paper two pages contain-
ing, among other items, an article on students' experiences with preg-
nancy and a separate article on the impact of divorce on students at the
school.55 The evidence indicated that the principal's primary concern with
the first article was a realistic prospect that the identities of the pregnant
students might be discernable, against their wishes, from the text of the
article notwithstanding their use of false names, as well as a belief that
the article's references to sexual activity and birth control might be inap-
propriate for dissemination to some of the younger students at the
school.5 6 The principal's concern with the second article was that it con-
tained negative references to the divorced parents of an interviewed stu-
dent who was identified in the article by name, while the parents had
been given neither an opportunity to respond nor to object to the article's
50. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
51. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
52. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
53. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
54. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
55. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 263.
56. See id.
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contents or its publication.57 The newspaper itself was an "integral part of
the school's" second level journalism curriculum.58
It is worth noting up front that it is much harder to fault the deci-
sions made by the Hazelwood principal than those of the administrators
in Des Moines. In fact, it may be suggested that his decisions appear
manifestly reasonable and sensitive to the concerns of students, parents,
and the most basic practices of responsible journalism. Yet, he interfered
with student expression, and he was sued. Furthermore, the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals sustained the suit on the grounds that (1) the news-
paper was a "public forum" virtually immune from official censorship
except (2) when "necessary to avoid material and substantial interference
with school work or discipline ... or the rights of others."5 9 As much as
we may view the facts of Tinker as having cried out for judicial inter-
vention to a receptive Warren Court, it is hardly surprising that the facts
of Kuhlmeier fell on receptive ears at what had now become the
Rehnquist Court.
Even so, the Court did not purport to abandon Tinker. Justice
White's opinion for the Court commences with a traditional and explicit
acknowledgment of Tinker.60 Accompanied by a perfunctory nod to
Fraser's holding that the First Amendment rights of students "'are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults, '' 61 the Court pro-
ceeds to reject the proposition that curricular school newspapers qualify
as a public forum. 62 The Court finally reaches its primary point-a
proposition that there is an operative distinction between speech which a
school must tolerate and speech which a school must sponsor:
The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to toler-
ate particular student speech-the question that we addressed in
Tinker-is different from the question of whether the First Amend-
ment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student
speech. The former question addresses educators' ability to silence a
student's personal expression that happens to occur on the school
premises. The latter question concerns educators' authority over
school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other ex-
pressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public
57. See id.
58. Id. at 264. The evidence also suggested that the principle would have taken less drastic
action than simply eliminating the articles had there been time to make changes before the scheduled
press run.
59. Id. at 265 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969)).
60. See Kuhlneier, 484 U.S. at 266.
61. Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
62. See Kuhlmeier, 484 at 267-70. This holding generated a national backlash from school
journalism activists and the adoption in more than a few states of statutes affirmatively declaring




might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.
These activities may fairly be characterized as part of the school cur-
riculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting,
so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to




Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this second
form of student expression to assure that participants learn whatever
lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are
not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of
maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not errone-
ously attributed to the school. 64
The Court concludes by defining the standard of judicial review to apply
to this newly defined "second form" of student expression: "[W]e hold
that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial
control of the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored
expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns." 65 Lest even this appear too inviting to
potential student plaintiffs, the Court continues, "[i]t is only when the
decision to censor . . . has no valid educational purpose that the First
Amendment is so 'directly and sharply implicate[d]' . . . as to require
judicial intervention to protect students' constitutional rights.
66
Notwithstanding the Court's facial suggestion to the contrary, it may
appear from the discussion above that Tinker has been all but lost in the
wake of Fraser and Kuhimeier, with a broadly applicable "material and
substantial interference, 67 standard being replaced by virtually complete
deference to school authorities to (1) censor whatever they want in the
context of "school-sponsored"68 activities (i.e., almost anything remotely
related to the school) as long as they are able to state some superficial
"valid educational purpose '69 for doing so, and (2) impose open-ended
standards of "socially appropriate behavior"7 ° on whatever is left. Inter-
estingly, this has not proven to be the case.
The original Tinker standard has had a persistent tendency to get its
nose above water when "school-sponsored" speech is not clearly impli-
cated, e.g., when a student was penalized by removal from a school foot-
ball team for telling his parents about a hazing incident to which he had
63. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 270-7 1.
64. ld. at 271.
65. Id. at 273.
66. Id. at 273 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
67. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
68. Kulhmeier, 484 U.S. at 271.
69. Id. at 273.
70. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
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been subjected;" when a dress code prohibited clothing that "harasses,
threatens, intimidates, or demeans" others without creating a "substantial
risk of a material and substantial disruption";7 2 when a school sought to
prohibit t-shirts purportedly alluding to an alcoholic beverage.73 In
Mclntire, the school had asserted, as might have been predicted in the
wake of Kuhlmeier, that "at least during school hours when classes are in
session ...the district can limit student expression in any reasonable
way ... . ",0 The court did not buy it.
75
On the other hand, courts have followed Kuhlmeier when "school-
sponsored" activities have been implicated, such as when a student
sought to hand out condoms in the context of a school election,76 or when
students objected to a school's refusal to allow them to play a particular
song as part of their marching band's fall program.77 The author of this
essay met with the same result two years running in the context of
graduation ceremonies---one year representing African-American stu-
dents who wished to wear Kente Cloths over their gowns, and the second
year representing a student who wished to wear a pin expressing sympa-
thy with the victims of the Columbine High School tragedy. 78 The objec-
tions of the school administrators in each of the latter cases focused not
on the content of the particular expression at issue, but upon the prospect
that if they opened the door to one form of expression, they would fall
into the trap of unsupportable viewpoint discrimination unless they
opened the door to everything imaginable-even, and perhaps especially,
under the highly deferential Kuhlmeier standard. In other words, with the
unquestioned power to exclude came the practical imperative to exclude
everything not manifestly linked to "pedagogical concerns." This was a
rather sad and perverse commentary, particularly in the context of the
very ceremony which celebrates the students' transition to the purport-
edly greater freedoms of adulthood.
71. See Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1237 (10th Cir. 1996).
72. Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 159 (D. Mass. 1994).
73. See Mclntire v. Bethel Sch., 804 F. Supp. 1415, 1427 (W.D. Okla. 1992). This is
notwithstanding the fact that Tinker itself expressly disclaimed application to "regulation of the
length of skirts or the type of clothing, to hair style or deportment." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507-08 (1969).
74. Mclntire, 804 F.Supp. at 1418.
75. See id. at 1427.
76. See Henerey v. City of St. Charles, 200 F.3d 1128, 1135-36 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that
the School District had the right to disqualify Henerey from the election because his conduct dealt
with the controversial topic of teenage sex and because his conduct "carried with it the implied
imprimatur of the school").
77. See McCann v. Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist., 50 F.Supp.2d 918 (E.D. Mo. 1999). The song
was Grace Slick's "White Rabbit," and the school's objection was that it promoted the illegal use of
drugs. McCann, 50 F. Supp. 2d. at 920.
78. See Ocansey v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-I, No. 98-M-1099 (D. Colo. 1998); Byrd v.
Williams, No. 99-WM-972 (D. Colo. 1999). Interestingly, in both cases the school district confined
its Kuhlmeier argument to the graduation ceremony itself, expressing no objections to the expressive
symbols at issue under the Tinker standard either before or after the formal ceremony.
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In the end, it is Fraser that seems to have been at least temporar-
ily-and one may frankly hope permanently-lost in the adjudicatory
shuffle. This alone may be quite a positive thing, as Fraser certainly em-
bodies the judicial approach potentially most dangerous from a civil lib-
erties perspective and most demeaning to students and contemptuous of
young people in general. What is left appears to be an uneasy dichotomy
between Tinker and Kuhimeier, turning upon whether or not the context
within which the speech occurs may be viewed as "school-sponsored."
The issue is one of the degree of deference to be accorded presumptively
to administrative discretion. It is within this dichotomy that we find our-
selves in the wake of the April 20, 1999 shootings at Columbine High
School.
The primary legitimate concern raised by Columbine is, of course,
the physical safety of both students and teachers. In this regard, we may
expect a focused discourse particularly on Fourth Amendment issues in
the continued aftermath of the shootings. The justification for constrict-
ing First Amendment rights, while much in the news, 79 is far less appar-
ent from a principled perspective. Yet, this is where many of the emo-
tional aftershocks are being felt.
It is essential to recall that the "hazardous freedom" 80 validated in
Tinker in no way limits the ability of school officials to ensure safety.
The standard enunciated by the Court in Tinker expressly excludes from
its protection "conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any
reason-whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior-materi-
ally disrupts class work or involves substantial disorder or invasion of
the rights of others . "..."81 This exclusion is broad enough to address
virtually all realistic and legitimate threats to safety. Kuhlmeier adds
nothing particular to the mix on this point'- it is difficult to imagine a
scenario in which speech or conduct which could realistically and legiti-
mately pose a danger to others would be protected under Tinker and
79. By way of illustration: A Virginia high school student was suspended in the immediate
wake of Columbine for dyeing his hair blue-a suspension justified by the school board chairman on
the grounds that "[tihere are things we have to look at now, with the mood of the whole nation," and
supported by the governor's attribution of the Columbine shootings to an "anything goes attitude
toward students' appearance[s]." Wes Allison, ACLU Threatens Surry Law Suit; On Behalf of Blue-
Haired Youth; Student Expelled After Columbine Slayings, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, May 26,
1999, at A-I. A Minnesota high school senior's picture was removed from the school year book
because it showed her seated on a flag-draped VFW howitzer as an expression of her patriotism and
anticipated career in the United States Army. Doug Grow, When Zero Tolerance Hits at Common
Sense: Even a Patriotic Student's Senior Picture Isn't Exempt from School's Weapons Rule,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, Oct. 31, 1999, at B2. All-black clothing, trench coats, oversized
baggy pants, camouflaged attire, spiked jewelry, swastikas, bandannas, skull caps, and pentagrams
were banned under a revised school dress code in Texas, and a 17-year old student was suspended
for wearing a black armband to honor the Columbine victims and as a statement of protest against
new school rules restricting student speech. Sandy Louey, Dress Code Changes in Works; Allen,
McKinney React to Incidents, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 24, 1999, at JI.
80. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
81. Id. at 513.
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could be prevented only due to its nexus with some "school-sponsored"
activity.
Tinker requires something more, however. It requires that a restric-
tion upon expression be validated by something beyond an enunciation
of "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance. '82 This is a
critical caveat. Absent this caveat, mere invocation of the word "Colum-
bine" would be sufficient to impose "absolute regimentation,"83 and
squelch any vestige of independent expression and, for that matter,
thought. Absent this caveat, school officials and administrators would be
accorded virtually absolute discretion to impose upon our students their
subjective standards of whatever may be viewed as "socially appropriate"
by themselves, or their momentarily most vocal constituency-i.e.,
Fraser becoming virulently malignant. This caveat is a last line of de-
fense against both administrative and majoritarian abuses, and against
even a good faith loss of perspective (if not common sense) that may
accompany times of passion. It is the line upon which our courts-"by
force of [their] commissions" to quote Justice Jackson u-must stand.
The examples recited in footnote 79, supra, are sadly illustrative
(though hardly exhaustive) of the levels to which we are all quite unwit-
tingly capable of sinking absent some imperative that we pause for a
moment and consider the implications of the power we are abusing.
Tinker's caveat regarding "undifferentiated fear or apprehension" '85 assists
with that pause. This is one of the great benefits of mandating a constant,
if not always overriding, level of constitutional discourse in the face of
administrative discretion. If nothing else, it keeps us honest. The great
threat of convulsions like Columbine is that they make it seductively
easy to be innocently dishonest. We become at least temporarily more
tolerant of those who, frequently with the best of intentions, would im-
pose (rather than truthfully seek to teach and inculcate) a viewpoint or
lifestyle and stifle a competing one. The Columbine tragedy does not call
for prohibiting blue hair or gothic dress styles any more than letter jack-
ets or cardigan sweaters. It does not justify depriving students of the op-
portunity to think for themselves and engage in emotive and intellectual
expression merely because it does not resonate with our own sensitivi-
ties. It does not justify the exclusion of controversial subjects from the
halls of our schools. Columbine is not a license to demean our young
people as incapable or unworthy of being respected or trusted.
In the aftermath of Columbine, the legacy of Tinker is perhaps more
crucial than it has ever been. There is room in that legacy for the opera-
tive limitations and inculcative function defined in Kuhlmeier. There is
82. Id. at 508.
83. Id.
84. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943).
85. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
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more than adequate accommodation for the safety of our students and
teachers. There is a strong basis for broad deference to the wisdom and
policies of the elective boards and administrative personnel who operate
our public school systems. There is also, however, a philosophical and
practical commitment to the "hazardous freedom... that is the basis of
our national strength."86 If we want that strength to last, this commitment
belongs as much in our schools as it does anywhere in our society.
86. Id. at 508-09.
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BASKETBALL DIARIES, NATURAL BORN KILLERS AND
SCHOOL SHOOTINGS: SHOULD THERE BE LIMITS ON
SPEECH WHICH TRIGGERS COPYCAT VIOLENCE?
JULIET DEE*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past five years, parents who send their children to school
in the morning have had to face the grim possibility, however remote,
that their children might be shot and killed by a classmate during the
school day. ABC News provides a list of school shootings between 1996
and the present', which is as follows:
February 19, 1997: 16 year-old Evan Ramsey opens fire with a shot-
gun in a common area at the Bethel, Alaska, high school, killing the
principal and a student and wounding two others. He is sentenced to
two 99-year terms.
October 1, 1997: A 16 year-old boy in Pearl, Mississippi is accused
of killing his mother, then going to Pearl High School, killing two
students including his ex-girifriend and wounding seven others. He is
sentenced to life in prison.
December 1, 1997: 14 year-old Michael Carneal kills three girls and
wounds five others as they take part in a prayer circle in a hallway at
Heath High School in West Paducah, Kentucky. Carneal pleads guilty
but is mentally ill and is serving life in prison. One of the wounded
girls is left paralyzed.
March 24, 1998: Four girls and a teacher are shot to death and 10 oth-
ers wounded during a false fire alarm at Westside Middle School in
Jonesboro, Arkansas when two boys, ages II and 13, open fire from
the woods. Both will be held in juvenile facilities while under age 21.
April 24, 1998: A 14 year-old student at James W. Parker Middle
School in Edinboro, Pennsylvania shoots a science teacher to death at
a graduation dance.
* The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Colby Rosenberg in providing many
of the background materials for this article. The author would also like to thank Denver University
professors Joyce Sterling and Nancy Reichman and Law Review editors Kristin Angus, Kelley
Southerland, David Becker and Sumaya Vanderhorst for their many, many hours spent in organizing
the March 2000 symposium on youth violence and also in editing this article.
1. See ABC News, available at
http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/schoolshootings990420.html (last visited Nov.
13, 2000).
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April 28, 1998: A 14 year-old boy kills two classmates and wounds a
third on the basketball court at an elementary school in Pomona, Cali-
fornia.
May 19, 1998: An 18 year-old honor student kills a classmate who
was dating his ex-girlfriend at Lincoln County High School in
Fayetteville, Tennessee.
May 21, 1998: 15 year-old Kip Kinkle kills both his parents with a
gun his father had bought for him; he then drives to school and opens
fire in the cafeteria, killing two classmates.
April 20, 1999. Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, wearing long black
trench coats, open fire at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colo-
rado, killing 12 students and a teacher. They then kill themselves.
November 19, 1999: A 12 year-old boy fires a .22-caliber handgun
and kills a girl in his class outside a middle school in Deming, New
Mexico.
December 6, 1999: 13 year-old Seth Trickey, in Fort Gibson, Okla-
homa, opens fire on his classmates with his father's 9 mm semi-
automatic handgun, injuring four children.2
February 29, 2000: A 6 year-old boy, the son of Dedric Owens, uses a
.32 semi-automatic weapon to kill his classmate Kayla Rolland in
front of the first-grade class in Mount Morris Township, Michigan.3
Following the 1997 killing spree involving Michael Carneal's
shooting of three girls in West Paducah, Kentucky, the parents of the
three murdered girls filed suit against the producers of the movie The
Basketball Diaries and also against the manufacturers of a number of
violent video games.4 The parents charged the violent media content in-
stigated copycat violence causing the murders of their daughters.5 Al-
though legal precedent might predict that plaintiffs who file suit against
the media for violent content will not prevail because such suits are gen-
erally barred by the First Amendment, Americans who file lawsuits per-
haps do so as an expression of outrage. Even though plaintiffs may real-
ize that their chances of prevailing in court are slim, it is possible that
they pursue litigation to further public discussion of causes and preven-
tion of youth violence. This may be especially true when considering the
2. ABC News, available at
http://more.abcnews.gp.comlsections/us/DailyNews/schoolshootings990420.html (last visited Nov.
13, 2000).
3. ABC News, available at
http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/uslDailyNews/schoolshooting000303.html (last visited Nov.
13, 2000).
4. See Complaint, James v. Meow Media. Inc., Civil Action No. 5:99CV-0096 (U.S.D.,
western Dist. Ky., Paducah Division, filed April 12, 1999.
5. Complaint, James (No. 5:99CV-0096).
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perspective of a grieving parent who is trying to understand the loss of a
cherished son or daughter.
II. DEGREE OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
In response to lawsuits alleging copycat violence, U.S. courts have
struggled to bridge two trends in law during the past two decades: 1) the
expansion of the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech;
courts have more frequently intervened to prevent juries from deciding
genuine issues of free speech; and 2) the liberalization of tort law in the
direction of strict liability, characterized "by the gradual erosion, if not
elimination, of legislative and judicial impediments to recovery for dan-
gerously defective products."6
During the past two decades, a number of plaintiffs have filed neg-
ligence suits against film producers or other media. For example, plain-
tiffs have claimed personal injury or that a family member was injured or
killed in an incident instigated by a particular Hollywood film, magazine
advertisement, a rap artist's lyrics, etc. In nearly all of these cases the
courts have refused to consider whether the media were "negligent,"
ruling instead that unless the media were guilty of "incitement" as de-
fined by First Amendment law, the media could not be held liable for the
harm or injury despite the fact that the harm mimics the medium's con-
tent. The courts have almost always concluded that to find the media
negligent for allegedly inducing people to harm themselves or others
would set a dangerous precedent whereby more and more people would
attempt to recover damages from media outlets, claiming that they had
hurt themselves or had been hurt as the result of an idea or image por-
trayed in the media.
In arriving at their decisions, judges have looked to various Su-
preme Court decisions suggesting that not all First Amendment rights are
created equal; rather, there is a "hierarchy" in which some types of
speech receive a greater degree of protection than others. Highest on the
hierarchy is "pure" or "core" speech, involving the expression of ideas.
This includes even the most inane or vulgar television program, film or
rap lyrics, provided that the only purpose is entertainment or artistic ex-
pression.
Lower on the hierarchy is speech consisting of highly technical in-
formation; for example, publishers have been found liable for negligence
in cases involving fatal plane crashes where the pilots had relied on inac-
curate or defective aviation charts.7 Due to the fact that aviation charts
contain purely technical information, and because lives depend on their
6. Jonathan M. Hoffman, From Random House to Mickey Mouse: Liability for Negligent
Publishing and Broadcasting, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 65, 77 (1985).
7. See, Brocklesby v. United States, 753 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1985), withdrawn and amended,
767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985), and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986).
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accuracy, courts have ruled that such charts have the legal status of a
navigation tool such as a compass. In other words, courts have shown
little concern for protecting the publishers' freedom of speech or freedom
to err in publishing faulty aviation charts.8 Lower courts have disagreed,
however, about whether publishers of science textbooks, cookbooks,
"how-to" books, informational brochures, mushroom encyclopedias or
chemical encyclopedias should be liable if plaintiffs have been injured
while trying to follow the instructions.9 The most recent case involving a
"how-to" book is Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc.,' ° which involved a
book instructing hitmen on how to commit murder-for-hire without get-
ting caught." A hitman followed the book's step-by-step instructions to
kill two women and a child.'2 Because these technical information or
"how-to" cases pose slightly different legal questions, they will not be
the focus of the current discussion; rather will focus solely on "pure" or
"core" speech involving media entertainment, and upon commercial
speech.
8. See, e.g., Brocklesby, 753 F.2d at 794, withdrawn and amended, 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir.
1985), and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986); Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671 (2nd Cir.
1983); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1981); Reminga v. United
States, 631 F.2d 449 (6th Cit. 1980); Times Mirror Co. v. Sisk, 593 P.2d 924 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978);
Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen Co., 216 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
9. See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1034 (9th Cir. 1991) (plaintiffs
not entitled to recovery after becoming severely ill from eating mushrooms, based on information
published by defendant's mushroom encyclopedia because "[t]he language of products liability law
reflects its focus on tangible items"); Carter v. Rand McNally, No. 76-1864-F (D.Mass. 1980);
Bertrand v. Rand McNally, No. 77-957-M (D. Mass. 1980); Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694
F.Supp. 1216, 1216-18 (D. Md. 1988) (nursing student who treated herself for constipation by taking
an enema consisting of hydrogen peroxide after consulting medical textbook not entitled to recovery
because publisher's conduct limited to publishing, not authoring of subject in question); Lewin v.
McCreight, 655 F.Supp. 282, 283 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (publisher of "how to" book not held liable
where supplied information is merely a compilation of third-party authors); Demuth Dev. Corp v.
Merck & Co., 432 F.Supp. 990, 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (publisher not held liable for plaintiffs loss of
sales based on publisher's misstatement about a chemical plaintiff produced because no contractual
relationship or other duty existed between defendant and plaintiff); Cardozo v. True, 342 So.2d
1053, 1056 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (liability without fault held inappropriate in an action against
one passing on printed words without opportunity to investigate them), cert. denied, 353 So.2d 674
(Fla. 1977); Alm v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 480 N.E.2d 1263 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (plaintiff
injured when following instructions of "how to" had no cause of action for negligence; adverse
effect of such liability upon public's access to ideas considered too high a price to pay); Walter v.
Bauer, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821, 822-23 (N.Y. 1981) (defendant not held liable for production of a book
describing a science experiment involving rubber bands resulting in eye injury to infant student
because the plaintiff was not injured by use of the book for the reading purposes for which it was
designed); Roman v. City of N.Y., 442 N.Y.S.2d 945, 948 (N.Y. 1981) ("[o]ne who publishes a text
cannot be said to assume liability for all 'misstatements' . . . to a potentially unlimited public for a
potentially unlimited period"); Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123, 126 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), afid, 587
A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991) (court rejects strict liability theory because it refuses to recognize a "book" as a
product under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A).
10. 940 F.Supp. 836 (D. Md. 1996), rev'd, Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir.
1997), and cert. denied, Paladin Enters. v. Rice, 523 U.S. 1074 (1998).
11. Rice, 940 F.Supp. at 838-40.
12. See id. at 838.
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Commercial speech is lower on the hierarchy than pure speech and
speech involving technical information. Until recently, commercial
speech was entirely unprotected by the First Amendment, and "business
advertising that [did] no more than solicit a commercial transaction
[could] be regulated by government on the same terms as any other as-
pect of the marketplace."' 3
More recently, however, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
First Amendment provides a degree of protection to commercial
speech,14 but it has distinguished commercial advertisements from "core"
speech in that they contain no "ideological expression" and are not "inte-
grally related to the exposition of thought."' 5 The Supreme Court has
further explained that it "[has] afforded commercial speech a limited
measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the
scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation
that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial
expression."' 6 Commercial speech is also given less rigorous protection
because the speakers "are well situated to evaluate the accuracy of their
messages and the lawfulness of the underlying activity."' 7
Lowest of all on the hierarchy is obscenity, which in theory receives
no First Amendment protection, 8 although it does in practice because
courts find it difficult to define what is obscene. There have been a few
copycat cases in which children have imitated either consensual or forced
sex portrayed in "dial-a-porn" audiotapes the children listened to when
dialing 900-numbers. 9 Because these cases have been analyzed else-
where, ° again, the current discussion will not cover technical informa-
tion or obscenity cases against the media, but will focus solely on "pure"
and commercial speech.
Thus, in dealing with the question of whether various media outlets
have been negligent, or whether media content has incited individuals to
13. Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due
Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1979).
14. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
770 (1976).
15. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 779-81.
16. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,456 (1978).
17. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 n.6
(1980) (citing Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977)).
18. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
19. In re Sean Matte, File No. 88127180 (P.Ct., Genesee, Mich., Dec. 14, 1988); In re Nicole
Matte, File No. 88127181 (P. Ct., Genesee, Mich., Dec. 14, 1988); Brian T. v. Pacific Bell, No. CH
128655-7 (Cal. Super. Ct., S.D. Alameda County 1988); In re Audio Enterprises Inc., Apparent
Liability for Forfeiture, Order and Consent Decree, 3 F.C.C.R. 88-389 at 7063 (1988); In re
Intercambio, Inc., Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, Memorandum and Order, 4 F.C.C.R. FCC 89-
273 at 6860 (1989).
20. See Juliet Dee, "To Avoid Charges of Indecency, Please Hang Up Now:" An Analysis of
Legislation and Litigation Involving Dial-a-Porn, 16 COMM. & THE LAw 3 (1995).
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commit violence against themselves or others, courts have considered the
type of speech involved and its position on the "hierarchy" of protected
speech.
There are numerous cases in which plaintiffs have had no trouble
documenting that an act of violence was inspired by certain media con-
tent. But in order to win against media defendants in court, plaintiffs
must prove that the media content "incited" the act of violence.
There are two clear conditions necessary to produce a conviction for
incitement. The Supreme Court outlined these conditions in Branden-
burg v. Ohio,2 in which it overturned the conviction of a Ku Klux
Klansman for a speech demanding "revengeance" against blacks.22 The
Court specified the conditions that must be present in tandem before an
incitement conviction can be upheld: 1) the danger of lawless action
must be immediate ("imminent") and likely; and 2) the speech is "di-
rected to inciting or producing" such lawless action.23
Brandenburg demonstrates that the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit States to forbid or proscribe advo-
cacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy
is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
to incite or produce such action.
The Brandenburg decision thus requires an analysis of every situa-
tion in which speech might be punished. It is exceedingly difficult, if not
impossible, for plaintiffs to prove, however, that the media outlet in-
tended for the violence to occur, thus resulting in a failure to meet the
second part of the Brandenburg test and a judgment in favor of the media
defendant. In a few cases, however, courts have permitted these cases to
proceed to trial.
III. COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Because courts rely on precedent in arriving at their decisions, it is
helpful to briefly consider previously decided cases. Because these cases
have been thoroughly discussed and analyzed elsewhere,24 the following
outline simply lists the cases with a parenthetical note regarding the out-
come. Our discussion begins with the commercial speech cases, which
are lower on the hierarchy of protected speech than the cases involving
"pure speech."
21. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
22. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446.
23. Id. at 447.
24. See Hoffman, supra note 3; Juliet Dee, From "Pure Speech" to Dial-a-Porn:




A. Earlier Cases Involving Commercial Speech
The cases outlined below comprise the precedents to which courts
will turn in future cases alleging media liability for commercial speech
content. Hanberry v. Hearst;25 Yuhas v. Mudge;26 Weirum v. RKO Gen-
eral;27  Libertelli v. Hoffinan-LaRouche28; Walters v. Seventeen
Magazine29; Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine°; Eimann v. Sol-
dier of Fortune Magazine31 ; Sakon v. Pepsico Inc. ;32 and Braun v. Soldier
of Fortune Magazine.33
The most recent of these cases involving commercial speech is Way
v. Boy Scouts of America, 4 discussed in detail below.
B. Way v. Boy Scouts of America (1993)35
On November 19, 1988, 12 year-old Rocky Miller and his friends
were experimenting with an old rifle that accidentally discharged and
killed Rocky. His friends testified that the three of them had been reading
a 16-page advertising supplement on shooting sports in the September
1988 issue of Boys' Life magazine published by the Boy Scouts of
America; the ad supplement motivated them to experiment with the rifle
25. 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 521 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (plaintiff prevailed in negligence suit against
Good Housekeeping magazine which had endorsed shoes alleged to be slippery and defective).
26. 322 A.2d 824, 824-25 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1974) (court granted summary judgment to
publisher of Popular Mechanics magazine following negligence suit by father whose two sons were
injured by fireworks advertised in the magazine).
27. 539 P.2d 36, 37, 40 (Cal. 1975) (radio station held liable for inciting teenagers to speed in
pursuit of station's DJ who was driving Los Angeles freeways; court held KHJ liable because such
injury was foreseeable; two speeding teenagers responding to radio content negligently caused death
of Ronald Weirum, a separate freeway driver).
28. 7 Media L. Rptr. 1734 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (court held that Hoffman-LaRouse had no duty of
care to plaintiff who had been addicted to valium advertised in Physician's Desk Reference).
29. 241 Cal. Rptr. 101, 101-03. (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (court found in favor of Seventeen
Magazine following negligence suit by plaintiff who suffered from toxic shock after using Playtex
tampons advertised in magazine).
30. 651 F. Supp 1397, 1397-98, 1403 (W.D. Ark. 1987) (court reversed defendant's previous
summary judgment victory finding that defendant's advertisements had a substantial probability of
causing harm to an individual; plaintiff filed negligence suit against Soldier of Fortune magazine
after he survived shooting by a hitman hired through the magazine's classified ads).
31. 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989) (Fifth Circuit found in favor of Soldier of Fortune Magazine
following claim of negligence by survivors of woman whose husband had responded to classified ad
in magazine to hire hitman to kill her; Court held that burden on publishers to investigate all
classified ads would be too great).
32. 17 Media L. Rptr. 1277 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1989) (court found in favor of Pepsico following
negligence suit by fourteen-year-old boy who broke his neck while imitating bicycle jump in
Mountain Dew television commercial).
33. 749 F. Supp. 1083 (M.D. Ala. 1990), affd, 968 F.2d 1110 (11 th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S.Ct. 1028 (1993) (jury found Soldier of Fortune Magazine negligent for publishing classified
ad which led conspirators to a hitman who murdered Richard Braun; U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed; U.S. Supreme Court declined to review case).
34. 856 S.W.2d 230; 21 Media L. Rptr. 1684 (Tex. App. 1993).
35. Id.
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that killed Rocky. Rocky's mother filed charges of negligence against the
Boy Scouts, the National Shooting Sports Foundation that sponsored the
ad supplement, and Remington Arms Company, which had placed an ad
in the supplement. Her attorney Windle Turley charged that Boys' Life
had breached a special duty to minors and was negligent per se because
the ad supplement constituted an illegal offer to sell firearms to minors in
violation of the Texas Penal Code. Turley also pursued a product liability
argument, charging that the ad supplement was a defective product with-
out proper warnings.36
The defendants argued that the ad supplement was protected by the
First Amendment and moved for summary judgment. 371In response, Tur-
ley argued that the gun supplement created a "foreseeable risk of harm"
and "incited" Rocky Miller to action. 38 Turley pointed out that Boys'
Life, whose subscribers range in age from nine to fourteen, had received
complaints from parents over the years regarding the Shooting Sports
supplement; furthermore, the Boy Scouts do not allow ads for alcohol,
judo, karate, tobacco, handguns or movies other than those with "G"
ratings in Boys' Life because "they reasonably foresee the danger [such
ads] would pose to impressionable young boys .... Clearly, if the Boy
Scouts foresaw [these dangers], they should have reasonably foreseen
that promoting guns to minors might present a risk of harm. '39 Turley
rejected the First Amendment defense, insisting: "Neither commercial
free speech, nor any other principal of statutory, common or moral law
gives a right to immunity if you peddle guns to kids .... It is unlawful
to even offer to sell guns to children as the defendant... has done."'
Repeating their request for a summary judgment, the defendants
cited Herceg v. Hustler,41 Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine,42
Walters v. Seventeen Magazine,43 Yuhas v. Mudge,44 Sakon v. Pepsico,45
and other cases in which courts held that the contested speech was pro-
tected by the First Amendment. 6 The defendants argued that the ad sup-
plement constituted pure speech rather than commercial speech because
the supplement contained "articles" on how to get started in the shooting
36. See id. at 232
37. Defendant Boy Scouts of America's Motion for Summary Judgment, Way v. Boy Scouts
of America, 856 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App. 1993) (No. 90-12265).
38. Plaintiff's Response and Brief in Support to Defendant Boy Scouts of America's Motion
for Summary Judgment at 7-8, Way v. Boy Scouts of America, 856 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App. 1993)
(No. 90-12265-B).
39. Id. at 27-29.
40. Id. at 28-29.
41. 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987).
42. 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989).
43. 241 Cal. Rptr. 101 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
44. 322 A.2d 824 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1974).
45. 553 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1989).
46. Defendant Boy Scouts of America's Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary
Judgment at 3-9, Way v. Boy Scouts of America, 856 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App. 1993) (No. 90-12265).
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sports. 7 However, earlier the defendants had admitted that the supple-
ment was an advertisement; the words "advertisement" are written in 6-
point type on the "editorial" portions of the supplement but not on the
ads themselves, which comprise 10 of the supplement's 16 pages. The 6-
point type is so small that it is nearly invisible, apparently unintended to
be seen by the reader. 8
The defendants also argued that if the Boy Scouts were found negli-
gent for printing the ad supplement, it could set a precedent for publish-
ers to be held liable for printing ads or articles about skiing, football,
swimming or snorkeling, all of which entail some risk of injury.49 The
defendants also rejected the plaintiff's charge that they were offering to
sell guns to minors, pointing out that the Texas Penal Code forbids the
transfer of weapons to minors, referring to individual transactions rather
than general-purpose advertising to the public.5"
In 1991 the Texas District Court granted a summary judgment for the
Boy Scouts, but Turley immediately filed an appeal. In 1993 the Court
of Appeals of Texas (Fifth District) applied a risk-utility equation, but
concluded that the social utility of the advertising supplement out-
weighed the risks because the court interpreted the ads as promoting
"safe and responsible use of firearms ... calculated to lessen the possi-
bility of accidental death caused by a child's use of firearms."'" Finding
that the risk of injury from reading the ad supplement was not suffi-
ciently foreseeable to outweigh the social utility of discussing the proper
use of firearms, the court dismissed the negligence claim against the de-
fendants. Rocky Miller's mother did not pursue an appeal.
IV. PURE OR CORE SPEECH CASES
Whereas courts are slightly less willing to extend First Amendment
protection to commercial speech, it is well established that "pure" or
"core" speech such as that designed to entertain, as in movies or even rap
lyrics, receives the highest level of First Amendment protection. In con-
sidering those cases in which media allegedly instigated copycat vio-
lence, one notes that in one type of case, a child imitating a media stunt
injured or killed himself, whereas in a second type of case, a teenager
who had watched a violent film then intentionally injured or killed an
innocent third party. The cases in which a child injured or killed himself
rather than an innocent third party are outlined as follows:
47. See id. at 25.
48. See Plaintiffs Response and Brief in Support to Defendant Boy Scouts of America's
Motion for Summary Judgment at 25, Way v. Boy Scouts of America, 856 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App.
1993) (No. 90-12265-B).
49. See Defendant Boy Scouts of America's Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary
Judgment at 27, Way v. Boy Scouts of America, 856 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App. 1993) (No. 90-12265).
50. See id. at 34.
51. Way v. Boy Scouts of America, 856 S.W.2d 230, 236 (1993 Tex. App.).
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A. Earlier Cases in Which a Child Injured or Killed Himself
1981 Shannon v. Walt Disney Productions52 (11 year-old Craig Shan-
non followed suggestion of actor on The Mickey Mouse Club Show to
put BBs in balloon, but balloon burst and propelled piece of lead into
his eye, partially blinding him; parents sued for negligence but lost).
1982 DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting Co.5 3 (13 year-old Nicholas
DeFilippo accidentally hanged himself while attempting to imitate
stunt hanging on Johnny Carson's Tonight Show; parents sued NBC
for negligence but NBC prevailed).
1984 Nezworski v. ABC and Hanna-Barbera Productions54 (6 year-
old Jeremy Nezworski imitated cartoon hanging on The Scooby Doo
Show and killed himself by accident; mother sued ABC and Hanna-
Barbera for negligence and won out-of-court settlement).
1984 Pulling v. TSR Hobbies55 (16 year-old Irving Pulling shot him-
self after allegedly experiencing "extreme emotional and psychologi-
cal stress" from playing Dungeons and Dragons, but court granted
summary judgment for TSR Hobbies).
1987 Herceg v. Hustler Magazine56 (14 year-old Troy Dunaway acci-
dentally hanged himself after reading Hustler magazine article on
autoerotic asphyxiation; mother sued Hustler for incitement; mother
prevailed in jury trial, but Hustler prevailed on appeal).
1988 McCollum v. CBS Records57 (19 year-old John McCollum shot
himself after listening to Ozzy Osbourne's music for five hours; father
sued Ozzy Osbourne and CBS Records for negligence and later for in-
citement, but court ruled in favor of Osboume and CBS Records).
1990 Watters v. TSR, Inc.58 (minor Johnny Burnett killed himself after
allegedly being "driven to self-destruction" as a result of playing Dun-
geons and Dragons; mother sued TSR for negligence but Sixth Circuit
upheld lower court's grant of summary judgment for TSR, Inc.)
1990 Vance v. Judas Priest5 9 and Judas Priest v. Second Judicial
District Court6° (19 year-old James Vance and 18 year-old Raymond
52. 275 S.E.2d 121 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980), reversed, 276 S.E.2d 580 (Ga. 1981).
53. 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982).
54. Nezworski v. American Broadcasting Companies, No. G83-202 (Cir. Ct., Gogebic
County, Mich., filed May 8, 1984).
55. Pulling v. TSR Hobbies, Inc., No. L-68-84 (Cir. Ct., Hanover County, Va., filed Oct. 10,
1984).
56. 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987).
57. 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Cal. App. 1988).
58. 904 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1990).
59. 1990 WL 130920 (Nev. Dist. Ct. 1990).
60. 104 Nev. 424; 760 P.2d 137; 15 Media L. Rep. 2010 (1988).
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Belknap shot themselves in the head after listening to heavy metal mu-
sic of Judas Priest; Belknap died but Vance survived; Vance and
Belknap's mother sued Judas Priest and CBS Records for negligence,
but court ruled in favor of Judas Priest and CBS Records).
1992 Waller v. Ozzy Osbourne61 (16 year-old Michael Waller com-
mitted suicide after listening to Ozzy Osbourne's music for several
hours; parents sued Ozzy Osboume and CBS Records for negligence,
but CBS Records prevailed).
1992 Hamilton v. Osbourne62 (17 year-old Harold Hamilton commit-
ted suicide after listening to Ozzy Osbourne's music; mother sued
Ozzy Osboume and CBS Records for negligence, but Osbourne and
CBS Records prevailed).
B. Earlier Cases in Which a Teenager Hurt or Killed a Third Party
A second type of case implicating pure or core speech involves
situations in which violent media content allegedly triggers a child or
teenager to injure or kill a third-party victim. Cases involving innocent
third parties are outlined as follows:
1979 Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting System63 (15 year-old boy
charged that CBS, NBC and ABC were negligent in airing so much
televised violence that he had become desensitized to real-life vio-
lence and therefore shot to death his 83 year-old neighbor while bur-
glarizing her home; court ruled in favor of defendant networks).
1981 Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co.64 (mother of Olivia
Niemi charged that NBC was negligent in airing Born Innocent,
which portrayed graphic rape in girl's reform school and which insti-
gated four teenagers to "rape" 9 year-old Olivia Niemi and a 7 year-
old friend with a beer bottle four days after Born Innocent was broad-
cast; NBC prevailed).
1982 Bill v. Superior Court65 (minor Jocelyn Vargas, who was shot
after seeing "gang movie" Boulevard Nights, claimed that the movie
producer was negligent in failing to warn her that the movie would
attract viewers prone to violence; movie producer Tony Bill pre-
vailed).
61. 763 F. Supp. 1144 (M.D. Ga. 1991), aff'd, 958 F.2d 1084 (1 th Cir. 1992) (unpublished
opinion).
62. 958 F.2d 1084 (11th Cir. 1992) (unpublished opinion), combined with Waller v.
Osbourne, 958 F.2d 1084 (11 th Cir. 1992) (unpublished opinion).
63. 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla 1979).
64. 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
65. 137 Cal. App. 3d 1002; 8 Media L. Rptr. 2622 (1982).
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1984 State of Florida v. Nelson Molina66 (Nelson Molina held down
10 year-old Karla Gottfried while her 16 year-old step-brother
stabbed her to death; Molina's defense attorney argued that Molina
was desensitized to violence by comedy film Love at First Bite; Mo-
lina was nonetheless convicted).
1989 Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp.67 (16 year-old Mi-
chael Barrett stabbed 16 year-old Martin Yakubovicz to death after
Barrett watched "gang movie" The Warriors; parents of Yakubowicz
sued Paramount for negligence, but Paramount prevailed).
1990 Lugo v. LJN Toys 6 8 (8 year-old Brian Franks threw spinning
blade from "Voltron" toy, permanently damaging eye of 6 year-old
Yessenia Lugo; mother sued for negligence; mother of girl won out-
of-court settlement from LJN Toys).
C. Cases Alleging that Boyz 'n' the Hood Incited Violence
Three years after Martin Yakubowicz' parents sued Paramount un-
successfully after Michael Barrett stabbed their son to death at the al-
leged instigation of the movie The Warriors, Columbia Pictures Indus-
tries distributed the film Boyz 'n' the Hood. In two separate screenings of
the film, Alejandro Phillips and Jon Lewis were shot and seriously in-
jured. Phillips and Lewis later filed two separate lawsuits; in both cases,
the shooting victims charged that the advertising campaign for the film
was designed to attract movie viewers with violent tendencies.
1. Phillips v. Syufy Enterprises, Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.
et al (1992)69
At a screening of the feature film Boyz 'n' the Hood in California in
1992, Alejandro Phillips was shot and seriously injured by an unknown
assailant. He subsequently sued Syufy Enterprises (the movie theater's
security service) and Columbia Pictures Industries, charging that Colum-
bia Pictures had created an advertising campaign for Boyz 'n' the Hood
which "was likely to incite violent and lawless activity during public
screenings of the film."7 Columbia Pictures filed a demurrer, and the
California Superior Court of Contra Costa County ruled in its favor,
finding that the First Amendment insulated Columbia Pictures from a
lawsuit based on content of the ad campaign for the movie.
66. No. 84-2314B (1 th Jud. Dist., Dade County, Fla.) (Filed Oct. 19, 1984).
67. 536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 1989).
68. 75 N.Y.2d 850; 552 N.E.2d 162; 552 N.Y.S.2d 914 (N.Y. 1990).
69. 20 Media L. Rptr. 1199 (1992).
70. Id. at 1199.
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2. Lewis v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. (1994)"'
Just as Alejandro Phillips had been shot, Jon Lewis was shot and se-
riously injured at another screening of Boyz 'n' the Hood in Chino, Cali-
fornia in 1994. Like Phillips, Lewis sued Columbia Pictures Industries
and also charged that Columbia Pictures' advertising campaign was neg-
ligent and was also "likely to incite and produce violence and lawless
activity during public screenings of the film."72 The California Superior
Court of San Bernardino County sustained Columbia Pictures' demurrer,
but Lewis appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District.
Lewis emphasized his argument that the shooting was foreseeable be-
cause Columbia Pictures had informed theater owners of the potential for
violence at screenings of Boyz 'n' the Hood and had offered to pay for
extra security precautions at certain movie theaters. But the California
Court of Appeal held that all advertisements for Boyz 'n' the Hood were
protected by the First Amendment. The court also considered the ques-
tion of whether Columbia Pictures owed a duty of care to Lewis, but
concluded that "To impose upon the producers of a motion picture the
sort of liability for which plaintiffs contend in this case would.. .permit
[people who react violently to movies] to dictate, in effect, what is shown
in the theaters of our land. '73 Allowing liability for the advertisements
for movies would result in a heavy burden on the movie industry, the
court explained. "Predicting when or where individuals . . . might react
violently to an advertisement for a movie would prove difficult, if not
impossible, in our violence-prone society. Moreover, the fact that Co-
lumbia warned movie theater owners of potential violence and offered to
assist in security measures at certain theaters does not impose a duty on
Columbia. '74 The court concluded that "the violent actions allegedly in
response to Columbia's advertisements for Boyz 'n' the Hood were not
foreseeable; therefore, Columbia had no duty to Lewis."75 The court thus
affirmed the lower court's judgment sustaining Columbia Pictures' de-
murrer without leave to amend, and Lewis did not appeal.
D. Davidson v. Time Warner (19 9 7)76
Unlike Way which involves a magazine advertising supplement, or
Phillips and Lewis, which involve a feature film, Davidson v. Time War-
ner, Inc. involves the rap music lyrics of the late rapper Tupac Shakur.
In April 1992, Ronald Howard was driving a stolen car through Jackson
County, Texas. Officer Bill Davidson, a state trooper, stopped Howard
for a possible traffic violation, not knowing that the car was stolen.
71. 23 Media L. Rptr 1052 (1994).
72. Id. at 1053.
73. Id. at 1056 (citing Bill v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1002 (1982).
74. Id. at 1056.
75. Id.
76. 25 Media L. Rptr. 1705 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
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Howard fatally shot Officer Davidson with a 9-millimeter Glock pistol.
At the time of the shooting, Howard was listening to a pirated audiocas-
sette of 2Pacalypse Now, a recording performed by Tupac Amaru Shakur
and produced by Interscope Records and Atlantic Records. In an attempt
to avoid the death penalty, Howard claimed that listening to 2Pacalypse
Now had incited him to shoot Officer Davidson. (Despite Howard's
claim, the jury sentenced Howard to death.) Bill Davidson's widow
Linda Davidson sued Time Warner, Tupac Shakur, Interscope Records
and Atlantic Records, claiming that 2Pacalypse Now incited Howard to
murder Officer Davidson. Her attorney pointed to one rap number,
"Crooked Ass Nigga," which glorifies the shooting of police officers.
The lyrics in question are as follows:
Now I could be a crooked nigga too
When I'm rollin' with my crew
Watch what crooked niggas do
I got a 9-millimeter Glock pistol
I'm ready to get with you at the trip of the whistle
So make your move and act like you wanna flip
I fired 13 shots and popped another clip
My brain locks, my Glock's like a f--ckin' mop,
The more I shot, the more mothaf-ka's dropped
And even cops got shot when they rolled up.
77
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Victoria
Division, immediately granted the motions of Time Warner and Tupac
Shakur to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, but it considered the
claims against Interscope Records and the Atlantic Recording Corpora-
tion. 78 The court dismissed the negligence claim, finding that the defen-
dants could not reasonably foresee that distribution of 2Pacalypse Now
would result in the murder of a state trooper. The court declined to find
2Pacalypse Now obscene.
Citing many of the cases outlined above, such as Eimann, Way, Sa-
kon, Herceg, McCollum, Waller, DeFilippo, Shannon, Bill, and Ya-
kubowicz, the court declined to find that the lyrics of "Crooked Ass
Nigga" constituted incitement under the Brandenburg test. The court
noted that 2Pacalypse Now had been released three years before Officer
Davidson was fatally shot, and of the 400,000 sales of the album, no one
except Linda Davidson had claimed that the recording incited listeners to
shoot police officers. The court's analysis of 2Pacalypse Now in light of
77. Id. at 1707 n.4.
78. In its decision the court noted that after Time Warner had filed its motion to dismiss,
Tupac Shakur himself was killed in a drive-by shooting in September 1996. The court further noted,
however, that Shakur's death would not affect the substance of its decision. Davidson v. Time
Warner, Inc., 25 Media L. Rptr. 1705, 1706 n.l (S.D. Tex. 1997).
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the Brandenburg test was surprisingly different from all preceding media
liability cases, however, in which courts had always declined to find that
the songwriter or screenwriter had not intended for violence to result. In
contrast, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas con-
ceded that "the Davidsons may have shown that Shakur intended to pro-
duce imminent lawless conduct. '79 As evidence of Shakur's intent, the
court cited two interviews with Shakur. In the first interview, Shakur
said: "I think of me as fighting for the black man .... I'd rather die than
go to jail."80 In the second interview, Shakur said:
I think that my music is revolutionary because it's for soldiers. It
makes you want to fight back. It makes you want to think. It makes
you want to ask questions. It makes you want to struggle, and if
struggling means when he swings, you swing back, then hell yeah, it
makes you swing back.8'
This admission of possible intent on Shakur's part meant that
2Pacalypse Now might have met one prong of the Brandenburg test for
incitement, but the court quickly qualified its admission, finding that "the
Davidsons cannot show that Howard's violent conduct was an imminent
and likely result of listening to Shakur's ["Crooked Ass Nigga."]82 Thus,
even if the rap number met the second prong of the Brandenburg test, it
did not meet the first prong.
The court explained that to assume that Davidson was killed be-
cause Howard was listening to 2Pacalypse Now would be to commit the
fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc. It was more likely that Howard shot
and killed Davidson in order to avoid being arrested for driving a stolen
car. Thus, although the court described the lyrics of 2Pacalypse Now as
disgusting and offensive, it nonetheless held that the lyrics were pro-
tected by the First Amendment, and dismissed Linda Davidson's case.
E. Cases Alleging that Natural Born Killers Incited Murders
There have been two lawsuits against Warner Brothers and movie
producer Oliver Stone alleging that Stone's film Natural Born Killers
incited a series of murders in real life. Like the two cases involving Boyz
'n' the Hood, the two cases involving Natural Born Killers were both
dismissed on First Amendment grounds.
79. Davidson, 25 Media L. Rptr. at 1722.
80. Id. at 1722 n.24.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1722.
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1. Miller v. Warner Brothers (1997)83
After repeatedly watching Natural Born Killers, Ronnie Beasley
and Angela Crosby apparently tried to emulate the young couple in the
film by going on a crime spree which included kidnapping, car-jacking,
theft and murder. They shot and killed Olin Miller. After Beasley and
Crosby were apprehended, they wrote each other letters signed "Mickey"
or "Mallory," who were the two characters in Natural Born Killers.
Miller's widow Margo Miller filed a wrongful death action against Time
Warner Entertainment Company, Warner Home Video, Inc. and Warner
Brothers, arguing that Natural Born Killers was the proximate cause of
her husband's murder. The trial court dismissed her complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Miller appealed, but
the Court of Appeals of Georgia upheld the trial court's dismissal of the
case.
84
2. Byers v. Edmondson (1999)85
In March 1995 Sarah Edmondson and her boyfriend Benjamin Dar-
rus watched Natural Born Killers "more than 20 times." Then they went
on a crime spree in which they shot and killed the owner of a Mississippi
cotton gin and then shot convenience store clerk Patsy Byers, leaving her
a paraplegic. Byers filed suit against Time Warner and Oliver Stone, the
producer of Natural Born Killers, arguing that "the Hollywood defen-
dants" should be held liable for distributing "a film which glorified the
type of violence [Edmondson and Darrus] committed against Byers by
treating individuals who commit such violence as celebrities and
heroes.86 Byers essentially contended that Time Warner and Oliver
Stone owed her a duty to not produce Natural Born Killers, or, failing
that, to protect her from viewers who would imitate the violent acts or
crimes committed by the film's two main characters. Patsy Ann Byers
also charged the filmmaker with incitement: "Defendants are liable...
for producing a film ... which they intended ... would cause or incite
persons such as defendants Sarah Edmondson and Benjamin Darrus (via
... glorification of violent acts) to begin shortly after repeatedly viewing
same, a crime spree such as that which led to the shooting of Patsy Ann
Byers. 87 The court ruminated over the question of intent: "If in fact
[Byers] can prove the allegation that the Warner defendants... intended
to urge viewers to imitate the criminal conduct of 'Mickey and Mallory'.
83. 492 S.E.2d 353 (1997).
84. Miller, 492 S.E.2d at 353.
85. 712 So.2d 681 (La. Ct. App. 1998), writ denied, 726 So.2d 29 (La. 1998), cert. denied sub
nor. Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P. v. Byers, 19 S. Ct. 1143 (1999).
86. Byers, 712 So.2d at 684.
87. Id. at 685.
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.. then the risk of harm to a person such as Byers would be imminently
foreseeable." 88
After considering Bill89 and Yakubowicz, 90 both of which involved
shootings of innocent third parties after the shooters had seen a movie
glorifying gang violence, the court found that Byers had pleaded a cogni-
zable cause of action under Louisiana law. The court relied most heavily
on the Fourth Circuit's decision in Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc.91 In
Rice, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that Paladin
Press' book Hitman: A Manual for Independent Contractors did not nec-
essarily comprise speech protected by the First Amendment. (In Rice, a
hitman followed over twenty-seven specific "how-to" steps outlined in
the book during his brutal murder of a mother, her son, and the son's
full-time nurse); rather, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the case could pro-
ceed to trial, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari, and Paladin Press
finally settled with the survivors of the hitman's three victims on the day
before the case was scheduled to go to trial. 92 In Byers, the Court of Ap-
peal of Louisiana, First Circuit, cited Rice, in which the Fourth Circuit
explained:
Where the intentional, deliberative infliction of suffering and agony
has the goal of emulation, such a product does not free from the
specter of "liability those who would, for profit or other motive, in-
tentionally assist and encourage crime and then shamelessly seek ref-
uge in the sanctuary of the First Amendment."
93
Although judges in all the other cases outlined here watched the
movies or listened to the rap songs alleged to incite violence, in Byers,
strangely, the decision made it clear that the video of Natural Born Kill-
ers was not before the court; in other words, the court did not have ac-
cess to the speech.
After the appellate court in Louisiana ruled that Byers could pro-
ceed to trial, Time Warner and Oliver Stone appealed to the U.S. Su-
preme Court for certiorari, but the High Court declined to hear the case
in March 1999, so the case proceeded to the discovery phase.
Entertainment lawyer Michael Kernan criticized the court's decision
in Byers, arguing that
88. Id. at 688.
89. 137 Cal. App. 3d 1002 (1982).
90. 536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 1989).
91. 940 F. Supp. 836, rev'd, 128 F.3d 233, (4th Cir. 1997), and cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1515
(1998).
92. For a comprehensive discussion of Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc. 940 F.Supp 836,
rev'd, 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), and cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1515 (1998), see ROD SMOLLA,
DELIBERATE INTENT: A LAWYER TELLS THE TRUE STORY OF MURDER BY THE BOOK (1999).
93. Byers v. Edmondson, 712 So.2d 681, 692 (1998) (citing Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc.,
128 F.3d 233 at 248 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1515 (1998)).
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The Byers court drafted an ambiguous opinion-with no clear test-
under which any author, composer or filmmaker can be held liable.
Yet, unlike the McCollum court, and unlike the Paladin court, the
Byers court did not in any way analyze the speech within the film...
Thus, under the Byers test, any song, book or film can face tort li-
ability-as long as there is a conclusory pleading-because there is
no analysis of the speech . .. . At the time Mark David Chapman
murdered John Lennon, he was holding a copy of The Catcher in the
Rye by J.D. Salinger. Under the Byers opinion, assuming John Len-
non's heirs followed the conclusory pleading format in [Byers], J. D.
Salin er could be forced to face litigation for The Catcher in the
Rye.
9
Kernan objected to the "conclusory pleading" in the Byers com-
plaint, arguing that the complaint "merely claims in conclusory terms
that Oliver Stone and the other film producers intended to incite and in-
tentionally cause injury." 95 Under the Brandenburg test, Kernan explains,
Patsy Ann Byers would have to allege specific facts to show that "Oliver
Stone intended to cause Byers' injury and made [Natural Born Killers]
for that purpose. Alleging that Stone intentionally engaged in the 'glori-
fication of violent acts' is quite different than showing Stone intended to
cause injury and made [Natural Born Killers] available for that
purpose."96
Kernan defended Oliver Stone:
There has never been any evidence that Stone ever intended any in-
jury. Rather, Stone says that his intent was to create a satire about the
way the American culture and its media crave violence .... [Tihe
purpose of Natural Born Killers was to mock the way the media and
the public respond to killings.97
Kernan warned that even though the Byers opinion merely permit-
ted the case to proceed to discovery,
it nonetheless could have a widespread implication for producers and
studios, because they could face a flood of lawsuits. The problem
with the Byers opinion is that it leaves no rule in place to determine
which films could be held liable; there is no standard or guideline
provided by the court .... If Byers becomes the rule, filmmakers will
be forced to either settle cases at nuisance-value amounts, or pay for a
costly defense.98
94. S. Michael Kernan, Should Motion Picture Studios and Filmmakers Face Tort Liability
for the Acts of Individuals Who Watch Their Films?, 21 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 695, 698
(1999).
95. Keman, supra note 94. at 705.
96. Id. at 706.
97. Id. at 708, 709.
98. Id. at 699.
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Oliver Stone stopped producing films for some time after the Miller
and Byers cases were filed, but on March 12, 2001, Judge Bob Morrison
of the 21' Judicial District Court in Amite, Louisiana dismissed Byers,
ruling that the case was barred by the First Amendment. Joe Simpson,
the attorney representing Byers' family, said that he intends to appeal the
ruling.99
F. James v. Meow Media, Inc. (1999)00
On December 1, 1997, Michael Carneal, a 14 year-old freshman at
Heath High School in Paducah, Kentucky, stole six guns from a friend's
house, took all six guns to school the next day and opened fire on a
prayer group that met before school began. Carneal killed three girls,
Jessica James, Kayce Steger and Nicole Hadley, and wounded five oth-
ers. Carneal had been an avid player of video games such as Doom,
Quake, and Mortal Kombat, three so-called "splatter games" in which
players navigate mazes in "subjective camera" perspective to shoot hu-
man beings, splattering blood with each kill. (Eric Harris and Dylan
Klebold, who killed 12 students and a teacher at Columbine High School
in Littleton, Colorado, were similarly devoted players of such games.)
Retaining attorneys Jack Thompson and Michael Breen, the parents
of the three girls who Carneal murdered filed suit against Meow Media,
the operator of a pornographic web site, Nintendo of America, Sega of
America and several other videogame companies for making games such
as Quake, Doom, and Mortal Kombat. They also filed suit against Time
Warner, Polygram Film Entertainment Distribution, Palm Pictures, Is-
land Pictures and New Line Cinema for their role in making or distrib-
uting The Basketball Diaries.'l ' Thompson and Breen charged the movie
producers with negligence, arguing that the producers knew or should
have known that "copycat violence would be caused by The Basketball
Diaries" and "there was an unreasonable risk of harm ... either through
the continuous effect of the movie .. .or by the foreseeable action of
others."' 2
Carneal had confessed that the movie The Basketball Diaries, espe-
cially the scene in which the anti-hero Jim Carroll, played by Leonardo
DiCaprio, has a dream about shooting his classmates and his teacher,
inspired him to imitate the scene and kill his Heath High classmates. It is
worth noting that the somewhat autobiographical novel by author Jim
Carroll, on which the movie is based, contains no classroom shooting
99. Kirk Honeycutt, No Illusions: Stone Stops Producing, HOLLYWOOD RPTR., May 4-10,
1999 at 3; Robert W. Welkos, Company Town: Judge Throws Out Lawsuit Against Oliver Stone,
Los ANGELES TIMES, March 13, 2001 at C-7.
100. Complaint, Civil Action No. 5:99CV-0096 (U.S.D., Western Dist. Ky., Paducah Division,
filed April 12, 1999).
101. Complaint, James, No. (5:99CV-0096).
102. Idat 10.
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episode whatsoever. Attorneys Thompson and Breen charged that the
producers of the movie "fabricated a gratuitous and graphic murder spree
for the sole purpose of hyping the movie . . . . This had the effect of
harmfully influencing impressionable minors such as Michael Carneal
and causing the shootings.""1 3
Dr. Diane Schetky, a professor at Yale School of Medicine and psy-
chiatrist retained by Carneal's defense team, concluded that violent and
pornographic media images had had a profound effect on Carneal. She
explained that "The media's depiction of violence as a means of resolv-
ing conflict, and a national culture which tends to glorify violence, fur-
ther condoned [Carneal's] thinking. ' 1°4
Turning from The Basketball Diaries to the video game defendants,
Thompson and Breen charged that games such as Quake, Doom and
Mortal Kombat:
made the violence pleasurable and attractive, and disconnected the
violence from the natural consequences thereof, thereby causing Mi-
chael Carneal to act out the violence.
Additionally, said games [taught] Cameal how to point and shoot a
gun ... making him an extraordinarily effective killer without teach-
ing him any of the constraints or responsibilities needed to inhibit
such a killing capacity ....
[The defendants] knew or should have known that copycat violence
would be caused by their products.
[The defendants] knew or should have known that there was an un-
reasonable risk of harm to others either through the continuous effects
of the video games or... by the foreseeable action of others.
10 5
Shortly after Jack Thompson and Michael Breen filed their com-
plaint and before any decision was made in the case, law professor Scott
Whittier predicted that in deciding James, the judge would look to Wat-
ters v. TSR, Inc.'6 which involved a negligence action against TSR, the
maker of the fantasy role-playing game Dungeons and Dragons.0 7 In
1987, minor Johnny Burnett, a "devoted" Dungeons and Dragons player,
had shot and killed himself. His mother sued TSR, charging that as a
result of his exposure to the game, her son "lost control of his own inde-
pendent will and was driven to self-destruction." Federal district court
Edward Johnstone, the same judge to decide James v. Meow Media, Inc.,
103. Id. at 9.
104. Id. at 8.
105. Id. at 17.
106. 904 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1990).
107. Scott Whittier, The Recent School Shootings: Are Video Game Manufacturers Liable?
N.Y. LAW JOURNAL (Sept. 13, 1999).
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had granted summary judgment in Watters solely on First Amendment
grounds. Johnstone held that Dungeons and Dragons comprised pro-
tected speech, regardless of whether the game was classified as literature
or just as a game, or was intended to inform the public or merely to en-
tertain it. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had upheld
Johnstone's decision; like the federal district court, the appellate court
declined to find TSR negligent in creating Dungeons and Dragons: "If
Johnny's suicide was not foreseeable to his own mother, there is no rea-
son to suppose that it was foreseeable to defendant TSR."' 8
Whittier indeed predicted the court's decision correctly: In April
2000 Judge Edward Johnstone dismissed James, relying upon his own
previous decision in Watters and on the Sixth Circuit's decision affirm-
ing the dismissal of Watters. Johnstone explained that to submit James
to a jury "would be to stretch the concepts of foreseeability and ordinary
care to lengths that would deprive them of all normal meaning. '' °
Johnstone continued: "Just as Johnny Burnett's suicide in Watters was
unforeseeable to the distributors of the game Dungeons and Dragons, so
was Michael Carneal's killing spree unforeseeable to the [media] defen-
dants .... [In Watters,] Johnny's death surely was not the fault of his
mother, or his school, or his friends, or the manufacturer of the game he
and his friends so loved to play. Tragedies such as this simply defy ra-
tional explanation, and courts should not pretend otherwise . ... ",0
"The fact that Michael Carneal chose to kill his classmates rather than
himself does not make his actions any more foreseeable.""' Johnstone
thus dismissed the case, resulting in a First Amendment victory for the
defendants.
V. DISCUSSION
Because courts nearly always dismiss lawsuits involving copycat
violence and media liability on the grounds that these suits are barred by
the First Amendment, it is not surprising that judges in Miller, Byers and
James dismissed the lawsuits alleging that Natural Born Killers and The
Basketball Diaries had incited viewers to commit violence against inno-
cent third parties." 2 Of the commercial speech cases outlined above, the
plaintiffs prevailed in Hanberry and Weirum, and the plaintiffs in Nor-
wood and Braun won out-of-court settlements from Soldier of Fortune
magazine. (Although no legal precedent is set when a media defendant
settles out of court, such settlements might be perceived as victories for
the plaintiffs: even if there is no admission of guilt on the part of the me-
108. Watters v. TSR, Inc., 904 F.2d 378 at 381 (6th Cir. 1990).
109. James v. Meow Media, Inc., Civil Action Number 5:99CV-96-J, Memorandum Opinion at
9 (U.S. District Court, Western District of Kentucky, Paducah Division, filed April 6, 2000).
110. Id. at 14.
Ill. Id. at 9.
112. See supra notes 85-99.
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dia defendant, the fact that the media defendant pays a large and usually
undisclosed sum of money to the plaintiff no doubt gives the appearance
of a tacit victory for the plaintiff in such cases.)
Of the "pure" or "core" speech cases outlined above, the only out-
of-court settlement occurred in Nezworski, when the mother of 6 year-old
Jeremy Nezworski hanged himself by accident and died while trying to
imitate a cartoon hanging on The Scooby Doo Show. Media defendants
ABC and Hanna-Barbera Productions may have settled Nezworski out of
court in order to avoid negative publicity or to avoid the costs of litiga-
tion even though they would probably have prevailed, had the case gone
to trial. Of the pure or core speech cases outlined above, only Herceg
and Vance proceeded to trial, whereupon the media defendants prevailed.
Legal precedents for cases proceeding to trial or cases settled out-of-
court are thus rare, as are the plaintiffs' victories in the commercial
speech cases.
A. Violence in Video Games
In James, the complaint specifies not only The Basketball Diaries,
but also violent video games such as Doom, Quake and Mortal
Kombat,' 3 which apparently influenced Michael Carneal as well as Eric
Harris and Dylan Klebold. The International Committee of the Red Cross
has recently published a report on the impact of violent video games as
"killing simulators and firearms training devices.""' 4 The Red Cross
committee concludes the following:
" Humans have a natural resistance to kill which must be overcome
before any act of armed violence is committed.
* Training devices such as combat simulators [like video games]
may not permit soldiers to develop the reflexes of not attacking
civilians or wounded and surrendering combatants.
* Young people watch violent films in the cinema in a pleasurable
environment, maybe even eating popcorn in the company of a
girlfriend; they come to associate killing with pleasure ....
* Some violent video games have been developed from combat
simulators. Players continually repeat the training sequence of
seeing a target and firing.
* To deny the link between visual violent media and violence in
our society is truly like denying that tobacco causes cancer... 11
113. Complaint, James, No. (5:99CV-0096).
114. International Committee of the Red Cross, Robin Coupland, ed. Humans and Weapons,




The Red Cross report is based in part on research by retired military psy-
chologist David Grossman, who explains that video simulators are de-
signed to desensitize soldiers to killing through repetition, and to condi-
tion soldiers to fire as a stimulus-response or reflex, not as a deliberative
act." 6 Grossman argues that "these same simulators are now in our
homes and arcades teaching the children of Paducah, Columbine and the
rest of the nation to kill.""' 7 Grossman thus warns that video games in
which a child is "rewarded" for hitting targets may be dangerous if the
line between fantasy (video games) and reality becomes blurred in the
child's mind.
B. Violence in Rap Music and Movies
Considering the question of whether the media should be held liable
for instigating teenagers to shoot their classmates or innocent conven-
ience store employees leads us to the larger question of the extent to
which gratuitous, graphic violence such as that portrayed in Tupac Sha-
kur's rap Crooked Ass Nigga, Boyz 'n' the Hood, The Basketball Diaries
or Natural Born Killers should receive First Amendment protection
when it is painfully evident that such images are inciting a few mentally
unstable teenagers to imitate these scenes in real life. But legal prece-
dents point toward no finding of liability for movie producers when their
on-screen mayhem becomes the subject of copycat violence.
Of course, so many variables are involved in human behavior that it
is usually impossible to isolate one cause of violence. For example, a
high percentage of children who are victims of child abuse-sadly-
grow up to become violent abusers themselves. ' 8 In addition to environ-
mental causes of aggression, causes of violent behavior could be
physiological. Professor Adrian Raine of the University of Southern
California has found that brain scans of men who committed assault,
rape, armed robbery and murder indicated that these men had 11-14%
less brain tissue containing mostly brain cells ("gray matter") rather than
nerve fibers.' New York Times reporters Lauri Goodstein and William
Glaberson compiled data on 100 "rampage killers" and concluded that
the vast majority of rampage killers had serious mental health
problems. 2 ° Duh.
116. DAVID GROSSMAN, STOP TEACHING OUR KIDS TO KILL 132 (1999).
117. GROSSMAN, supra note 116.
118. E. Magnuson, Child Abuse: The Ultimate Betrayal, TIME, Sept. 5, 1983 at 20-22.
Magnuson says: "Child abuse perpetuates itself. In a great preponderance of cases-estimates run
as high as 90%-the abusive parent was abused as a child."
119. Curt Suplee, Violent People's Brains May Lack 'Gray Matter;' Condition May Affect
Behavior, Study Finds (Wilmington, Delaware) NEWS JOURNAL, Feb. 15, 2000 at A7.
120. Laurie Goodstein and William Glaberson, The Well-Marked Roads to Homicidal Rage,
N.Y. TIMES, April 10, 2000 at Al, A12-13.
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Given that some percentage of the population of school children
will indeed have mental health problems, how do we prevent them from
the mass murder of their classmates? In considering the 12 cases of
school shootings outlined at the beginning of this discussion, the obvious
question to ask is: Why are guns so easily accessible to school children
in the United States? Why do minors have such easy access to semi-
automatic rifles? The National Rifle Association would of course prefer
to deflect our attention from this question, pointing us instead toward
blaming media influences but never the gun manufacturers and gun deal-
ers who peddle assault rifles to anyone with $130, few questions
asked.12' During the past several years, however, courts have appeared to
be more willing to find that gun dealers owe a duty of care to gunshot
victims murdered by those who purchase guns and ammunition from
dealers in violation of the Federal Gun Control Act.'
22
Meanwhile, pundits on television talk shows wring their hands and
gnash their teeth, while good faith attempts to pass gun control legisla-
tion survive the U.S. Senate but die in the House of Representatives.
After Harris and Klebold murdered 12 classmates and a teacher at Col-
umbine High School, public outcry forced the U.S. Congress to consider
gun control seriously for the first time since 1994. The Senate passed gun
control provisions to close the gun show loophole by requiring back-
ground checks for all purchases at gun shows. In June 1999 Tom Mauser,
the father of one of the students killed at Columbine, called on the House
of Representatives to pass the same legislation which had passed the
Senate. Sadly, however, NRA board member Representative Bob Barr
of Georgia prevented any meaningful gun control legislation from pass-
ing in the House.
123
Turning from gun control legislation to the question of media liabil-
ity, if movies provide the ideas of mass murder and guns provide the
means, should Hollywood producers be liable, or should gun manufac-
turers be liable, or both? Where were the parents of the teen-murderers,
and what were they doing? Although the easy availability of guns in our
society is an excruciatingly painful reality, this question is beyond the
scope of this discussion, which has focused on the allegations that maga-
zine ads, rap lyrics, movies, videogames or pornographic web sites have
incited certain teenagers to commit murder.
121. William Glaberson, Man and His Son's Slayer Unite to Ask Why, N.Y. TIMES, April 12,
2000 at Al, A22.
122. See Coker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 642 So. 2d 774 (Fla. App. 1994); Sogo v. Garcia's
Nat'l Gun, Inc., 615 So. 2d 184 (Fla. App. 1993). See also Sposato v. Intratec Firearms, et al., No.
960937 (S.F. County Super. Ct., filed May 18, 1994) (plaintiffs alleged negligence after Gian Luigi
Ferri killed eight people in a law firm with two assault pistols; court permitted suit against
manufacturers of assault pistols to proceed to trial).




Looking to legal precedent, it was painfully predictable that courts
would conclude that the First Amendment protects Leonardo DiCaprio's
graphic shootings in The Basketball Diaries, as well as Woody Harrelson
and Juliette Lewis' gleeful sadism in Natural Born Killers. It is such a
clichd to say that freedom of speech comes with a price. But sadly, this is
exactly the question we must ask. If we were to use a utility/risk analysis,
as the court in Way did, we could balance the "utility" or entertainment
value and box office profits of The Basketball Diaries and Natural Born
Killers against the "risk" that yet another deranged teenager will imitate
the scenes and massacre innocent school children.
If, as a society, we continue to blindly assert First Amendment free-
doms without looking carefully at the glorification of violence in a Boy
Scout magazine ad, rap lyrics, videogames, pornographic web sites or
Hollywood films, will we pay for this "freedom of expression" with the
lives of our school children?
Of course, the answer is obvious: yes, we will. We don't know
whose children will be shot and killed. We don't know whose children
will be injured for life. But as long as guns are so easily accessible, and
as long as our media continue to glorify gratuitous violence, mentally
disturbed children will kill other children. When the 6 year-old boy in
Mount Morris Township, Michigan shot and killed his 6 year-old class-
mate Kayla Rolland,'24 Genesee County prosecutor Arthur Busch spoke
to the 6 year-old murderer, who was nonchalant about his crime. Busch
reported that the boy said: "Well, this just kinda happens on
television."'25 Unless we as a society make a concerted effort to 1) pre-
vent easy access to guns and to 2) convey to Hollywood producers a lack
of interest in gratuitous violence, school shootings will continue to "just
kinda happen." It's time to stop kidding ourselves.
124. NEW YORK TIMES, March 1, 2000 at Al.
125. <http://newsweek.comlnw-srv/printed/us/naa I 7088-2000mar5.html>.
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FREE SPEECH AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN A POST-
COLUMBINE WORLD: CHECK YOUR SPEECH RIGHTS AT
THE SCHOOLHOUSE METAL DETECTOR
CLAY CALVERT*
In December 1965, to protest the escalating hostilities in Vietnam
and to express support for a truce over the holiday season, 13-year-old
Mary Beth Tinker wore a black armband to her high school in Des
Moines, Iowa.' In protecting the young girl's First Amendment2 right of
free speech in a public school, the United States Supreme Court fa-
mously proclaimed in 1969 that students do not "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.
' 3
Now fast-forward a full thirty years to 1999 and Allen High School
just north of Dallas, Texas. Jennifer Boccia, then a 17-year-old honors
student, wears a black armband like Mary Beth Tinker's to school-not
to protest a war, however, but to mourn the students killed in April 1999
at Columbine High School near Littleton, Colorado4 and to inveigh
against newly implemented school security policies.5 The school's re-
sponse? A three-day suspension coupled with an order gagging her from
speaking with members of the news media.6 Boccia, ultimately, was
forced to file a lawsuit against the school and its officials in order to
protect her free speech rights and to have the three-day suspension ex-
punged from her transcript.!
Associate Professor of Communications & Law and Co-Director of the Pennsylvania
Center for the First Amendment at The Pennsylvania State University. B.A., 1987 Communication,
Stanford University; J.D. (Order of Coif), 199 1, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific;
Ph.D., 1996, Communication, Stanford University. Member, State Bar of California.
1. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
2. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses have been incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause to apply to state and local government entities and officials. See
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
3. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
4. See generally James Brooke, Terror in Littleton: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21,
1999, at Al (describing "the deadliest school massacre in the nation's history" in which two gun-
toting students wearing ski masks, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, fired semiautomatic weapons at
fellow students and hurled explosives).
5 Mary Doclar, Allen student won't face further discipline, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM,
Aug. 5, 1999, at Metro 3.
6. Id.
7. Metro & Texas Digest, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Aug. 31, 1999, at Metro 2.
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Regrettably, the Texas school's action, which flies directly in the
face of the 30-year-old precedent established in Tinker v. Des Moines
School District,8 is far from unique in a post-Columbine world. It is a
world in which administrators, fraught with fears of similar violence at
their own institutions, routinely sacrifice students' rights to free expres-
sion.9 The armband dispute in Allen, Texas, in fact, is not even the only
censorship atrocity after Columbine involving this most passive form of
silent expression. In Louisiana in 1999, the Bossier Parish School Dis-
trict threatened Jennifer Roe, a Parkway High School student, with sus-
pension for wearing a black armband in protest of her school's uniform
policy. ° It took a federal judge to rule in Roe's favor before the school
board finally gave up its sartorial censorship campaign."
This article is more than just the tale of three armband-wearing
young women with a law firm-like name-Tinker, Boccia and Roe-and
a proclivity for engaging in symbolic expression. 2 In particular, it is a
story of censorship illustrated with a collection of cases from a growing
laundry list of speech-repressive incidents involving public school stu-
dents in the first twelve months since the tragic shootings at
Columbine. 3 The article contends that, in many cases, the censorship
occurring today is far from justified under established principles of First
Amendment jurisprudence. The article suggests that constitutional rights
currently are trampled on a routine basis in the nation's public schools,
largely out of a combination of fear, ignorance and self-preservation on
the part of administrators. The troubling lessons taught today's youth are
that free speech means very little when fear takes over and that confor-
mity to the norm-not daring to speak out, not voicing one's own opinion
on issues, not engaging in creative writing or artwork-is the only way
to avoid controversy, both inside and outside of school. Any speech, it
8. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker, the United States Supreme Court held that school
officials may only restrict student speech lawfully if it "materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." Id. at 513.
9. For current background on the topic of school violence, including a number of essays
from different scholars, see SCHOOL VIOLENCE (William G. Hinkle & Stuart Henry eds., 2000).
10. School Board won't appeal protest order, SATURDAY STATE-TIMES/MORNING
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Jan. 8, 2000, at 4-B.
11. Id.
12. Conduct, such as wearing an armband, can be defined as expression -- symbolic speech --
under the First Amendment "if, first, there is the intent to convey a specific message, and second,
there is a substantial likelihood that the message would be understood by those receiving it." ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 868 (1997). The Supreme Court
in Tinker cited with approval the district court's recognition "that the wearing of an armband for the
purpose of expressing certain views is the type of symbolic act that is within the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment." Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969).
13. Columbine was rocked again in February 2000 when two of its students were killed in a
shooting at a sandwich shop near the school. See Michael Janofsky, In Sandwich Shop, 2 More
Columbine Students are Killed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2000, at A18 (describing this second round of
violence affecting students at Columbine High School).
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seems, that in any remote or tangential way evokes images of Columbine
or violence is fair game for censorship.
The cases examined in this article make this clear. They run the
gamut from the actual arrest of a seventh-grade student in Ponder, Texas
for writing a violent Halloween horror story 4-ironically, the student
reportedly had received an "A" grade on the paper'-to the long-term
suspension of a 17-year-old senior honors student in Leon, Kansas for
writing a short poem, told from the perspective of an angry individual
whose dog has been killed, that she posted on a door inside the school.16
In another case examined here, a high school student in North Carolina
was prosecuted and convicted of communicating threats for typing a
simple-yet-polysemic 7 phrase-"the end is near"-on a school computer
screen about two weeks after the shootings at Columbine High School. 8
He also was expelled from school for one year.19 In January 2000, a high
school student in Wisconsin wrote a note reading "Columbine 3:30 To-
morrow" that was discovered by a school employee.20 He was charged
with the felony offense of making a bomb threat.21 Nothing in that
phrase, however, mentions a bomb.
In some cases, school administrators even have cracked down after
Columbine on the wearing of religious symbols on the chance that they
might also be gang related and thereby lead to violence. In Harrison
County, Mississippi, 15-year-old Ryan Green was prohibited from
wearing the Star of David-the six-pointed star and symbol of Judaism
that bedecks the Israeli flag--on school grounds. The school contended
it was a gang emblem.23 It took the intervention of the American Civil
14. See Josh Romonek, Violent horror essay lands student in jail, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
Nov. 4, 1999, at B6 (describing the arrest of 13-year-old Christopher Beamon for writing a fictional
story about shooting two classmates and a teacher). See infra notes 150-154 and accompanying text
(describing the case in more detail).
15. Halloween Tale Gets Boy an 'A,'and a Jail Stay, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1999, at A20.
16. Boman v. Bluestem Unified Sch. Dist., No. 00-1034-WEB, 2000 WL 297167, at *1 (D.
Kan. Jan. 28, 2000); See Kansas Court to Hear ACLU Case of Honor Student Expelled for
Displaying Artwork, ACLU News (visited Feb. 14, 2000)
<http://www.aclu.org/news/2000/nO12800a.html>. See infra notes 162-176 and accompanying text
(describing the case in more detail).
17. See GRAEME TURNER, BRITISH CULTURAL STUDIES: AN INTRODUCTION 36 (1990)
(observing that "language is polysemic; that is, it can mean different things to different readers"). In
this case, the phrase "the end is near" could mean many different things because it is ambiguous as to
what or to whom "the end" refers.
18. Cory Reiss, Computer Message at Hoggard, MORNING STAR (Wilmington, N.C.) Sept.
30, 1999, at lB.
19. Id.
20. Threatening note forces Viroqua schools to close, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 6, 2000,
at 2.
' 21. Some Seek Tough Law on School Threats, WIS. ST. J., Feb. 22, 2000, at 5B.
22. Charles C. Haynes, Safety is Important, But So Are Liberties, DAYTON DAILY NEWS,
Sept. 6, 1999, at 10A.
23. Id.
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Liberties Union and the filing of a lawsuit by the boy's family before "the
school board backed down and exempted religious symbols from its anti-
gang policy. 2 4 Not only does this case raise troubling free speech issues
under the First Amendment but also questions about the extent of free
exercise of one's religion on school grounds.25
The wave of censorship even is affecting the student press. In a sub-
urb of Cleveland, Ohio, a high school journalist was suspended after
writing a satirical column in the wake of the Columbine shootings.26 The
student had suggested that students could relieve stress by assassinating
the president and blowing up a house.27 The school eventually ended up
learning to appreciate the satire the hard way-by paying the student
$16,500 to settle his lawsuit.
28
But not all of the cases involve censorship of speech in the class-
room or on school premises. Schools today are punishing students for
their off-campus expression on the Internet if it somehow suggests or
merely conjures up images Columbine-like terror.
For instance, a high school student in rural Rolla, Missouri was sus-
pended for ten days and required to perform over forty hours of commu-
nity service for an online comment he made five days after the Colum-
bine shootings.29 The student's offense? In response to a rather innocent-
but-important question posed on a teens-only Internet discussion board-
"Do you think such a tragedy could happen at your school?"-the student
typed in a single word answer, "yes."3 ° The suspension resulting from the
use of this word apparently gives new meaning to the phrase "just say
no."
In Washington state in February 2000, a federal judge issued a tem-
porary restraining order preventing a high school from suspending a stu-
dent who created a Web site that school officials claimed "contained
threats against individual students and staff members."'" Eighteen-year-
24. Id.
25. The First Amendment provides in relevant part that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The Free Exercise Clause has been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause to apply to state and local government entities and officials. See Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (holding that "the concept of liberty" in the Fourteenth
Amendment "embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment").
26. Donna J. Robb, Suspension taken off school record of student journalist, PLAIN DEALER,
Nov. 5, 1999, at lB.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Student sues school after being suspended for comment about Columbine on Internet
discussion board, Student Press Law Center Web Page (visited Feb. 8, 2000)
<http://www.splc.org/newsflashes/102099missouri.html> [hereinafter Student sues school].
30. Id.
31. Lisa Pemberton-Butler, Judge won't let district suspend student, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 24,
2000, at BI.
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old Nick Emmett, a star basketball player at Kentlake High School 32 and
a standout student,33 included mock obituaries of other students on his
Web site.34 The students, however, requested their own death notices and
Emmett actually obtained permission from the students before running
their photographs.35 According to the Temporary Restraining Order en-
tered by the district court judge, the site even contained a warning that it
was for entertainment purposes only.36
In another recent Washington state case, a group of high school stu-
dents who created a Web page off-campus, on their own time and with
own their own computers, were suspended for a week and fined by the
Lake Washington School Board after a prankster from another state
"posted what sounded like a death threat" on their site.37 Once again, it
took the involvement of American Civil Liberties Union attorneys before
the school district reversed itself several months later in February 2000.38
These cases, it must be stressed, are not exhaustive of the incidents
of censorship occurring in schools today across the country. They merely
are examples of the ones that either have been reported in the news me-
dia or have reached the judicial system. They are, in other words, only
the tip of the iceberg. Is all of this censorship justified? Does it violate
the First Amendment? What are the implications of this censorship on
democracy? These are some of the important questions this article con-
siders.
Part I articulates the primary legal standards and tests under which
speech like that described above might justifiably be punished in public
schools.39 Part II then applies those rules to some of the cases mentioned
above, illustrating that the speech in each incident merits protection un-
der established principles of First Amendment jurisprudence. 4° Part III
then suggests some of the undesirable social and political ramifications
that may result from today's efforts to squelch student expression." Fi-
nally, the article predicts that although today's censorship most likely
will wane as time passes since the tragedy at Columbine, it nonetheless
could very easily be revived by a similar incident unless like the one in
Santee, California in March 2001 secondary school educators come to
32. See All-League boys teams, SEATLE TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at C5 (identifying Emmett as
a first-team all-league player).
33. Emmett maintained a 3.95 grade-point average. Sandy Ringer, Emmett wins court
reprieve on suspension by Kentlake, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 24, 2000, at D7.
34. Judge Temporarily Halts Suspension of Student, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 24,
2000, at B3.
35. Id.
36. Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp.2d 1088, 1089 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
37. Tan Vinh, Students appealfine over threat on Web, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 10, 2000, at B 1.
38. Tan Vinh, Web-threat case dissolves, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 4, 2000, at B 1.
39. See infra notes 43-144 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 145-206 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 207-237 and accompanying text.
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understand, embrace and fully value the importance of student speech
rights.42
I. STIFLING STUDENT EXPRESSION: AVENUES OF ATTACK FOR
ADMINISTRATORS
The current wave of censorship in public schools might be sup-
ported under several legal standards and principles that are applied by
courts to determine whether a restriction on expression is constitutionally
permissible. These different standards are described below.
A. Supreme Court Standards for Regulating Student Expression
In a trio of cases, the United States Supreme Court has suggested
three circumstances in which student speech rights may be restricted
without violating the First Amendment: 1) when the speech could sub-
stantially and materially disrupt the educational environment or interfere
with the rights of other students; 2) when the speech is offensive or vul-
gar and occurs during a school-sponsored activity; and 3) when censor-
ship is reasonably related to serving legitimate pedagogical concerns.
Those three exceptions to the free speech rights of public school students
are described below in more detail.
1. Substantial and Material Disruptions
The United States Supreme Court first recognized that public high
school students possess a right to free expression in 1969 in Tinker v.
Des Moines School District.43 That right, however, is not absolute. In
particular, the Court in Tinker held that "conduct by the student, in class
or out of it, which for any reason-whether it stems from time, place, or
type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized
by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech." 44 Put more suc-
cinctly, the Court observed that speech may be abridged if it could rea-
sonably lead school authorities "to forecast substantial disruption of or
material interference with school activities."45
Applying this test to the donning of a two-inch wide band of black
cloth on the sleeve to express disapproval of the Vietnam conflict, the
Court ruled in favor of the students' rights to free speech in Tinker.46 The
speech, although it may have been unpopular among some students and
42. See infra notes 238-245 and accompanying text.
43. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); see DAVID MOSHMAN, CHILDREN, EDUCATION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 11 (1989) (observing that Tinker marked "the first time" that the Supreme Court
"declared a government action unconstitutional on the ground that it violated minors' rights to
freedom of expression").
44. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
45. Id. at 514.
46. Id.
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administrators, was not disruptive and it did not interfere with the rights
of other students.47
2. Offensive Language
The victory in Tinker, however, was far from ironclad and ulti-
mately proved to be what one federal court in 1992 called "the high-
water mark for public school students' First Amendment rights.'48 The
"first major deviation" from the Tinker substantial-and-material disrup-
tion standard came in 1986.49 In that year, the United States Supreme
Court upheld the suspension of Matthew Fraser for making a campaign
nominating speech laced with sexual innuendoes at a school assembly.5"
Writing for the majority of the Court, Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote
that "the First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from
determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent's
would undermine the school's basic educational mission."51 The Supreme
Court had distinguished Matthew Fraser's oration from that of Mary Beth
Tinker's "nondisruptive, passive expression," calling the former's speech
"lewd and obscene" and the latter's a "political position."52 The Court
concluded that "it was perfectly appropriate for the school to disassociate
itself to make the point to pupils that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is
wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental values' of public school edu-
cation.""
With the decision in Fraser, the Court carved out a new exception
to students' speech rights-the restriction of lewd and vulgar speech in
assemblies and classrooms. 4 Lower courts picked up this confining
precedent and ran with it. In one case, a federal district court upheld the
suspension of a student for wearing a T-shirt that actually expressed an
anti-drug use message-"Drugs Suck."55 Kimberly Broussard purchased
the shirt at a New Kids on the Block concert in March 1991 and wore it
to her middle school about two weeks later.5 6 School administrators ob-
47. Id. at 509.
48. Broussard v. School Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1534 (E.D. Va. 1992).
49. S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Teaching the Three Rs -- Repression, Rights, and Respect: A
Primer of Student Speech Activities, 37 B.C. L. REV. 119, 131 (1995). Cf MICHAEL W. LA MORTE,
SCHOOL LAW: CASES AND CONCERTS 97 (4th ed. 1993) (observing that "Supreme Court decisions in
the late 1980s have tended to limit what many observers heretofore thought the Tinker decision
allowed").
50. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). The speech described the
candidate as "firm in his pants" and going to the "climax" for students. Id. at 687 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
51. Bethel Sch. Dist. at 685.
52. Id. at 680.
53. Id. at 685-686.
54. "A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit monologue
directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students." Id. at 685.
55. Broussard v. School Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1533 (E.D. Va. 1992).
56. Broussard, 801 F. Supp. at 1528.
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jected to the use of intransitive verb "sucks" because it could be inter-
preted as offensive or sexual.17 Broussard served a one-day suspension
for refusing to change out of her shirt.58 The young girl alleged the dis-
ciplinary action violated her right of free speech.5 9
After considering-hard as it may be to believe-scholarly expert
testimony on the meaning of "sucks," a federal court in Virginia sided
with the school, .holding "that a reasonable middle school administrator
could find that the word 'suck,' even as used on the shirt, may be inter-
preted to have a sexual connotation. "' Citing the Supreme Court's deci-
sion against Matthew Fraser, the district court in Broussard observed that
"[s]peech need not be sexual to be prohibited by school officials; speech
that is merely lewd, indecent, or offensive is subject to limitation."' The
district court found that school "officials had an interest in protecting
their young students from exposure to vulgar and offensive language."62
Thus, the court concluded that the school district did not violate Kim-
berly Broussard's First Amendment rights.63
In 1998, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a case that
also involved the use of offensive language by students. 6 In Lacks v.
Ferguson Reorganized School District,65 a high school teacher allowed
her students to write and then have videotaped plays "including the re-
peated uses of the words 'fuck', 'shit', 'ass', 'bitch', and 'nigger'."'66 The
school board eventually terminated the teacher as a result of this
incident.67 The appellate court found that "[a] flat prohibition on profan-
ity in the classroom is reasonably related to the legitimate pedagogical
concern of promoting generally acceptable social standards. '68  The
Court concluded "that a school district does not violate the First
Amendment when it disciplines a teacher for allowing students to use
profanity repetitiously and egregiously in their written work."'69
As recently as December 1999, a federal appellate court reiterated
this sentiment in support of regulating offensive speech.7° In Henerey v.
57. Id. at 1533.
58. See id. at 1527.
59. See id. at 1528.
60. Id. at 1534.
61. Broussard v. School Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1536 (E.D. Va. 1992).
62. Broussard, 801 F. Supp. at 1537.
63. See id.
64. Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1998).
65. Lacks, 147 F.3d 718.
66. Id. at 719.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 724.
69. Id. at 719. See generally Merle H. Weiner, Dirty Words in the Classroom: Teaching the
Limits of the First Amendment, 66 TENN. L. REV. 597, 631-634 (1999) (discussing the Lacks
decision).
70. Henery v. City of St. Charles Sch. Dist., 200 F.3d 1128, 1131 (8th Cir. 1999).
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City of St. Charles School District," a case in which a student was pun-
ished for distributing condoms as part of his election campaign with the
slogan "The Safe Choice;0 2 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ob-
served that a school must:
retain the authority to refuse to sponsor student speech that might rea-
sonably be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible
sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with "the shared values of a
civilized social order," or to associate the school with any position
other than neutrality in matters of political controversy.73
The appellate court thus concluded that it was "well within the Dis-
trict's rights to disqualify Henerey for his actions in distributing material
that ran counter to the District's pedagogical concern and its educational
mission. "' This language regarding pedagogical concerns, as the next
section suggests, is derived from a United States Supreme Court decision
affecting student newspapers. It reflects the third general exception to the
principle of free speech for students in public schools.
3. Legitimate Pedagogical Concerns
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,75 the United States Su-
preme Court held that "educators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech
in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are rea-
sonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. 76 In articulating this
"legitimate pedagogical concerns" standard, the Court upheld the deci-
sion of a high school principal to censor two articles-one on pregnancy
among students, the other on divorce-in the high school newspaper.
77
The Hazelwood78 decision, according to legal scholar Don Pember,
"has acted as a kind of imprimatur for high school officials to wield the
censor's blue pencil with a heavy hand. '79 But the danger to student ex-
pression posed by the ruling extends far beyond censorship of newspa-
pers. By its terms, the Hazelwoods° standard is not limited to newspapers,
but is applicable to other forms of "school-sponsored expressive activi-
ties."'" Indeed, the 1999 federal appellate decision in Henerey82 described
71. Henery, 200 F.3d 1128.
72. Id. at 1131.
73. Id. at 1135 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1998)).
74. Id. at 1136.
75. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
76. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 273.
77. Id. at 276.
78. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
79. DON R. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 85 (2000 ed.).
80. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
81. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 (emphasis added).
82. 200 F.3d 1128 (8th Cir. 1999).
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above applied this test to a very different school-sponsored expressive
activity-an election for junior class president.83 The Eighth Circuit held
in Henerey84 that "the election was a school-sponsored activity that was
part of the school's curriculum" and that the question therefore, under
Hazelwood,85 was whether the school district's "decision to disqualify
Henerey from the election was reasonably related to legitimate peda-
gogical concerns.""
Taken together, the decisions in Fraser8 7 and Hazelwood 8 "grant
school officials considerable discretion in deciding all matters of student
expression where the school's official imprimatur is present, whether the
context of the activity is curricular in nature or where the school's spon-
sorship of the activity is obvious."8 9 The two cases, as Professor William
D. Valente observes, "limit the Tinker doctrine to expression that is not
of pedagogical concern. "90
4. Off-Campus, Internet-Posted Expression
Despite the erosion of protection for student speech in both Fraser"
and Hazelwood,92 a federal court in Missouri in 1998 found that neither
of those cases controls in situations involving non-school sponsored
speech created by students on their own time using their own
computers. 93 The district court's decision in Beussink v. Woodland R-IV
School District94 is, as Professor Leora Harpaz writes in a recent law
review article, "a victory for student Internet rights and a defeat for the
school's disciplinary efforts." '95
Brandon Beussink created, at home with his own computer, a web
page that used vulgar language and was highly critical of the administra-
tion at his high school.96 He was suspended from school for ten days im-
mediately upon discovery by school officials of the offensive page.97 In
granting Beussink's motion for a preliminary injunction on the ground
83. See supra, notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
84. 200 F.3d 1128 (8th Cir. 1999).
85. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
86. Henery, 200 F.3d at 1133.
87. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
88. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
89. H.C. HUDGINS, JR. & RICHARD S. VACCA, LAW AND EDUCATION: CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES AND COURT DECISIONS 395 (3d ed. 1991).
90. WILLIAM D. VALENTE, LAW IN THE SCHOOLS 278 (3d ed. 1994).
91. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
92. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
93. Beussink v. Woodland R-W Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
94. Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 1175.
95. Leora Harpaz, Internet Speech and the First Amendment Rights of Public School Students,
2000 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L. J. 123, 146 (2000).
96. Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1177.
97. See id.
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that the school's action violated his right to free speech; the district court
held that "[d]isliking or being upset by the content of a student's speech
is not an acceptable justification for limiting student speech under
Tinker."98 Applying the Tinker" standard of a reasonable fear of a mate-
rial and substantial disruption of school affairs to the facts underlying the
case, the court found that the principal's testimony "does not indicate that
he disciplined Beussink based on a fear of disruption or interference with
school discipline (reasonable or otherwise)."'" Instead, the testimony
suggested that the principal "disciplined Beussink because he was upset
by the content of the homepage."''
The court later added an important piece of public policy dictum
about the necessity of protecting the student's Web page:
Indeed, it is provocative and challenging speech, like Beussink's,
which is most in need of the protection of the First Amendment.
Popular speech is not likely to provoke censure. It is unpopular
speech that invites censure. It is unpopular speech which needs the
protection of the First Amendment. The First Amendment was de-
signed for this very purpose.
1°2
The public interest, the court added, was not served by censorship or
suspension, but instead by giving the students at Beussink's high school
the "opportunity to see the protections of the United States Constitution
and the Bill of Rights at work."' 3 The case thus marks an important vic-
tory for the free speech of public school students, at least when that
speech involves personal expression that is neither school sponsored nor
created using school facilities, resources and time. It also suggests that
the spirit and precedent of Tinkerj ° are not dead just yet. This is an im-
portant point that should not be lost in the post-Columbine era of censor-
ship.
5. Summary of Supreme Court Standards in Schools
The discussion above reveals that the United States Supreme Court
has carved out three separate justifications for restricting student speech
in public secondary schools-protecting the educational process and
rights of other students against material and substantial disruptions,
shielding minors from offensive and lewd speech, and training students
based on legitimate pedagogical concerns. Beyond this trio of principles,
98. Id. at 1180.
99. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
100. Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1180.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1182.
103. Id.
104. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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however, there are other ways in which student speech rights might be
limited. Section B below discusses one of those avenues of censorship.
B. The Incitement to Violence Standard
As the Introduction suggested, many school administrators are con-
cerned about Columbine-like violence at their own institutions and seem
ready to censor any speech that advocates or vaguely suggests such vio-
lence. Advocacy of violence, however, generally is protected by the First
Amendment "except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or pro-
ducing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action."' 5
This principle, articulated over thirty years ago by the United States
Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio, °6 represents what constitutional
law scholar Erwin Chemerinsky calls the Court's "most speech protective
formulation of an incitement test."'1 7 The Brandenburg'08 test marks the
modem evolution of the old clear-and-present danger standard' °9 and it
applies today to speech that "in some way urges people to action."''0
The standard could be applied against students who intend, through
their advocacy, to have others cause imminent violence to their schools.
As Part II will later suggest, however, all of the post-Columbine cases
mentioned at the start of this article involve expression that would re-
main protected under the Brandenburg' test.
C. The True Threats Doctrine
Some of the incidents of censorship after Columbine appear to be
based on the idea that particular instances of speech constitute a threat of
violence. The United States Supreme Court made clear in 1969 in Watts
v. United States" 2 that threats are not protected by the First
Amendment.' '3 The Court did not, however, articulate a clear test at that
time for distinguishing a "true threat" from protected speech.' 14 None-
105. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
106. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
107. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 813.
108. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
109. ROBERT D. RICHARDS, FREEDOM'S VOICE 62 (1998).
110. KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 54 (1999). See
RALPH HOLSINGER AND JON PAUL DILTS, MEDIA LAW 82 (4th ed. 1997) (observing that, after
Brandenburg, "[any law that fails to make clear the distinction between urging people to take up
arms against their government and merely talking about doing so violates the First Amendment.").
111. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
112. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
113. Watts, 394 U.S. at 707 (observing that "[w]hat is a threat must be distinguished from what
is constitutionally protected speech.").
114. See United States v. Francis, 164 F.3d 120, 122 (2nd Cir. 1999) (observing that the
Supreme Court in "Watts [sic] did not fashion a bright-line test for distinguishing a true threat from
protected speech.").
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theless, some rules about the true threats doctrine have emerged over
time at the federal appellate court level." 5
For instance, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 1999 decision
involving alleged bomb threats conveyed by a member of an Oklahoma-
based white supremacy organization, observed that true threats must be
distinguished from "mere political argument, idle talk or jest."' 16 Citing
Black's Law Dictionary,"7 the appellate court defined a threat "as a dec-
laration of intention, purpose, design, goal, or determination to inflict
punishment, loss, or pain on another, or to injure his property by the
commission of some unlawful act."' 18 It then emphasized that "[t]he
question is whether those who hear or read the threat reasonably consider
that an actual threat has been made."' 19
In its 1999 decision in United States v. Francis,'2 ° the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that a threat is not protected by the First
Amendment if "on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made
is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to the person
threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of
execution."'' The appellate court observed that "once a statement meets
this test, it is no longer protected speech because it is so intertwined with
violent action that it has essentially become conduct rather than
speech."'22
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals actually considered, albeit in a
1996 and thus pre-Columbine case, a dispute involving an alleged threat
by a public school student to shoot a guidance counselor. 23 In Lovell v.
Poway Unified School District,24 a tenth-grade student allegedly told her
counselor that she would shoot her if the counselor did not make changes
to the student's class schedule. 125 The student was suspended for the
comment. 
26
115. See generally Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, The "True Threat" to Cyberspace:
Shredding the First Amendment for Faceless Fears, 7 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 291, 293-295 (1999)
(discussing the true threats doctrine).
116. United States v. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d 392, 395 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing U.S. v. Leaverton,
835 F.2d 254, 257 (10th Cir. 1987)).
117. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1489-90 (7th ed. 1999).
118. Viefus, 168 F.3d at 395.
119. Id. at 396.
120. 164 F.3d 120 (2nd Cir. 1999).
121. Francis, 164 F.3d at 123 (quoting United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2nd Cir.
1976)).
122. Id.
123. Lovell v. Poway Unified School Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 368 (9th Cir. 1996).




DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
In considering whether this alleged comment-the student claimed
she uttered a mere figure of speech under her breath' 27-- constituted a
true threat, the Ninth Circuit observed that the determination is based on
an objective standard.'28 The test, the appellate court wrote, was "whether
a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be inter-
preted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a
serious expression of intent to harm or assault."'1
29
Of particular importance for the current wave of censorship based
on Columbine-like fears is the Ninth Circuit's observation that "in light of
the violence prevalent in schools today, school officials are justified in
taking very seriously student threats against faculty or other students."'
130
The appellate court concluded that the alleged statement constituted a
true threat of physical violence, remarking that "[t]his is particularly true
when considered against the backdrop of increasing violence among
school children today." '' This language is especially favorable to ad-
ministrators seeking to stifle student speech on the ground that it consti-
tutes a true threat of violence. It acknowledges that violence does happen
in schools and that, at least in some circumstances, speech must be
abridged to prevent further violence from transpiring.
D. Terroristic Threats Statutes
Another avenue of attack against student speech-one based on fears
that it may cause violence-is the use of state statutes that restrict terror-
istic threats. For instance, the California Education Code includes a spe-
cific section which provides that "a pupil may be suspended from school
or recommended for expulsion if the superintendent or the principal of
the school in which the pupil is enrolled determines that the pupil has
made terroristic threats against school officials or school property, or
both."'32 The statute defines a "terroristic threat" as:
any statement, whether written or oral, by a person who willfully
threatens to commit a crime which will result in death, great bodily
injury to another person, or property damage in excess of one thou-
sand dollars ($ 1000), with the specific intent that the statement is to
be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it
out, which, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is
made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to
convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immedi-
ate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes that person
127. Id.
128. Id. at 372.
129. Lovell v. Poway Unified School Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting United
States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990)).
130. Lovell, 90 F.3d at 372 (emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900.7(a) (Deering 1999).
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reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his
or her immediate family's safety, or for the protection of school dis-
trict property, or the personal property of the person threatened or his
or her immediate family.
133
This definition is lengthy yet precise. In particular, it makes clear
that abstract advocacy of violence is not a terroristic threat. Instead, the
threat must be "unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific"
before it can be punished. 134 The language also substantially mirrors that
contained in the California Penal Code statute making the communica-
tion of threats a crime.
35
California is not alone, however, in possessing a law that addresses
threats in a school setting. The Texas Education Code provides for the
removal from class and placement in an alternative education program
for making a terroristic threat.'36 This Code section, in turn, refers to the
Texas Penal Code section, which defines a terroristic threat as a threat
"to commit any offense involving violence to any person or property
with intent to . . .place any person in fear of imminent serious bodily
injury."'37 The Texas Education Code also requires principals of both
public and private primary and secondary schools to notify the local po-
lice department if they have "reasonable grounds to believe" the terroris-
tic threat will be carried out on school property or at a school-sponsored
activity or event off campus.'3 8
In North Carolina, a person commits a misdemeanor offense for
"[c]ommunicating threats" when he or she:
willfully threatens to physically injure the person or that person's
child, sibling, spouse, or dependent or willfully threatens to damage
the property of another; (2) The threat is communicated to the other
person, orally, in writing, or by any other means; (3) The threat is
made in a manner and under circumstances which would cause a rea-
sonable person to believe that the threat is likely to be carried out; and
(4) The person threatened believes that the threat will be carried
out.
39
All four elements must be satisfied before a comment constitutes a
threat."4 There is, however, "no requirement that the threat be carried
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 422 (West 1999).
136. See TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.006(a)(2) (West 1999).
137. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(a)(2) (West 1999).
138. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.015(a)(3) (West 1999).
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.1 (1999).
140. See State v. Elledge, 343 S.E.2d 549, 550 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) ("The crime of
communicating threats... involves more than making a threat to injure one's person or property and
communicating it to the other person; it is also necessary, as the statute expressly provides, that the
threat was made 'in a manner and under circumstances which would cause a reasonable person to
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out...... Seventeen-year-old Joshua Mortimer was convicted of this crime
for writing the simple phrase "the end is near" on a high school com-
puter. 142 In some states, calls are being heard to strengthen existing stat-
utes regarding threats. Legislators in Wisconsin want to make the penal-
ties more severe for troublemakers who disrupt schools with death
threats.'43 These lawmakers are seeking to enact legislation to treat death
threats as felonies, like bomb threats are currently treated.'"
E. Summary
This part described a number of different limitations on the speech
rights of public primary and secondary school students. Clearly, the
means exist to suppress student speech rights that do not run afoul of the
First Amendment. Part II below suggests that students' constitutional
rights to free expression have been violated since the shootings at Col-
umbine. As will be made clear, it takes quite a bit of legal contortion and
administrative courage to make some of the aforementioned instances of
student speech fit within the categories of prohibited expression.
II. CENSORSHIP UNJUSTIFIED: WHY LEGAL STANDARDS DON'T
SUPPORT TODAY'S REPRESSION
The tragedy at Columbine has produced a series of copycat threats
of violence,'45 in addition to "heavy-handed responses from school ad-
ministrators and authorities."' 146 As Nadine Strossen, president of the
American Civil Liberties Union recently observed, "'the schoolhouse
these days is looking more like a jailhouse .... 147
While events like bomb threats that undoubtedly deserve punish-
ment have transpired since Columbine, 148 none of the cases described in
the Introduction fit this description or can be described as true threats or
incitements to violerice. Likewise, none involved lewd, profane, or inde-
cent speech that might be regulated under the precedent in Bethel School
believe that the threat is likely to be carried out' and that '[t]he person threatened believes that the
threat will be carried out."').
141. State v. Roberson, 247 S.E.2d 8,9 (N.C. Ct.App. 1978).
142. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
143. See Some Seek Tough Law on School Threats, Wis. ST. J., Feb. 22, 2000, at 5B.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Peter Mailer, Shawano school threat keeps students at home, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Nov. 24, 1999, at 2. (indicating that Wisconsin schools have received "a series of threats"
since the massacre at Columbine High School); Lisa Kernek et al., Variety of incidents hit schools
post-Columbine, ST. J.-REG. (Springfield, I11.), May 30, 1999, at 5 (describing a "wave of
Columbine-prompted incidents" in Illinois).
146. Thaddeus Herrick, Going too Far?, HOUSTON CHRON., May 29, 1999, at Al.
147. Frank Santiago, School violence jeopardizes, DES MOINES REG., Oct. 10, 1999, at Metro
Iowa 8.
148. See Student Admits Bomb Threat, Is Expelled, Wis. ST. J., May 12, 1999, at 3C.
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District No. 403 v. Fraser.4 9 This Part of the article will demonstrate, by
applying the free speech standards and limitations explained in Part I to
some of the cases described in the Introduction, that many instances of
censorship today not only are misguided but are patently unlawful.
A. True Threats or False Fears?
Thirteen-year-old Christopher Beamon's teacher, Amanda Henry, as-
signed her class in Ponder, Texas "to write a horror story about being
home alone and hearing noises."'5 0 Beamon wrote a story in which he
"'acssedently [sic] shot Mrs. Henry,"' whom he 'thought . . .was a
crook so I busted out with a 12 guage [sic] and Ismael busted out with a
9 mm and we step [sic] off the porch and this bloody body droped [sic]
down in front of us and scared us half to death."'' The story mentioned
guns, drug paraphernalia, and shootings of two students as well as his
teacher.12 Beamon read his grammatically challenged story to the class
to earn a few extra-credit points.'
Was the story poorly spelled? Certainly. Was it violent? Clearly.
Was it worthy of the criminal complaint that his teacher filed with the
local police?"5 Hardly. Was it a true threat of violence against his
teacher? Far from it, at least under established First Amendment princi-
ples. Was it worth the five days that Beamon spent jailed in a juvenile
facility?'55 No. The proper remedy may be a poor grade for inferior
grammar and spelling but certainly not prolonged confinement in a de-
tention center.
Under Texas law a person commits a terroristic threat "if he threat-
ens to commit any offense involving violence to any person or property
with intent to ... place any person in fear of imminent serious bodily
injury."'15 6 The key is intent. The intent, most likely, was to comply with
the assignment. This was not a note threatening violence; instead it was a
fictional story that, unfortunately and in pathetically poor taste, used the
teacher's name as a victim of fictional violence.
The young boy's story did not constitute a true threat under First
Amendment jurisprudence. Compare this situation to the case of Lovell v.
Poway Unified School District, " described in Part I, in which the Ninth
149. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text (discussing Bethel School District No. 403
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)).




154. See Bud Kennedy, Ponder school case disgraces Denton County., FT. WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, Nov. 4, 1999, at Metro 1.
155. See id.
156. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(a)(2) (West 1999).
157. 90 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 1996).
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Circuit held that a tenth-grade student's verbal statement to her guidance
counselor constituted a "true threat."'58 The student stated that she would
shoot the counselor if she did not make changes to her class schedule.'59
The court observed that the test is "'whether a reasonable person would
foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the
maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of intent to
harm or assault.' '' 60 It is hard to believe that a reasonable person would
find that a Halloween story by a seventh-grade student constitutes a seri-
ous expression of intent to harm or assault, regardless of its violent con-
tent. Indeed, the case of the Halloween story seems to be one involving
unreasonable fears, illustrating the type of irrational censorship occurring
across the country. The irony is that the paper received a 100 grade, plus
extra credit points for the oral presentation. 161
Like Beamon, Sarah Boman's ventures in creative writing landed
her in trouble with school officials. 62 This Kansas high school senior
was suspended for the remainder of the school year in January 2000 for
displaying artwork on a school door that included text deemed "threat-
ening" by school officials. 163 She wrote a short poem with the words ar-
ranged in a spiraling pattern, something an art professor called "repeti-
tive" art. 64 In full, it reads:
Please tell me who killed my Dog. I miss him very much -- He was
my best friend. I do miss him terribly. Did you do it? Did you kill my
dog? Do you know who did it? You know, don't you? I know you
know who did it. You know who killed my dog. I'll kill you if you
don't tell me who killed my dog. Tell me who did it. Tell me. Tell me.
Tell me. Please tell me now. How could anyone kill a dog? My dog
was the best. Man's best friend. Who could shoot their best friend?
Who? Dammit, Who? Who killed my dog? Who killed him? Who
killed my dog? I'll kill you all! You all killed my dog. You all hated
him. Who? Who are you that you could kill my best friend? Who
killed my dog?
165
In a post-Columbine world, this poem constitutes a threat, according
to some school administrators. 66 Under tenets of First Amendment juris-
158. Supra notes 123-131 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
160. See Lovell, 90 F.3d at 372 (quoting United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262,
1265 (9th Cir. 1990)).
161. See Brenda Rodriguez & Annette Reynolds, Boy freed after story lands him in cell,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 3, 1999, at IA.
162. ACLU Vows Legal Action Over Honor Student's Expulsion for Displaying Artwork





166. See Boman v. Bluestem Unified Sch. Dist., No. 00-1034-WEB, 2000 WL 297167, at *1
(D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2000).
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prudence, however, it is anything but a threat. In order to constitute a true
threat, the speech in question must be "so unequivocal, unconditional,
immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a grav-
ity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution .... " 167
No identifiable person is threatened in Sarah Boman's poem. The
only violent parts are two statements: "I'll kill you if you don't tell me
who killed my dog" and "I'll kill you all!' 61 In the context of a piece of
posted artwork, these phrases are not true threats of imminent harm to
any individual. When they are stripped of the artistic context they be-
come only slightly menacing.
There is no intent to convey an actual threat. The intent was to cre-
ate a piece of artwork, not to threaten actual violence. 69 The school
could not point to any evidence suggesting that Boman's intent was "bad
or willful." 7' Nonetheless, the school suspended Boman and conditioned
her return on receiving a satisfactory report following a psychological
examination.71 One must wonder about the intellectual capabilities of
educators who are unable to distinguish imaginative poetry from true
threats and attacks.
Despite this egregious violation of Sarah Boman's right of free
speech, it took legal action to resolve the matter. Boman's complaint
alleged, among other things, that Bluestem High School's suspension of
her violated her First Amendment right to freedom of speech. 72 On Feb-
ruary 14, 2000, a federal judge found "no factual basis for believing that
Ms. Boman had willfully violated any school rule, caused.a substantial
disruption in the operation of the school, or invaded the rights of other
students."' 73 He added that to require Boman to undergo a psychological
examination as "a condition to reinstatement in the absence of any valid
basis would impermissibly infringe on plaintiffs rights under the First
Amendment."' 74 The Judge ordered a permanent injunction, allowing
Sarah Boman to return to school immediately.'75 Bill Hays, one of the
attorneys representing Boman, called the judge's ruling a "'wise deci-
167. United States v. Francis, 164 F.3d 120, 123 (2nd Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v.
Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2nd Cir. 1976)).
168. ACLU Vows Legal Action, supra note 162.
169. Roxana Hegeman, Judge Rules Bluestem High School violated student's free speech
rights, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Feb. 14, 2000, available in LEXIS, News Library. Boman,
a student assistant to the art teacher who was responsible for hanging artwork around the school,
defended the work as conceptual art that she learned about in an art class. See id.
170. Boman, 2000 WL 297167, at *3.
171. See id. at *1-*2.
172. See id. at *3.
173. Boman v. Bluestem Unified Sch. Dist., No. 00-1034-WEB, 2000 WL 433083, at *1 (D.
Kan. Feb. 14, 2000).
174. Id. at *2.
175. See id. at *3
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sion, we are pleased he made the decision based on the First Amendment
,176in Sarah Boman's case' .. ..
The creative works of Beamon and Boman, no matter how different
they might have been in terms of creativity, have one very important
thing in common. The First Amendment protects them both. But what
about some of the other recent examples of student speech mentioned in
the Introduction? Do those cases involve speech that legitimately could
be construed to constitute a true threat of violence?
Nick Emmett created a Web page with mock obituaries of other stu-
dents.177 According to a district court judge, the fake obituaries were
written in "tongue-in-cheek" fashion. 78 Visitors to the page could decide
"who would be the subject of the next mock obituary." '179 In rejecting the
school's contention that the page constituted a true threat of violence, the
judge wrote that the school had "presented no evidence that the mock
obituaries and voting on this web site were intended to threaten anyone,
did actually threaten anyone, or manifested any violent tendencies what-
soever."'8 ° The Nick Emmett case demonstrates another instance of an
unconstitutional punishment of speech in the post-Columbine era.
Emmett's case is particularly egregious because the speech took
place off campus. The judge did not overlook this important fact, noting
that Emmett's speech could not be restricted under the precedents of ei-
ther Fraser or Hazelwood.8' The speech in question did not occur during
a school assembly, "was not in a school-sponsored newspaper," and "was
not produced in connection with any class or school project."'82 The
speech on the web site thus "was entirely outside of the school's supervi-
sion or control."'1
83
Now consider again the case of Dustin Mitchell, the student who
wrote "yes" on an Internet discussion board in response to whether a
tragedy like Columbine "could happen" at his school.'8 4 He was sus-
pended for ten days for the remark, which he made just five days after
the shooting at Columbine.'85 Mitchell did not post the comment at
176. Hegeman, supra note 169.
177. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
178. Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 1088, 1089 (N.D. Wash. Feb. 23, 2000).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1090.
181. See id.; see also supra notes 49-90 and accompanying text (describing the cases of Fraser
and Hazelwood and the rules articulated therein by the United States Supreme Court).
182. Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. at 1090.
183. Id.
184. Student sues school, supra note 29.
185. See ACLU Defends Missouri Honors Student Suspended For Remark in Internet Chat
Room, (visited Feb. 29, 2000) <http://www.aclu.org/news/1999/n101499b.html> [hereinafter ACLU
Defends].
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school. He made it over a weekend, using the name of another student as
an alias in the non-school sponsored chat room.
1 86
The word "yes" posted off-campus on a computer in response to a
question is not a true threat of violence under the tests articulated in Part
1. Merely agreeing that violence could happen, without further specifica-
tion, is not a true threat that it will happen. A true threat exists only if the
speech is unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to the
person threatened. 8 7 These elements are not present in this case.
Even more outrageous is that the speech, like the last two examples,
occurred off campus, beyond the reach of the school's disciplinary
authority. But, as in the case of poet Sarah Boman, Mitchell was forced
to file a lawsuit to make this point and prove that his speech was not a
threat.'
Now reconsider the case of Ryan Green, the Jewish student men-
tioned in the Introduction who wore the Star of David around his neck
until school officials found it to be a threatening gang emblem.8 9 The
problem in this case is simple-it is hard, if not impossible, to make a
rational argument that, without anything more to indicate unrest, a sign
of faith is a sign of violence. Even if some anti-Semitic students found
the symbol threatening to their own beliefs, Green was not intending to
threaten them with his sartorial accessorizing.
Courts actually have addressed the constitutionality of regulating al-
leged gang symbols and clothing in public schools."' ° Indeed, an in-
creasing number of schools are regulating student appearance today. 9 '
In Stephenson v. Davenport Community School District,92 the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals declared a school's regulation that restricted
common religious symbols-in this case, a cross tattoo-as gang sym-
bols to be unconstitutionally vague.'9 3 In a non-school setting, an appel-
late court in Illinois declared an anti-gang ordinance overbroad"9 and
186. See id.
187. See supra note 120-121 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Fraser, 164
F.3d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 1999)).
188. See ACLU defends, supra note 185.
189. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
190. See generally Christopher B. Gilbert, We Are What We Wear: Revisiting Student Dress
Codes, 199 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L. J. 3, 10-15 (1999) (describing courts that have addressed school
regulations that affect gang-related attire and symbols).
191. Alison G. Myhra, No Shoes, No Shirt, No Education: Dress Codes and Freedom of
Expression Behind the Postmodern Schoolhouse Gates, 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 337, 344-46
(1999).
192. 110 F.3d 1303 (8th Cir. 1997).
193. Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1308-1311.
194. See City of Harvard v. Gaut, 660 N.E.2d 259, 262 (111. App. Ct. 1996). "A law is
unconstitutionally overbroad if it regulates substantially more speech than the Constitution allows to
be regulated and a person to whom the law constitutionally can be applied can argue that it would be
unconstitutional as applied to others." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 764-65.
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thus unconstitutional because it "prohibits nongang [sic] members from
engaging in religious expression."' 95 In that case, a 13-year-old boy was
arrested for wearing a six-pointed star-the same symbol that Ryan
Green wore to school. But unlike Green, this minor did not wear the Star
of David as a symbol of Judaism but as a gang symbol. 196 Despite this
fact, the appellate court held the law was unconstitutional because it was
drafted so broadly that it would punish those individuals such as Green
who wear the star as an expression of their religious beliefs.
197
Finally, contemplate the conviction of Joshua Mortimer for commu-
nicating terroristic threats in North Carolina for typing in and then leav-
ing the phrase "the end is near" displayed on a school computer.9 Al-
though the district attorney who prosecuted young Mortimer maintained
that the statement could not be separated "from the surrounding circum-
stances"I 99-it was made two weeks after the incident at Columbine-
this statement is not a direct threat of anything against anyone. The
conviction was so stunning and ridiculous that the Freedom Forum, a
pro-First Amendment organization, 2" dubbed the incident its First
Amendment- "Outrage of the Week." '' Calling the action in North
Carolina "legalistic hysteria," the organization admonished that "school
administrators should have taken the little incident as an opportunity not
for overreaction and prosecution but for education and perspective. Tell
the student jokester why others might be frightened (justifiably or not) by
what he wrote. And tell others just to calm down."20 2
In summary, school administrators are turning harmless statements-
stories, poems, mock obituaries, jewelry, and otherwise innocuous mes-
sages-into true threats. In doing so, they have harmed not only the stu-
dents involved these cases, but also the free speech rights of others who
might want to engage in similar benign expression.
B. Substantial Disruptions or Petty Problems?
Even if student speech does not constitute a true threat of violence, it
still may be punished under the Tinker precedent if administrators can
reasonably foresee that it may lead to a substantial and material disrup-
195. Gaut, 660 N.E.2d at 263.
196. Id. at 260.
197. " Because the ordinance prohibits symbolic speech, freedom of religion and freedom of
expression, we conclude that ordinance is 'substantially overbroad.'" Id. at 263.
198. See supra notes 17-21 and 139-142 and accompanying text (describing the Mortimer case
and the law applied by the court).
199. Reiss, supra note 18, at lB.
200. For more background on the organization, see the Web site for the Freedom Forum at
<http://www.freedomforum.org> (visited Mar. 3, 2000).
201. First Amendment outrage of the week: Turning kids' stray comments into lawsuits,
FREEDOM FORUM ONLINE (visited Oct. 5, 1999) <http://www.freedomforum.orglfirst/outrage.asp>.
202. Id.
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tion of school affairs. 2 3 None of the instances depicted in this article fall
within this standard.
Reading a story in class that contains violence or posting on a door a
piece of artwork/poetry that refers to killing does not substantially dis-
rupt school affairs. It is highly unlikely, to say the least, that after hearing
Christopher Beamon read his story that his classmates would actually
pick up guns and shoot their teacher. Students may laugh or chuckle, but
such levity surely is not a substantial or material disruption. Likewise,
the readers of Sarah Boman's work were not likely to become so riled up
by its text that they disrupted the school day. As Judge Brown wrote in
his order granting a permanent injunction against Boman's school that
entitled her to be reinstated as a student, "the evidence simply fails to
show that the poster caused or was likely to cause a substantial disruption
in the operation of the school."' 2' The speech of Beamon and Boman thus
cannot be punished justifiably under the Tinker precedent.
Wearing the Star of David on a chain around one's neck hardly can
be said, without any other evidence or extenuating circumstances, to cre-
ate a reasonably foreseeable risk of substantial disruption in the class-
room. Likewise, mock obituaries, written in tongue-in-check fashion and
posted on a non-school sponsored Web site, are not likely to cause a
material interference with academic affairs or the rights of other students.
The only foreseeable disruption might occur if someone, during a class
that used computers, logged onto the Web site of Nick Emmett and burst
out laughing. But that is a far cry from the type of disruption necessary to
stifle speech that was envisioned by the United States Supreme Court in
Tinker.
A computer displayed message reading "the end is near" is not
likely to cause a substantial disruption. The only time it conceivably
would do so would be if a teacher or administrator panicked and over-
reacted, letting unreasonable fears-not rational reasons-take over and
guide the reaction to this statement. Deleting the message from the com-
puter screen removes whatever potential for disruption may exist.
C. Incitements or Amusements?
As discussed in Part I, speech that is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action is
not protected by the First Amendment. None of the incidents discussed in
this article constitute an incitement of others to engage in violence at
school.
203. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (describing the Tinker case).
204. Boman v. Bluestem Unified School Dist No.5., No. 00-1034-WEB, 2000 WL 433083, at
*2 (D. Kan. Feb. 14, 2000).
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The prose of Christopher Beamon and the poetry of Sarah Boman
did not advocate others to engage in violence. They were not directing or
intending others to commit violence. What's more, there is no way these
fictional works could be construed as likely to produce violence.
In fact, none of the examples of abridged speech mentioned in this
article-mock obituaries posted on a Web page, the phrase "the end is
near" displayed on a school computer screen, the word "yes" typed in on
an Internet chat room in response to a question about whether violence
could happen at one's school, the Star of David hung around one's neck
on a chain-can in any way be said to encourage or urge others to com-
mit violence. None of this speech, in other words, constitutes an incite-
ment to imminent violence.
In some cases, harmless amusements-mock obituaries, for in-
stance-have been transformed by school administrators into insolent
incitements. But an intent to amuse is not an intent to incite.
The United States Supreme Court once observed that it is "often true
that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric.""°5 Perhaps this aphorism ex-
plains the problem today in public schools-the subjectivity of meaning
across generations and cultures. Students who might create a message
without any intent of it being interpreted as an incitement to violence
may find their messages misconstrued. Consider the case in which a note
reading "Columbine 3:30 Tomorrow" resulted in a felony charge.2°6 Is
this an incitement to violence? Is it a true threat of violence? Or is it one
student's amusement or prank? Rather than rush to judgment that it is an
incitement or threat, administrators should step back and consider the
third possibility.
III. THE POLITICS OF COLUMBINE: CENSORSHIP AND THE LESSONS IT
TEACHES
"Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free
speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. It is the
function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears."20 7
Those words, written by Justice Louis Brandeis over seventy years in a
concurring opinion in the criminal syndicalism case of Whitney v. Cali-
fornia, °8 seem to be forgotten today by public school administrators.
Irrational fears of violence, in many cases, have justified suppression of
some very harmless, albeit sometimes sophomoric, statements.
Ironically, all of this is occurring at a time when FBI data reveal that
arrests nationwide of juveniles for serious and violent crimes are drop-
205. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
206. See supra and accompanying text.
207. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927).
208. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376.
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ping dramatically. 2°9 What's more, a study published in August 1999 in
the Journal of the American Medical Association indicates that between
1991 and 1997, high school students in the United States "became less
likely to carry weapons, to engage in physical fights, and to be injured in
physical fights."21 These reports, it seems, have been all but ignored by
public school administrators.
Part I made it clear that it is permissible to punish speech that con-
stitutes a substantial and material interference with the academic affairs
of a public school, as well as speech that constitutes either a true threat of
violence or an incitement to violence. 2"' The problem, however, is that
in the process of punishing this type of unlawful speech, school adminis-
trators also are sweeping up otherwise protected expression. The meta-
phorical net, in brief, has been cast too far and too wide, and it now is
trapping innocent speech.
The efforts of school administrators thus remind one of the dictum
of the United States Supreme Court's 1957 decision in Butler v. Michi-
gan 2  Justice Felix Frankfurter, in declaring a Michigan law that re-
stricted speech unconstitutional because it "reduce[d] the adult popula-
tion of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children, '213 wrote that
the affect of the law "is to burn the house to roast the pig. '214 School
administrators today are, essentially, burning the free speech rights of
many students in order to nab the tiny fraction that legitimately should be
punished for conveying true threats of violence or disrupting academic
affairs.
What price will be paid down the road for this wave of censorship?
Will it produce a generation of young adults who do not appreciate the
value of free speech because, sadly, their own public school principals
and administrators did not appreciate its value? At a time when many
young people already are disenchanted with politics and opting out of
voting because they feel they have no voice in the process,2t 5 will the
209. Arrests for Juvenile Crimes Drop Across Nation, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 18, 1999, at A2; See
also Matthew Katz, Crime in schools decreasing. CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 20, 1999, at A08
(describing the results of the second annual report on school safety released by the Clinton
Administration).
210. Nancy D. Brener et al., Recent Trends in Violence-Related Behaviors Among High School
Students in the United States, 282 JAMA 440, 442 (1999).
211. Supra notes 43-144and accompanying text.
212. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
213. Butler, 352 U.S. at 383.
214. Id. (emphasis added).
215. See Mary Beth Marklein, Taking the pulse of America's freshmen, USA TODAY, Jan. 25,
1999, at 6D (reporting the findings of the annual "American Freshman" survey conducted by
UCLA's Higher Education Research Institute and finding that "today, new freshmen in growing
numbers are significantly less interested in talking about politics and in keeping up with political
issues"). During the 1996 presidential election, people ages 18 to 24 voted in record low numbers.
Young Americans Shunned Polls This Year, ARIz. REPUB., Nov. 24, 1996, at A25. An estimated 29
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ongoing war on student speech rights further weaken and, perhaps, si-
lence their voice in the political process?
The implicit message conveyed by administrators today is that de-
mocracy is not too far removed from totalitarianism when fear of vio-
lence takes hold with a vengeance. It is important, then, to keep in mind
the majority's words in Tinker-that "[in] our system, state-operated
schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not
possess absolute authority over their students. '216 As the attorney for one
teenager charged after Columbine with making plans to blow up his own
high school-charges that were later dismissed on First Amendment
grounds-aptly put it, students are being prosecuted "in response to the
politics of Columbine."2 7 The danger is that the politics of Columbine
amount to the politics of authoritarianism and totalitarianism.
School administrators, it must be recognized, are responsible for
protecting other students from harm in the classroom and on the school-
yard. Their efforts to quash true threats, to punish speech that substan-
tially disrupts the academic affairs, and to act on behalf of legitimate
pedagogical concerns are all worthy objectives.2 8 The problem arises,
however, when fear and panic take over-as they have post-
Columbine-and when the desire to preserve the educational environ-
ment means sacrificing speech that does not fall into one of these catego-
ries recognized by the United State Supreme Court.
A. Missing the Teachable Moment
In the Sennett Middle School in Madison, Wisconsin a 13-year-old
boy was expelled in June 1999 after he allegedly wrote "People are going
to die like in Colorado" on a locker in the boys' locker room.21 9 Is this the
proper response to an alleged threat that did not lead to the evacuation of
the school? 22° True, the student may never do this again, but was a mo-
ment-a teachable moment-lost in which school officials might have
explained to the student why the speech was inappropriate and informed
him of both the rights and responsibilities that come with the First
Amendment? If the writing merely was a hoax, then the lesson to be
taught is the age-old one articulated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
to 30 percent of people that age cast a ballot in the 1996 presidential election, compared with 42
percent in the 1972 race between Richard Nixon and George McGovern. Id.
216. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
217. Linda Spice, Judge dismisses teen bomb threat case, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 3,
1999, at 1.
218. See supra notes 43-144 and accompanying text (explaining how these justifications for
restricting speech are recognized by the United States Supreme Court).
219. Chris Murphy, 13-Year-Old Expelled for Threat, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), June
22, 1999, at Local/State 3A.
220. According the school's attorney, the threat did not force the evacuation of the school. Id.
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Jr.-that one cannot falsely shout fire in a theatre.22' Must, however, this
First Amendment lesson be learned at the cost of expulsion?
It is important to note here that suspending students for their alleg-
edly harmful speech may not cure the problems perceived by school ad-
ministrators. Indeed, research demonstrates that "suspensions fail to
modify negative behavior. ''222 If this is correct, then the rash of suspen-
sions and expulsions for students exercising their rights of free speech is
further unjustified, even if one sides with administrators that the speech
should be punished.
In choosing to suspend and expel students rather than teach them
about the rights and responsibilities of freedom of expression, school
administrators also are ignoring one of the age-old remedies or antidotes
to speech that we find harmful. Justice Brandeis, concurring in Whitney
v. California,223 articulated the premise of what today is known as the
doctrine of counter speech.224 When it came to expression that was per-
ceived by some to be dangerous, threatening or harmful, Brandeis fa-
mously wrote that "if there be time to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education,
the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. '225
At the heart of the counter-speech doctrine is the principle, as Har-
vard's Laurence Tribe writes, that "whenever 'more speech' could elimi-
nate a feared injury, more speech is the constitutionally-mandated rem-
edy." 26 Rather than censor allegedly harmful speech and thereby risk
violating the First Amendment protection of expression or file a lawsuit
that threatens to punish speech perceived as harmful, the preferred rem-
edy is to add more speech to the metaphorical marketplace of ideas.227
221. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (observing that "[t]he most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic").
222. BEVERLEY H. JOHNS ET AL., REDUCTION OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE: ALTERNATIVES TO
SUSPENSION at 1.5 (2nd ed. 1997).
223. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927).
224. Id. See generally Michael Kent Curtis, "Free Speech" and Its Discontents: The Rebellion
Against General Propositions and the Danger of Discretion, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 419, 433
(1996) (observing that Justice Brandeis "insisted that in spite of dangers, the only appropriate
remedy for much evil speech is counter-speech and reason").
225. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
226. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 834 (2d ed. 1988).
227. "The 'marketplace of ideas' is perhaps the most powerful metaphor in the free speech
tradition." RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6 (1992). The marketplace
metaphor "consistently dominates the Supreme Court's discussions of freedom of speech." C.
EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 7 (1989). The metaphor is used
frequently today, more than 75 years after it first became a part of First Amendment jurisprudence
with Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s often-quoted admonition that "the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See W. Wat Hopkins, The
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School administrators are ignoring the counter speech doctrine.
Surely programs could be initiated to teach students about the right of
free speech, as well as its limitations. Because very few of the instances
of allegedly harmful speech in public schools today actually rise to the
level of true threats of imminent danger, there is time, as Justice Brandeis
would put it, "to avert the evil by the processes of education." '228 It is, of
course, more than slightly ironic that educators are missing the chance to
educate.
B. Silly Leaflets Redux?
Justice Holmes, of course, is known for more than his aphorism
about falsely shouting fire in a theatre described in the previous
section. 229 In his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States,230
Holmes argued that speech cannot be restricted unless there is a "present
danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about. '23' In that case, he
alleged that the offending speech did not approach a clear and present
danger of violence but was, instead, nothing more than a "silly leaflet.
232
Might it be that today, in our public schools, we are turning what
amount to silly leaflets into something more than they really are? Are we
turning harmless rhetoric and otherwise indirect messages of violence
into true threats? As we crack down on speech, then, might we not actu-
ally be tempting more minors to engage pranks? Forbidden fruit often is
attractive, and if talking about Columbine or schoolhouse violence is
forbidden by adults and schools administrators-people in positions of
authority-it may actually make it more attractive for some teenagers to
engage in such speech.233 The mass hysteria of censorship, in other
words, could have the unintended and unfortunate consequence of actu-
ally promoting the very speech that it attempts to deter.
Perhaps there is no better analogy so far to the silly leaflet referred
to by Justice Holmes inoAbrams than the case of the 13-year-old Wiscon-
sin boy who allegedly scribbled bomb threats on Popsicle sticks.2" Re-
gardless of the message scribbled, it is extremely hard to take seriously a
threat on a Popsicle stick. Nonetheless, the middle school student was
Supreme Court Defines the Marketplace of Ideas, 73 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 40 (1996)
(providing a recent review of the Court's use of the marketplace metaphor).
228. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
229. Supra note 221 and accompanying text.
230. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
231. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
232. Id.
233. There is support for the forbidden fruit theory in areas such as movie ratings, with
research showing that putting a more adult rating on a movie may make it more attractive to
children. Heather Fleming, TV's 'forbidden fruit', BROADCASTING & CABLE, Mar. 31, 1997, at 14.
234. Herrick, supra note 146, at Al.
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taken to, and held in, a secure detention facility. 23" The offending sticks,
in fact, actually caused school officials to dismiss classes after they were
discovered.236
School officials must protect the safety and lives of their students.
No reasonable person would question that. But, perhaps, reasonable peo-
ple would question whether writing on a Popsicle stick is a true threat. If
it was nothing more than a prank to get students out of classes, it worked,
probably much to the delight of many students who got to go home early.
Recall from Part I that true threats must be distinguished from "mere
political argument, idle talk or jest.' '237 Unfortunately, what is said in jest
and what simply is silly are being swept up together with true threats in
post-Columbine hysteria.
CONCLUSION: ZERO TOLERANCE, ZERO COMMON SENSE
Some of the school administrators who zealously censor student
speech today do so under the justification of a "zero tolerance" policy for
expression that suggests violence.238 The problem is that in the course of
enforcing these policies, zero tolerance often amounts to zero common
sense. School administrators strive to teach critical thinking skills to their
young charges are not applying those same skills in their own reasoning
process when it comes to punishing student expression.
As time continues to pass since the events at Columbine in April
1999, common sense may begin to reemerge. However, when other dis-
turbing events such as the shooting in February 2000 of one first-grader
by another in a Michigan elementary school arise,239 irrational fears will
not be suppressed for long. Speech will find itself the target of suppres-
sion once again, and federal courts will find themselves dealing with
merit less instances of censorship anew.
School administrators rightfully are concerned about stopping vio-
lence on their campuses. But they also must be concerned about protect-
ing the rights-speech rights included--of the vast majority of non-
violent students under their supervision. Unless school officials appreci-
235. Third-grader among latest students caught for threats, Associated Press, May 21, 1999,
available in LEXIS-NEXIS Academic Universe, News Library.
236. Senior faces charges just before graduation, Associated Press, May 23, 1999, available in
LEXIS-NEXIS Academic Universe, News Library.
237. United States v. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d 392, 395 (10th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
238. See Carlos Illescas, School threats now taken very seriously, DENVER POST, Nov. 22,
1999, at B-01 (observing that "since the April 20 shootings at Columbine High School, educators
nationwide are armed with new zero-tolerance policies and are taking threats more seriously than
ever before.").
239. See Stephen Braun & Julie Cart, 6-Year-Old Mich. Girl Is Killed By Classmate Shooting,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2000, at Al (describing the shooting in a first-grade classroom in Beull
Elementary School in a working-class community sixty miles north of Detroit).
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ate the values of free speech-as a tool for self-realization, 24° a means of
discovering the truth,24' and a fundamental part of democracy 42-and
learn to appreciate the harm done to the First Amendment and society
when they unnecessarily punish expression, censorship will continue.
Students who are taught that freedom of speech means very little
and can be sacrificed cavalierly will be less appreciative of its values
and, perhaps, less likely to assert themselves through expression in our
already participation-poor democracy. The value taught now, regrettably,
is that government authorities-read, public school principals and su-
perintendents-can shut off the flow of speech at their whim. Unless a
student is willing to hire an attorney or can convince the American Civil
Liberties Union to take up her cause, there will be little to prevent indi-
vidual instances of school-based censorship from going unchecked.
The crackdown on student speech after Columbine is paralleled by a
similar move to restrict violent media fare that allegedly promotes vio-
lence in schools.24 3 It is this overall climate of censorship, including the
media blame game now in vogue in Washington against the Hollywood
entertainment industry,2"4 that allows speech restrictive measures to
thrive in public schools.
In summary, the cases analyzed in this article should provide edu-
cators with a primer on what not to do when it comes to student expres-
sion. Unfortunately, when speech in public schools is in dispute, we
rapidly are becoming the diametric opposite of what University of
Michigan President and constitutional scholar Lee C. Bollinger once
hoped for-we are becoming a very intolerant society, not a tolerant
one.
245
240. See BAKER, supra note 227, at 69 (writing that speech must be protected, in part, because
it promotes "the speaker's self-fulfillment").
241. "[Tjhe best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
242. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948) (describing the purpose of free speech in a democracy).
243. See Nick Anderson, House GOP Seeks Media Violence Curbs Legislation, L.A. TIMES,
June 8, 1999, at A6 (describing government proposals to restrict the sale of media products such as
books and films that contain violence).
244. Howard Kurtz, media reporter for The Washington Post, observed that within hours of the
shootings, commentators and politicians cast blame on violent movies, violent computer games, and
the Internet. Howard Kurtz, Let the Blame Begin, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 199, at CO.
245. See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986) (developing a tolerance theory
of free expression).
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A NEW CASE FOR DIRECT CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION
OF GUNS IN SCHOOL ZONES
MICHAEL A. LAWRENCE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The one-year anniversary of the Columbine school shootings in
Littleton, Colorado provides an appropriate opportunity to explore the
legal and social issues relating to school violence. While Columbine
brought the topic of school violence to the forefront of the nation's con-
sciousness in horrifying fashion a year ago last April 20th, it was hardly
the only school attack or threat of attack that has occurred in the last sev-
eral years. Since 1995 alone there have been school shootings resulting
in death or injury in Moses Lake, Washington; Bethel, Alaska; 2 Pearl,
Mississippi; 3 Paducah, Kentucky;4 Stamps, Arkansas; 5 Jonesboro, Ar-
kansas;6 Edinboro, Pennsylvania; 7 Fayetteville, Tennessee; 8 Springfield,
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Michigan State University, Detroit College of Law. J.D.,
M.S. University of Wisconsin - Madison. The author wrote this Article while visiting at the
University of Denver College of Law in 1999-2000. Special thanks to Susan J. Hendrick, Erick
Hohenegger and Chris Rose for their research assistance.
1. Two students and one teacher were killed, and one other was wounded when 14-year-old
Barry Loukaitis opened fire on his algebra class in February 1996. Elissa Haney, Lessons In
Violence: A Timeline of Recent School Shootings, available at
http://www.infoplease.com/spot/schoolviolencel.html (last visited July 30, 2000) [hereinafter Haney
http://www.infoplease.com/spot/schoolviolence I.html].
2. The school Principal and one student were killed and two others were wounded when
Evan Ramsey, 16, opened fire at his high school in February 1997. See Haney
http://www.infoplease.com/spot/schoolviolence lhtml, supra note 1.
3. Two students were killed and seven wounded in October 1997 by a 16-year-old who was
also accused of killing his mother. He and several friends thought to be in on the plot were said to
be outcasts who worshipped Satan. See Haney
http://www.infoplease.com/spot/schoolviolencel html, supra note 1.
4. Three students were killed and five were wounded by a 14-year-old boy as they
participated' in a prayer circle at Heath High School in December 1997. See Haney
http://www.infoplease.com/spot/schoolviolencel .html, supra note 1.
5. Two students were wounded in December 1997 when Colt Todd, 14, from his hiding spot
in the woods, shot at students as they stood in the parking lot. See Haney
http://www.infoplease.com/spot/schoolviolencel'html, supra note 1.
6. Four students and one teacher were killed and ten others were wounded as they evacuated
Westside Middle School during a false fire alarm when Mitchell Johnson, 13, and Andrew Golden,
11, shot at their classmates and teachers from the woods in March 1998. See Haney
http://www.infoplease.com/spot/schoolviolencel.html, supra note 1.
7. One teacher was killed and two students were wounded when a 14-year-old boy opened
fire at a dance at James W. Parker Middle School in April 1998. See Haney
http://www.infoplease.com/spot/schoolviolence I.html, supra note I.
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Oregon;9 Richmond, Virginia;10 Littleton, Colorado; 1 Taber, Alberta,
Canada; 12 Conyers, Georgia; 13 Fort Gibson, Oklahoma in December
1999; 14 and Mount Morris Township, Michigan in March 2000. 15
The numbing frequency of these events - nearly 200 reports of
school shootings resulting in death since 1992, not counting the hundreds
of copy-cat threats made in dozens of other states during that same pe-
riod - suggests that the problem is approaching epidemic proportions.
What can be done about this flurry of deadly school attacks? The
problem stems from teen alienation and anger and, therefore, any lasting
solution must address both the root sociological causes of the teen al-
ienation and anger that has resulted in the increase in school violence.
Regardless of the cause-be it lack of parental involvement, teasing
among students, perpetuation of a have/have not atmosphere in schools,
the easy accessibility of violent video games, or any number of other
societal pressures facing teenagers, the solution must also encompass
matters of enforcement, including the passage of legislation imposing
penalties for the possession of guns and other weapons in schools.
The source of any proposed solution could come from either Con-
gress or individual states. It can be argued on one hand that matters in-
8. One student was killed in the parking lot at Lincoln County High School in May 1998,
three days before he was to graduate, when he was shot by 18-year-old honor student Jacob Davis,
his girlfriend's ex-boyfriend. See Haney http://www.infoplease.co/spot/schoolviolencel.html,
supra note 1.
9. Two students were killed and twenty-two others were wounded in the cafeteria at
Thurston High School in May 1998 by 15-year-old Kip Kinkel, who had been arrested and released
to his parents a day earlier, after it was discovered that he had a gun at school. His parents were
found dead at home. See Haney http://www.infoplease.com/spot/schoolviolencel.html, supra note
1.
10. One teacher and one guidance counselor were wounded when they were shot by a 14-
year-old boy in the hallway of a Richmond high school. See Haney
http://www.infoplease.con-fspot/schoolviolencel .html, supra note 1.
11. Fourteen students (including the killers) and one teacher were killed and twenty-three
others were wounded at Columbine High School in April 1999. Eric Harris, 18, and Dylan Klebold,
17, had plotted for a year to kill at least 500 people and blow up their school. At the end of their
hour-long rampage, they tumed their guns on . themselves. See Haney
http://www.infoplease.conspot/schoolviolence I .html, supra note 1.
12. One student was killed and one was wounded at W. R. Myers High School in April 1999,
in the first fatal high school shooting in Canada in 20 years. The suspect, a 14-year-old boy, had
been unhappy at Myers and dropped out in order to begin home schooling. See Haney
http://www.infoplease.com/spot/schoolviolencel.html, supra note 1.
13. Six students were injured at Heritage High School in May 1999 when they were shot by
15-year-old T.J. Solomon, who was reportedly depressed after breaking up with his girlfriend.
Haney, supra note 2.
14. Four students were wounded and one was severely bruised when a 13-year-old boy
opened fire in December 1999 with a 9mm semiautomatic handgun at Fort Gibson Middle School.
See Haney http://www.infoplease.com/spot/schoolviolence I.html, supra note 1.
15. Six-year-old Kayla Rolland was killed when her six-year-old classmate fired a handgun at
her in class. See Haney http://www.infoplease.com/spot/schoolviolencel.html, supra note 1.
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volving education are of "traditional state concern," so any attempts to
address the problem should be undertaken-if they are to be undertaken
by government at all-by the individual states and local subunits. 16 The
Tenth Amendment 17 is at the root of this concern for the relative author-
ity of Congress vis-a-vis the states. Respect for Tenth Amendment prin-
ciples requires that Congress must be especially sensitive in attempting
to regulate in areas of "traditional state concern" such as criminal law
and education. 18
On the other hand, one can argue that the increased frequency and
the very severity of these attacks suggest a crisis of national dimension
that is beyond the competence of the individual states. 19 A component of
this argument is that school attacks--epitomized by the spate of recent
shootings culminating in Columbine-have evolved into nothing less
than a new form of domestic terrorism, thus requiring congressional
intervention.
The latter approach raises fundamental constitutional questions con-
cerning Congress's authority to legislate on the matter of school violence.
It is axiomatic that Conr ess may act only pursuant to a power enumer-
ated in the Constitution. As the Supreme Court stated in U.S. v. Lopez
22
16 Indeed, this was a component of the Supreme Court's reasoning in U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
551 (1995) in which the Court held that Congress exceeded its Commerce Power in enacting the
Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990. See infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
17. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution... are reserved to the
States .... U .S. CONST. amend. X.
18. Regarding criminal law, Congress' explicit constitutional authority to regulate in the field
of criminal law is limited to two types of laws: those that would (1) "provide for the punishment of
counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, (6); and
(2) "define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law
of nations." U.S. CONST. Art. I § 8 (10). In addition, the "necessary and proper clause" allows
Congress to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (18). Some believe that Congress' use of the necessary
and proper clause and other provisions of Article 1, Section 8 to promulgate and enforce criminal
laws has gone too far, however "[i]t is questionable whether Congress should arrogate to itself vast
criminal powers supposedly deriving from the interstate commerce power, or the taxing power.
Much of the expansion of [the] federal criminal power has taken place as a result of an excessive
judicial deference to Congress' proclivity for reading the interstate commerce power as a general
grant of legislative authority on any subject." Douglas B. Kopel & Joseph Olson, Preventing a Reign
of Terror: Civil Liberties Implications of Terrorism Legislation, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 247, 344
(1996).
19. See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text describing the chilling fact that well over
600 students could have died at Columbine had all of the killers' bombs been detonated as they had
planned - a number of deaths 4 times greater than at the bombing of the Alfred Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 -- which has been described as the single most destructive act of
domestic terrorism in our nation's history.
20. See infra notes 64 and accompanying text.
21. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (18).
22. 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
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in holding that Congress exceeded its Commerce power in enacting the
Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990:23
The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated pow-
ers. As James Madison wrote, "the powers delegated by the proposed
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and in-
definite." This constitutionally mandated division of authority "was
adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental lib-
erties. Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate
branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumula-
tion of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of
power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the
risk of tyranny and abuse from either front."
24
Congress has not been completely thwarted in its efforts to limit the
possession of guns in schools. In addition to several broader pieces of
existing and proposed legislation that regulate the purchase and posses-
sion of guns, which would of course ultimately affect possession of guns
in schools,25 The Gun Free School Act of 199426 tied the states' receipt
of certain funds to their passage, by October 20, 1995, of state laws re-
quiring local educational institutions to expel from school any student
found in possession of a gun on school grounds.
27
The fact remains, however, that currently there is no uniform na-
tional law dealing directly with the possession of guns in schools. Again,
23. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994). The Act made it a federal offense "for any individual
knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to
believe, is a school zone." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A).
24. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (internal citations omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45,
pp.292-293; Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
25. See, e.g., The Youth Handgun Safety Act, 18 U.S.C. 922(x) (1994). The Act was passed
as 'an amendment to the federal criminal code in 1994 to combat the problems associated with
juvenile possession of handguns. See 18 U.S.C. 922(x). Part I of the Act prohibits the sale or
transfer of handguns or handgun ammunition to someone the seller knows, or should know, is a
juvenile. See id. Part 2 prohibits juveniles from knowingly possessing a handgun or handgun
ammunition. See id. Part 3 contains exceptions; and Parts 4, 5, and 6 are procedural provisions. See
id. The Youth Handgun Safety Act was upheld against commerce clause challenge by the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Michael R. in 1996, see infra notes 964-109 and accompanying text, but
to date has not been reviewed by the Supreme Court. See also Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1994).
26. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-22 (1994). The Act was passed as part of the Improving America's
Schools Act of 1994, which was part of the reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965. The state laws may also permit the local education agency's chief executive
officer (presumably the superintendent) to modify the expulsion requirement on a case-by-case
basis. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-22.
27. Congress is allowed to engage in such "arm-twisting" pursuant to its spending power
under Article I § 8 (1). See, generally, South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (upholding
Congress tying highway funds to the states' passage of laws fixing the minimum drinking age at 21).
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some will maintain that this is as it should be.28 This Article argues to
the contrary, however, that the problem of violent attacks in schools has
reached a critical point whereby direct Congressional intervention is nec-
essary and constitutionally supportable. The landscape of school violence
is quite different than that of just five years ago when Lopez was decided,
as became so jarringly evident with the events of Columbine and its af-
termath. To borrow from Justice Stevens' dissent in Lopez, "Whether or
not the national interest in eliminating [the market for possession of
handguns by school-age children] would have justified federal legislation
in [1995], it surely does today."
29
This Article proceeds in stages. Section II provides a synopsis of the
Supreme Court's most recently elucidated position, in Lopez, on the
matter of direct Congressional regulation of guns in schools, and con-
cludes that the case was decided correctly under principles of federalism
in the context of the year 1995. Section III recalls the events of Colum-
bine and other school attacks of recent years, and asks whether uniform
national legislation is necessary in order to address the burgeoning na-
tional crisis of deadly school violence and then suggests that some forms
of deadly school violence might properly be classified as a new form of
domestic terrorism.
Section IV considers possible constitutional justifications for any
possible new federal legislation banning guns from schools, and also
briefly discusses broader federal gun statutes that, by extension, reach the
matter of possession in schools. Based on the foregoing-i.e., in par-
ticular, the stunning increase in the magnitude of the problem of deadly
school attacks in recent years; the devastating economic and social toll
that such attacks inflict on victims, families, communities, and the nation
alike; and the failure of states to adequately address the problem (as
epitomized by the Colorado legislature's failure to enact meaningful leg-
islation in the wake of Columbine)-Section IV finally concludes that
the direct national regulation of guns and weapons in school zones is
necessary at this time to lessen the likelihood of the recurrence of such
acts of domestic terrorism as occurred at Columbine High School last
year.
II. U.S. V. LOPEZ?0
A. The Holding
Congress' previous attempt to regulate directly guns in schools-the
1990 Gun Free School Zones Acta31-was struck down by the Supreme
28. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
29. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 602 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
30. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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Court in 1995 in Lopez v. United States.32 In Lopez, a 5-4 majority of the
Court pointedly noted that the .Act "contains no jurisdictional element
which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm pos-
session in question affects interstate commerce .... [and that] 'neither
the statute nor its legislative history contains express congressional
findings regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of gun posses-
sion in a school zone. ''33 The Court suggested that while "Congress nor-
mally is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial bur-
dens that an activity has on interstate commerce .... [such] congressional
findings would enable [the Court to better] evaluate the legislative judg-
ment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate com-
merce, even though no such substantial effect [is] visible to the naked
eye." 34
The opinion then went on to state that Congress under its commerce
power may regulate (1) "the use of the channels of interstate commerce";
(2) "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce even though the threat may come only from intra-
state activities"; and (3) "those activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce."35 The Court found unconvincing the government's
arguments that the possession of guns in school zones "substantially af-
fects" interstate commerce, and thus held that Congress had acted be-
yond its commerce clause authority in passing the Gun Free School Zone
Act.
36
In arguing unsuccessfully that the Act should be upheld, the Gov-
ernment argued that the Gun Free School Zones Act sufficiently affected
interstate commerce in two ways: one, violence in general (including in
31. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994). The Act made it a federal offense "for any individual
knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to
believe, is a school zone." Id.
32. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
33. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62 (quoting Brief for United States 5-6).
34. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63 (citing Perez v. U.S., 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). Indeed, a number of commentators suggest that this failure on the
part of Congress to offer adequate constitutional justification for the Act is the true basis for the
Court's opinion. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, Reflections on United States v. Lopez:
COMMERCE!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 690 (1995) (commenting that "the important point [of Lopez]
is that Congress must proceed in a way that recognizes the possibility of some limits and takes the
doctrine of enumerated powers seriously"); Steven Rosenberg, Note: Just Another Kid With a Gun?
United States v. Michael R.: Reviewing the Youth Handgun Safety Act Under the United States v.
Lopez Commerce Clause Analysis, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L REV. 51, 64, 78 (1998) (stating that
"Congress' complete failure to justify its intrusion into the traditional state zones of power of
education and criminal law signaled to the Court that federalism itself was threatened. Underlying
the Court's decision in Lopez was the Court's belief that Congress should not use the commerce
power as a general police power").
35. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
36. See id. at 551.
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schools) affects the national economy in the sense that insurance costs
are spread throughout the national population and that people will be less
willing to travel to parts of the country they perceive to be unsafe;37 and
two, violence in schools adversely affects the educational process "by
threatening the learning environment [which in turn] will result in a less
productive citizenry, [which in turn] will have an adverse effect on the
Nation's economic well-being."
38
In rejecting both of these arguments, the Lopez Court raised the
following "slippery slope" concerns:
[U]nder its 'cost of crime' reasoning, . Congress could regulate not
only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent
crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce.
Similarly, under the Government's 'national productivity' reasoning,
Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related to the
economic productivity of individual citizens: family law (including
marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example .... [I]t is diffi-
cult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as
criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have
been sovereign. Thus, if we are to accept the Government's argu-
ments, we are hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual that
Congress is without power to regulate.
39
Moreover, the Court reasoned, a natural extension of the ability to
regulate "activities that adversely affect the learning environment" would
be the ability to "mandate a federal curriculum for local elementary and
secondary schools because what is taught in local schools has a signifi-
cant 'effect on classroom learning,' and that, in turn, has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. ' 4° The Court rejected the dissent's asser-
tion that "Congress ... could rationally conclude that schools fall on the
commercial side of the line" (i.e., that schools encompass commercial
activities to an extent sufficient to justify the exercise of the commerce
power),41 commenting that:
[This] rationale lacks any real limits because, depending on the level
of generality, any activity can be looked upon as commercial. Under
the dissent's rationale, Congress could just as easily look at child
rearing as 'falling on the commercial side of the line' because it pro-
vides a 'valuable service - namely to equip [children] with the skills
they need to survive in life and, more specifically, in the
workplace.'
42
37. See id. at 563-64.
38. Id. at 564.
39. Id. (internal citations omitted).
40. Id. at 565.
41. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995).
42. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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The Court then commented that while Congress does have the
authority under its Commerce power "to regulate numerous commercial
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce and also affect the
educational process[, t]hat authority, though broad, does not include the
authority to regulate each and every aspect of local schools." 
4 3
B. Lopez Was Properly Decided
The Court's holding in Lopez was proper if solely for the fact that
Congress, in deliberating upon and drafting the Gun Free School Zones
Act, failed to make any attempt whatsoever to offer justification for how
the legislation was authorized under the Constitution.44 Only when the
Act was found to be unconstitutional by the court below4 5 did Congress
begin to offer any sort of constitutional justification for the legislation.
46
Congress's complacency is a result of the extreme deference -
amounting to virtually unchecked authority-given Congress by the
Court since 1937 in matters involving the Commerce power. The
Court's deference during the more than half a century following 1937 has
been largely well-advised in the sense that it has allowed for the passage
of monumentally important legislation that has, among other things,
43. Id. at 565-66. Moreover,
The statute makes the simple possession of a gun within 1,000 feet of the grounds of the
school a criminal offense. In a sense any conduct in this interdependent world of ours
has an ultimate commercial origin or consequence, but we have not yet said the
commerce power may reach so far. If Congress attempts that extension, then at the least
we must inquire whether the exercise of national power seeks to intrude upon an area of
traditional state concern ....
[Ilt is well established that education is a traditional concern of the States. The
proximity to schools, including of course schools owned and operated by the States or
their subdivisions, is the very premise for making the conduct criminal ....
While it is doubtful that any State, or indeed any reasonable person, would argue that
is wise policy to allow students to carry guns on school premises, considerable
disagreement exists about how best to accomplish that goal. In this circumstance, the
theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States may perform their role as
laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far
from clear. (citing New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 31 1)(Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 580-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal citations ommitted).
44. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
45. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993).
46. In the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Congress found that
"firearms and ammunition move easily in interstate commerce and have been found in increasing
numbers in and around schools," and that the "occurrence of violent crime in school zones has
resulted in a decline in the quality of education in our country," resulting in an "adverse impact on
interstate commerce." 42 U.S.C. 13701; see also supra notes 387-38 and accompanying text for the
Government's justifications in arguing the case.
47. See generally, ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
§ 3.3.4 (1997) (analyzing the Supreme Court decisions pertaining to the commerce clause following
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, (1937); 1 LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW L 5-4 (3d ed. 2000) (addressing the Supreme Court's perspective on the
commerce clause throughout the twentieth century).
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helped bring the nation out of the Great Depression, improved working
conditions, and guaranteed protection of civil liberties for tens of mil-
lions of Americans. 48
That said, principles of federalism 49 suggest that the minimum Con-
gress - a co-equal branch of the federal government with limited Consti-
tutional authority-should be expected to do in exercising its broad
Commerce power is to explain, at the very least when it is not intuitively
obvious, the nexus of the regulated activity to interstate commerce.
Indeed, this very notion may be the most important and lasting as-
pect of Lopez, because it forces Congress to "stay honest" and engage in
a "self-checking" process as it considers adopting legislation pursuant to
its Commerce power. In other words, Lopez might be seen as "merely a
,sort of 'signaling device'-a reminder to Congress that the Court is still
out there, willing (however reluctantly) to intervene if federal legislators
become too complacent about extending their authority. ' '' 5  Some com-
mentators have applauded this outcome, stating, for example, that Lopez
was an "extraordinary event" marking "a revolutionary and long overdue
revival" of limiting federal powers.51
48. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30-49 (1937) (upholding
unfair labor provisions of the National Labor Relations Act); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
125-126 (1941) (sustaining minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the National Labor
Relations Act); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) and Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304-305 (1964) (upholding anti-discrimination provisions of the Civil
Rights Act).
49. See Rosenberg, supra note 34 at 56, stating,
[F]ederalism is the political theory that two independent, sovereign systems of
government are better able [than one] to ensure liberty and prosperity. A number of
rationales explain why this balance of power under federalism is beneficial. These
rationales include (1) decentralizing power ensures diversity and allows for
experimentation in governing approaches by the states; (2) placing power in both national
and state hands protects against tyranny, either from an overly powerful federal
government or from a local majority exercising power over a local minority; (3) having
two systems of government increases citizen participation in political affairs and makes
government entities more accountable to their constituents; and (4) splitting power
between the national and local governments is the most efficient use of resources because
the national government can focus on national problems, while local governments can
concentrate on local concerns. Many consider federalism the greatest American
innovation to political theory.
Id.
50. Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Federal Power and Federalism: A Theory of
Commerce-Clause Based Regulation of Traditionally State Crimes, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 921,
922-23 (1997) (quoting from Guns in Schools, 1995: Hearings on S. 890 Before the Subcomm. on
Youth Violence of the Senate Judiciary Comm., (1995) (statement of Professor Larry Kramer)). See
also Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 83-84 (commenting that "When Congress makes no attempt to
show the Court that, at a minimum, it thought about the effects of its regulation on federalism, as in
Lopez the Court will treat the regulation as though Congress was threatening federalism itself, and
the Court will find a way to strike down the law.")
51. Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995). See also Merritt, supra, at 690 (commenting
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In addition to recognizing Congress's failure to offer constitutional
justification for the Act, the Lopez opinion also properly suggested that
there are substantive "outer limits" beyond which the commerce power
may not extend. 52 The Court noted that even in 1937, when it granted
Congress a broadened commerce power in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.53 , that commerce power
must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and
may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate com-
merce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our
complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between
what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized
government.
54
Despite the positive effects of judicial acceptance of a broad com-
merce power during the latter half of the Twentieth Century, when Con-
gress attempts to regulate an activity whose connections to interstate
commerce are so attenuated as to strain credulity, the appropriate
boundaries in our federalist system of dual sovereignty and shared state-
national authority are inappropriately exceeded.
By enacting the Gun Free School Zones Act, "a criminal statute that
by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms, [and that] is
not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which
the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity,55
were regulated", Congress went too far. There is no logical stopping
point if Congress's commerce power extends so far. For example,
Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related to the
economic productivity of individual citizens: family law (including
marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example .... [11f we are to
accept the Government's arguments, we are hard-pressed to posit an ,
activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.
51
Such a state of affairs is unacceptable, and the Court properly struck
down the Act in Lopez.
that "the important point [of Lopez] is that Congress must proceed in a way that recognizes the
possibility of some limits and takes the doctrine of enumerated powers seriously."); Ann Althouse,
Enforcing Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 793, 813 (1996) (suggesting
that "Lopez may amount to nothing more than a citation for the commercial/noncommercial
distinction and the general proposition that the courts do have at least some role, however minimal,
in limiting Congress to its enumerated powers ....").
52. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556-57 (stating that the commerce power is
"subject to outer limits").
53. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
54. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,37 (1937)).




Even though-Congress as a coequal branch of government which
is due great deference in the exercise of its constitutional authority--ob-
viously believed it was necessary to address the issue of guns in schools,
basic separation of powers principles require that the Court has the final
responsibility for defining the "outer limits" of Congress's authority.
57
"Whether particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to
come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ul-
timately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled
finally only by this Court.' 58 Moreover, "[Slimply because Congress
may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate
commerce does not necessarily make it so. ' 59 Justice Kennedy, concur-
ring in Lopez, commented that:
Although it is the obligation of all officers of the Government to re-
spect the constitutional design, the federal balance is too essential a
part of our constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in secur-
ing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the
other level of Government has tipped the scales too far.
60
In sum, it is well-settled constitutional doctrine that it is the Court's
responsibility for adjusting and fine-tuning the relative responsibilities
and powers of the co-equal branches of government as disputes arise.
61
By the late Twentieth Century Congress's commerce power had ex-
panded to a point where a correction was necessary, and the Court's Lo-
pez opinion was the appropriate vehicle for such a correction.
III. DEADLY SCHOOL VIOLENCE AS A FORM OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM
Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold succeeded in their desire to cause
mayhem and to achieve notoriety for themselves. By the afternoon of
their attack on Columbine on April 20, 1999, 615 officers from 27 differ-
ent agencies had converged on the scene, together with news organiza-
tions from around the world. Students encountered the media crush, local
schools were locked down, and a two-mile radius around Columbine was
blocked off. Frantic parents of Columbine students converged on the area
looking for their unaccounted children, only to be sent to the public li-
57. So long as a "rational basis" exists for Congress' "concluding that a regulated activity
sufficiently affected interstate commerce", the regulation would be upheld by the Court. Lopez, 514
U.S. at 557 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276-
280 (1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155-156 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294, 299-301(1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-253
(1964)).
58. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 273 (Black, J.,
concurring)).
59. Id. (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 311 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
60. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
61. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (stating that "It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
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brary and a nearby elementary school. Lists were created and faxed be-
tween the library and the elementary school to aid in reuniting parents
with their students. Around 4 p.m., the gravity of the attack started to set
in. As the day wore on into the night and the number of parents waiting
to be reunited with their students dwindled. For some of those remaining,
the unfathomable began to sink in-that their children were the ones still
in the high school, dead.
As other investigators began the task of piecing together what hap-
pened at the high school, they found hundreds of backpacks left behind,
in which pagers were going off. In the library, investigators found bodies
and blood on the books. In the words of one, "[lhis was a school, a place
where kids laughed, passed notes, studied" and dreamed of tomorrow.
62
"It was now a place where they had died."
63
The magnitude of this tragedy brought seasoned investigators of
violent crimes to tears and prompted a national soul-searching seeking to
understand what would drive two teenagers to unleash such a ruthless
attack on their classmates and teachers. The Columbine massacre dem-
onstrates that some forms of school violence have evolved into nothing
less than a new form of domestic terrorism.
64
62. Nancy Gibbs & Timothy Roche, The Columbine Tapes, TIME, Dec. 20, 1999, Vol. 154,
No. 25, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/articles.html [hereinafter Gibbs,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/articles.html].
63. See Gibbs & Roach, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/articles.html, supra note 62.
64. It is possible to be too loose in defining "terrorism", and to react in knee-jerk fashion by
suggesting ill-advised and overbroad federal enforcement. History suggests that the government has
overreacted time and again to organizations which have challenged the existing system - such as the
Alien and Sedition Acts which were enacted in part to respond to the Jeffersonians criticisms of
President Adams and the Federalists; the relentless suppression of anti-slavery speech by many
Southern states in response to the extremist rhetoric of some southern abolitionists; and the use of
conspiracy and criminal syndicalism laws to suppress labor organizers, Communists, and civil rights
activists. The temptation must be resisted to have government "crack down" in a way that would
unnecessarily abridge civil liberties. See Kopel & Olson, supra note 18, at 252-55. Kopel and
Olson suggest:
[I]t is easy for many Americans to see, in hindsight, the legitimacy of the viewpoint of
the Jeffersonians, of southern abolitionists, of labor organizers, and of the civil rights
movement, it is not so easy for some Americans to respect the current concerns of their
fellow citizens. Today, there are many tens of millions of people who are terrified of the
government, and many thousands (or perhaps more) who participate in militias. To
follow the voices of those who urge us to ... crack down on radicals with unorthodox
views would be the most dangerous course. Respectful dialogue and reform, not
stereotyping and repression, are the courses that history will judge wisest .... Everything
that terrorists do is already illegal. Current laws already provide ample authority for
investigations of potential terrorists, including persons who have done nothing more than
talk big. Various proposals that are offered as supposed solutions to terrorism -
including more spying on peaceful dissidents, more electronic surveillance, trials with
secret evidence, felonizing charitable donations to foreign humanitarian causes, and
federalizing and militarizing criminal law - will make America more dangerous, not
safer. Releasing the federal government from the strict Constitutional rule of law would,
in the long run, facilitate state terrorism.
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According to the FBI, terrorism is "the unlawful use of force or
violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a govern-
ment, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of
political or social objectives," with the perpetrators' motivation or intent
as the key factor.65 If, therefore, the perpetrators target a sector of the
public in order to instill fear and to cause a political or social change, the
act is one of terrorism under the FBI's definition.
66
For its part, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
defines terrorism as "the use of force or violence against persons or
property in violation of criminal law for purposes of intimidation, coer-
cion or ransom. '67 The FEMA materials suggest that terrorists "often use
threats to create fear among the public to try to convince citizens that
their government is powerless to prevent terrorism and to get immediate,,68 •
publicity for their causes. Moreover,
a terrorist attack can take several forms, depending on the technologi-
cal means available to the terrorist, the nature of the political issue
motivating the attack, and the points of weakness of the terrorist's tar-
get. Bombings are the most frequently used terrorist method in the
United States. Other possibilities includes an attack at transportation
facilities, an attack against utilities or other public services or an inci-
dent involving chemical or biological 
agents.
6 9
After Columbine, it is necessary to add "attack on a school" to the
list of possibilities for terrorist attacks. The attack on the students and
staff at Columbine High School fits the FBI and FEMA definitions for
terrorism. 70 Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris were "picked on," and they
Kopel, supra at 255-56, 346. These are wise words, and Congress would do well to heed them
whenever it is tempted to pass any new laws designed to counter terrorism. That said, a law that
would prohibit the possession of guns in schools does not raise the sorts of concerns addressed above
- a school gun possession statute simply does not in any way abridge civil liberties in the way that
other more invasive statutes might.
65. See Interview by Susan Hendrick with Mark Holstlaw, special agent, Denver FBI field
office, Denver, Co. (February 23, 2000).
66. If, by contrast, the motivation is simply a personal agenda, such as to "get back at" an ex-
girlfriend of ex-boyfriend, one would be hard-pressed to classify such an act as terrorism. See
Interview by Susan Hendrick with Mark Holstlaw, special agent, Denver FBI field office, Denver,
Co. (February 23, 2000).
67. FEMA: BACKGROUNDER - TERRORISM, available at
http://www.fema.gov/library/terror.html (last modified Jan. 10, 1998).
68. FEMA, supra note 67, available at http://www.fema.gov/1ibrary/terror.html According to
FEMA, "most terrorist incidents in the United States have involved small extremist groups who use
terrorism to achieve a designated objective . . . . In recent years the largest number of terrorist
strikes have occurred in the Western States and Puerto Rico. Attacks in Puerto Rico accounted for
about 60 percent of all terrorist incidents between 1983 and 1991 that occurred on United States
territory." Id.
69. Id.
70. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text. The FBI is called in whenever a situation
involves interstate commerce, explosives or hostages, and once the area is secured. In the case of
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retaliated against a sector of the public-i.e., students and teachers-in
order to foment "a revolution" of social change. 7 1 Investigators found
over 80 bombs in Columbine High School. 72 "Some were pipe bombs.
Others were fashioned out of propane canisters and C02 (carbon diox-
ide) cartridges. Investigators even found some explosives containing
homemade napalm, a jellied form of gasoline." 73 Investigators also found
bombs in the cars and gym bags of both Harris and Klebold.
The FBI agents delicately looked inside the bags -- and instantly un-
derstood the true intentions of Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris: death,
by fire, for hundreds of their fellow students. The gym bags each held
a large bomb fashioned from a barbecue grill propane tank, a gasoline
can and other fuel cylinders. Each was wired to a pipe bomb. A two-
bell alarm clock served as a timing device. Had both bombs not
failed, explosives experts concluded, the 660 kids in the cafeteria at
11:20 a.m. on April 20 likely would have died-nearly four times the
number killed in the Oklahoma City bombing.
74
It is a sad fact that after Columbine it can no longer be said that the
threat of attack upon a school is an extremely rare occurrence. In the four
weeks following Columbine, for example, there were 350 arrests for
threats and bomb scares upon schools, with at least 30 of those arrests
involving an actual bomb or weapon.75
Columbine, there were both hostages and over ninety explosives. In addition, local law enforcement
lacked the resources or experience to deal with the crisis and the subsequent investigation, so the
FBI was summoned. See Interview by Susan Hendrick with Mark Holstlaw, special agent, Denver
FBI field office, Denver, Co. (February 23, 2000).
71. Gibbs & Roche, supra note 62. "Harris and Klebold have an inventory of their ecumenical
hatred: all 'niggers, spics, Jews, gays, f ing whites' the enemies who abused them and the friends
who didn't do enough to defend them.. . 'I hope we kill 250 of you,"' Klebold said, predicting that
the attack would be the most 'nerve-racking 15 minutes of my life, after the bombs are set and
we're waiting to charge through the school. Seconds will be like hours. I can't wait. I'll be shaking
like a leaf."' Harris and Klebold expressed their hope to live forever in memory and nightmares:
'We're going to kick-start a revolution,"' Harris said, and 'create flashbacks from what we
do.. and drive [the survivors] insane."' Id.
72. Dan Luzadder & KevinVaughan, Amassing the Facts, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
Dec. 13, 1999, available at http://www.denver.rmn.comlshooting/l213col l.shtml.
73. Luzadder & Vaughan, supra note 72 available at
http://www.denver.rmn.com/shooting/l1213coll.shtml..
74. id.
75. Steve Drummond, Arrests Top 350 in Threats, Bomb Scares, EDUCATION WEEK, May 26,
1999, available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/1999/37threat.hl8. "This is a terroristic activity that
needs to be taken seriously." Id. (quoting Ronald D. Stephens, Executive Director, National School
Safety Center). "Many Communities are no longer taking teenage threats lightly. In Texas, four 8th
grade boys were arrested for conspiracy to commit murder, conspiracy to commit arson, conspiracy
to manufacture explosives after teachers and students overheard conversations about an attack on the
school. In another Texas town, 4 teens were arrested after police found bomb making materials in
the back seat and trunk of the car the boys were in." http://www.angelfire.com (visited Feb. 12,
2000). In Jefferson County, Colorado, the home of Columbine, eight students were expelled from
the Jefferson County School district for making threats. See
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The mere threat of a Columbine-type attack is enough to gain wide-
spread media attention and virtually shut down entire communities. A
troubled adolescent with a desire to "send a message" or seeking venge-
ance of some sort intends these effects 76-just as any other terrorist in-
tends his actions to impose maximum damage and to garner widespread
publicity for his cause. True enough, gun-toting adolescents do not fit the
typical "terrorist" profile, but the effect of their actions and threats on the
average American is no less real - indeed, the effect is more real due to
its immediacy-than the amorphous threat of a stereotypical foreign ter-
rorist carrying out some sort of "traditional" terrorist activity such as a
car-bombing or the like. 77 Moreover, the fact that some (or even most)
threats or attacks are carried out by adolescents with a twisted desire for
fame78 or simply by confused kids who are lashing out in a highly inap-
propriate way (the latter do not constitute acts of terrorism) does not di-
minish the damaging effect of the act on the community and the nation as
http://www.salon.comlnewslfeature/1999/12116/columbine/indexhtm (visited Dec. 16, 1999).
Moreover, others besides Harris and Klebold were plotting in late 1998 and early 1999. In
November 1998, for example, in Burlington, WI,
five students, all boys aged 15 and 16, were arrested for conspiracy to commit murder.
Two of the boys were subsequently released as they had dropped out of the conspiracy
before the arrests. The plot to take the staff of the school hostage and kill some of them,
as well as killing twelve other children, came apart when police intervened and arrested
the boys the day before the plot was scheduled to happen. A police video of the
interrogation did not show Miranda warnings being given, so the confessions of the three
boys were not allowed at trial. All three plead to lesser offenses.... Initially, many of the
townspeople felt that the police over-reacted, and that the situation was blown out of
proportion. One mother thought the 'hysteria' was unreasonable. Six months later, after
Columbine, parents and school officials believe they narrowly missed a major disaster.
http://www.angelfire.com (visited Feb. 12, 2000).
76. Gibbs & Roche, supra note 62. "'Do not think we're trying to copy anyone,"' Eric Harris
warned, recalling the school shootings in Oregon and Kentucky. Harris suggested that he and Dylan
Klebold had the idea long ago, "'before the first one ever happened."' Id. They also bragged that
their plan was better, "not like those f_ s in Kentucky with camouflage and .22s. Those kids were
only trying to be accepted by others." Id.
77. As discussed supra note 68 and accompanying text, such acts of terrorism on U.S. soil are
rare.
78. Such a child knows that carrying out a school shooting will get him on the evening news
and perhaps even lead to Hollywood making a movie about him. "'They wanted to be famous,'
concludes FBI agent Mark Holstlaw. 'And they are. They're infamous.' It used to be said that living
well is the best revenge; for these two, it was to kill and die in a spectacular fashion." Gibbs &
Roche, supra note 62. Fame was not Harris's and Klebold's sole motivation, though:
Because they were steeped in violence and drained of mercy, they could accomplish
everything at once; payback to those who hurt them, and glory, the creation of a cult, for
all those who have suffered and been cast out. They wanted movies made of their story,
which they had carefully laced with 'a lot of foreshadowing and dramatic irony,' as
Harris put it. There was a poem he wrote, imagining himself as a bullet. 'Directors will
be fighting over this story,' Klebold said - and the boys chewed over which could be
trusted with the script: Steven Spielberg or Quentin Tarantino. 'You have two
individuals who wanted to immortalize themselves,' says Holstlaw. 'They wanted to be
martyrs and to document everything they were doing,'
to the point where they even made a video on the morning of the shooting describing their feelings.
apologizing to their parents and bequeathing their favorite belongings. Id.
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a whole, whose sense of well-being and safety is shaken to the core by
these events.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION IS NECESSARY
Given all of the above, what, if anything, should be done? One thing
is clear-guns and schools do not mix, and new strategies must be
adopted to prevent the recurrence of the events that occurred last year at
Columbine and in its wake.79 One area of focus that is receiving renewed
attention is so-called "preventive" legislation, ranging from measures that
would encourage strategies initiated within the family itself to those that
that are more community-based in nature.
80
Beyond the possible promulgation of such preventive measures, it is
important to consider what sort of "enforcement" mechanisms are neces-
sary, and whether legislation establishing these mechanisms should be
promulgated at the local, state or federal level. Whether it should be
Congress or the states who will take the lead in legislating the possession
of guns in schools is a matter of considerable controversy. While Con-
gressional deference to state primacy in regulating activities touching
upon matters of "traditional state concern" such as education and crimi-
nal law is to be desired and preferred in most circumstances, 8 1 our feder-
alist system of dual sovereignty authorizes the national government to
become involved pursuant to a power enumerated in the Constitution
when a particular problem--even one concerning a subject that is "tradi-
tionally a state concern"-grows to such a dimension as to seriously
harm the nation's economy and overall well-being.82 In such circum-
stances, if the states simply are unable -whether through their own inher-
ent limitations as only single entities among fifty, or through an absence
of political will-to address the problem effectively, it is appropriate for
Congress to step into the breach.
83
79. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
80. Herein lies the potential for significant debate as well - i.e., should government have a
role in becoming involved in "family" and "child-rearing" issues, and if so, what level of government
- local, state, or federal - should take primary responsibility? Such questions are beyond the scope of
this article, so the article does not venture into this particular hornet's nest, other than to say that the
soul-searching that has been prompted by Columbine on the topics of the family's and community's
role in mitigating problems of teen alienation is useful and necessary. As a society, we need to
address the problems facing our youth as they negotiate the difficult transitions from adolescence to
adulthood.
81. See, e.g., Kopel & Olson, supra note 18 at 343-48 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 80 for discussion of the "which came first - the chicken or the egg?"
nature of the purpose of the legislation.
83. As of 1995, a total of 40 states did regulate guns in schools in some way, Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring), but the lack of a national standard leads to uncertainty and
ignorance of what the law is in any given state. State laws vary widely. In Colorado, the very state
where Columbine High School is located, the legislature failed to pass meaningful gun control
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Columbine forever changed the dimensions of the issue of gun pos-
session in schools. Whereas before Columbine it was debatable whether
Congress should have a role in regulating guns in schools, 84 the brave
new post-Columbine world cries out for national control.
In the post-Columbine world, it is eminently reasonable for one to
conclude, while still maintaining fidelity to federalist principles of a lim-
ited national government and a meaningful Tenth Amendment, that Con-
gress may regulate guns in schools. Guns simply have no place in
schools, and especially with Columbine and its aftermath there is little
question that guns in schools have substantial negative effects on the
nation's economy to the point where Congressional exercise of the com-
merce power would be justified--even after Lopez.
While it is arguably true that the commerce power has been used by
Congress for too long as a virtual "blank check" for justifying legislation
beyond its natural constitutional boundaries, the fact remains that Article
One of the Constitution does grant Congress the affirmative power "to
regulate Commerce ... among the several states."'85 It has long been rec-
ognized that the commerce power is not to be read in its most narrow
sense - i.e., it encompasses far more than mere commercial traffic:
Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is in-
tercourse .... [The commerce power] is the power to regulate; that
is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This
power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be
exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other
than are prescribed in the constitution.
86
That such a regulation may survive constitutional scrutiny is not
certain,87 of course, but there are a number of reasons to believe it would
legislation in the year following the massacre. For example, on February 11, 2000 the Colorado
House Appropriations Committee killed HB 1242. which would have required background checks for
all buyers at gun shows. A former girlfriend of Harris's bought a couple of the guns used in the
attack at a gun show. Ordinarily, "experimentation" by the states is to be lauded and encouraged, as
described by Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebman,
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial
of the rights to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.
Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). However, with the advent of the
Columbine-type school massacre, the problem of violence in schools has gone beyond the point
where a single state should be allowed to serve as a "laboratory" - when potentially hundreds of
children die, communities are terrified, and interstate commerce is adversely affected, Congressional
preemption is necessary.
84. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text for discussion of Lopez, in which the Court
held in 1995 that Congress does not have a role.
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
86. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 189, 196 (1824).
87. See supra note 83 and accompanying text for "source of legal uncertainty" language.
20001
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
be upheld. For example, even before Columbine, in its 1997 United
States v. Michael R. opinion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sub-
jected another federal "gun possession" statute (i.e., the Youth Handgun
Safety Act--Congress' regulation of juvenile possession of handguns) to
rigorous post-Lopez scrutiny and upheld the statute, concluding that the
statute and facts were distinguishable from Lopez. Granted, Michael R. is
not an opinion of the Supreme Court, and the statute does not specifically
involve gun possession in schools, but there are enough parallels be-
tween the statute upheld in Michael R. and a statute that would regulate
possession in schools to conclude that the latter would have a good
chance in surviving judicial scrutiny.
A. Federal Measures - Constitutional Authority
In light of the magnitude of the problem, from an enforcement per-
spective it is time for Congress to take action to establish a uniform fed-
eral penalty for the act of bringing a gun onto school grounds. Current
federal laws, such as the Gun Free School Act, 88 and other broader gun-
related statutes such as the Youth Handgun Safety Act,89 and the Brady
Bill,90 while effective in their own rights, do not adequately address and
target the specific problem of guns in schools. Nor do individual state
laws-many of which fall far short in their attention to the issue of guns
possession among youth--do enough in addressing the national scope of
the problem.
The problem on the ground, in real life, is severe. After Columbine,
kids and families are fearful. Just as earlier problems of, for example,
unfair working conditions began to harm the nation's economic well-
being to a degree that the Court finally agreed that Congressional inter-
vention was warranted, 9 1 the Columbine massacre and its aftermath have
transformed the matter of gun possession in schools from the occasional
isolated incident of a troubled youngster shooting his classmate(s)92 into
a problem that has substantial negative impacts on the national economy.
Columbine thus marks a turning point where the Court would be
justified in concluding that Congress does have the constitutional
authority and the necessary "rational basis" (at least)93 for believing that
88. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1994). See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 922(x) (1994). See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
90. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1994)..
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 64, 82and accompanying text
92. Tragic though events such as the murder in Spring 2000 of a 6 year old Michigan girl by a
first grade classmate are, Keith Naughton and Evan Thomas, Did Kayla Have to Die?, NEWSWEEK,
March 13, 2000, at 24, they are not acts of "domestic terrorism," and probably do not by themselves
justify Congressional intervention. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
93. See infra note 110 and accompanying text for description of standard of review.
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regulation of gun possession in schools would further the legitimate gov-
ernment interest of preventing the recurrence of such terrorist acts and
threats that do so much harm to the national economy and to the indi-
viduals, families and communities involved.
1. United States v. Michael R.
94
Any new federal legislation attempting to regulate the possession of
guns in schools must be promulgated with the principles of Lopez firmly
in mind. Given the Court's disapproval of the statute at issue in Lopez, in
which the Court asserted that "the possession of a gun in a local school
zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition
elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce,"95 is it
possible for Congress to craft any sort of legislation regulating guns in
schools that would survive constitutional scrutiny? A more recent opin-
ion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals would seem to suggest that the
answer is "Yes," provided the measure meets certain requirements.
In United States v. Michael R,96 the Ninth Circuit upheld a provi-
sion of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act prohibiting the knowing
and intentional possession of a handgun by a juvenile97 against constitu-
tional challenge, 98 stating that "18 U.S.C. 922(x)(2) is different" from
section 922 (q).
99
An analysis of the court's reasoning in distinguishing section
922(x)(2) from section 922(q) is crucial to the understanding of how a
statute that prohibits the possession of guns in schools might be crafted
to survive constitutional attack. The court first noted that section
922(x)(2) is "part of a larger, more comprehensive regulation to curb the
bustling underground market in firearms and drugs."' 00 Specifically,
section 922(x)(2)
94. 90 F.3d 340 (9th Cir. 1996).
95. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
96. 90 F.3d 340 (9th Cir. 1996).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2) (1994).
98. The defendant challenged the constitutionality of section 922(x)(2) on the grounds that it
is, like the statute that was at issue and struck down in Lopez (section 922(q)), "criminal statute that
by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise." Michael R., 90
F.3d at 343 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). "Furthermore, [the defendant] maintains that section
922(x)(2) has no 'jurisdictional element' which would operate to ensure that, on a case-by-case basis,
there was an effect on interstate commerce." Michael R.., 90 F.3d at 343 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at
561).
99. Section 922(q) was the statute reviewed and struck down in Lopez.
100. Michael R., 90 F.3d at 344. The Ninth Circuit noted the comparison to section 922(q),
which the Supreme Court in Lopez commented was designed to regulate an activity (possession of a
gun in a local school zone) that "is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition
elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce." Id. at 344 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 567).
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is part of a larger regulation [Section 922(x)] that deals with the sale,
delivery, or transfer of firearms to a juvenile .... Read as a whole,
section 922(x) by its terms regulates commerce: subsection (1) is tar-
geted at curbing the supply of handguns and suitable ammunition,101
while subsection (2) restricts the demand for those firearms. 10 2 We
find that under the statute, Congress is in effect regulating interstate
commerce by attacking both the supply and demand for firearms with
respect to juveniles. 
10 3
Second, the court concluded that "possession of a handgun by a juvenile,
as a general matter, could have a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce." 104 The court based this conclusion in part on the legislative his-
tory of Section 922(x), 105 which suggested that:
Congress enacted this statute to help control crime "by stopping
commerce in handguns with juveniles nationwide." Congress de-
fended the enactment of this statute as consistent with the Commerce
Clause on three grounds: (a) the movement of the component parts,
ammunition, and raw materials in interstate commerce; (b) the deter-
rence effect of violent crime on the travel of ordinary citizens and
foreigners; and (c) the related effort to control gun possession and
drug flow.
10 6
The court found justifications (a) and (b) to be self-explanatory:
"possession of a handgun by a juvenile implicates interstate commerce
through the manufacturing process and by its deterrent effect on inter-
state travel;" 10 7 and justification (c) to be valid as well, based on the
logical nexus between Congress's regulation of the sale, transfer and pos-
101. Subsection (1) provides: "It shall be unlawful for a person to sell, deliver, or otherwise
transfer to a person who the transferor knows or has reasonable cause to believe is a juvenile- (A) a
handgun; or (B) ammunition that is suitable for use only in a handgun." 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(1).
102 Subsection (2) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person who is a juvenile to knowingly
possess- (A) a handgun; or (B) ammunition that is suitable for use only in a handgun." 18 U.S.C. §
922(x)(2).
103. Michael R., 90 F.3d at 344.
104. Id. The court also cites to a federal district court opinion that reaches the same
conclusion: "The District Court of Massachusetts found that 18 U.S.C.§ 922(x) impacts the handgun
market by excluding juvenile participation; it concluded that because of section 922(x)'s effects on
the supply and demand of handguns, the statute fits within Congess's constitutional authority to
regulate commerce." Id. at 344 n.2 (citing United States v. Cardoza, 914 F.Supp 683, 687 (D.Mass.
1996)).
105. The court alluded in a footnote to Lopez's approval of the judiciary's recourse to
legislative history "as par of its independent evaluation of constitutionality under the Commerce
Clause." Michael R., 90 F.3d at 345 n.3. See supra note 34 and accompanying text for the Lopez
Court's comments on this topic.
106. Michael R, 90 F.3d at 344-45 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 390-91 (1994),
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1858, 1859).
107. Michael R., 90 F.3d at 345.
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session of handguns by juveniles to its efforts curb the illegal flow of
drugs and firearms in interstate commerce.108
In sum, the analysis undertaken by the Ninth Circuit in Michael R.
serves as a useful template for understanding how a federal law prohib-
iting the possession of guns in schools might survive after Lopez. It is
fair bet that the reasoning of the Michael R. court would not be accepted
by an unanimous Supreme Court, but it is quite likely that it would be
accepted by a majorityl°9-and that, as they say, is all it takes for the
Court to uphold a challenged law.
2. The necessary contours of any new proposed legislation
If it is to survive constitutional scrutiny, any federal legislation spe-
cifically regulating the possession of guns in schools of course must dif-
fer fundamentally from the Gun Free School Zones Act struck down in
Lopez. In short, Congress must ask whether (and then affirmatively con-
clude) the subject of the regulation falls within its limited scope of
authority and then, practically speaking, it must be able to defend its
legislation convincingly in the likely event the legislation is
challenged. 110
Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Lopez, though by far the
shortest of any of the opinions in the case, implicitly identifies a key
component of any successful school gun-control legislation, when he
states that "[tihe market for the possession of handguns by school-age
108. The court noted Congress' statement that "[v~iolent crime and the use of illicit drugs go
hand-in-hand, and attempts to control one without controlling the other may be fruitless." Id.
(quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 390-91 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1858,
1859).
109. While it is true that denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court does not have formal
precedential value, denial of cert. does have practical value to the extent that it can be understood
that at least six Justices believed that the holding below was not so objectionable as to require the
Court's review. Accordingly, when the Court denied certiorari in Michael R., [cannot find denied
cert citation], it was because at least six Justices concluded that the Ninth Circuit's upholding of
Section 922(x) of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act was not so objectionable as to require
review.
110. Although the appropriate judicial standard of review for any legislation not involving a
"fundamental right" (or "suspect classification" in equal protection claims) is "rational basis" review
- i.e., the legislation is presumed to be constitutional, and will be upheld so long as Congress had a
"rational basis" for believing the legislation was within its authority - the reality is that the Court
seemed in Lopez to employ a standard somewhat more searching than is typical with highly-
deferential rational basis review. Regardless of whether or not one believes the Court overstepped
the boundaries of judicial review by applying this "rational basis-plus" standard, Congress needs to
assume the Court will continue to examine its legislation (particularly that enacted under the
commerce power) more critically than it had in the past. Indeed, in the scope of things, this is
probably a good thing: as suggested supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text, constitutional
principles of separation of powers and federalism argue in favor of the Court stepping in to 'keep
Congress honest" in those times when Congress becomes too complacent and casual in its exercise
of its limited powers.
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children is, distressingly, substantial." ''' Conceptually, the proper way to
think of any new measure seeking to regulate the possession of guns in
schools is to understand that, while a criminal statute, the law by its
terms is seeking to dry up a particular market-i.e., the interstate market
for guns among school-age children. For example, if Congress concludes
on the basis of available information that when the federal penalties for
possessing guns in schools become so onerous as to convince a person
who might otherwise consider purchasing a gun-the component parts,
ammunition, and raw materials of which largely traveled in interstate
commerce-not to consummate that transaction, the demand side of this
particular market is affected. Multiply the decision of a single individual
not to buy by the similar decisions of hundreds and thousands of other
individuals, and one starts to see how a federal measure designed to im-
pose harsh penalties on an individual possessing a gun in a school does
in fact regulate "an economic activity that might, through repetition
elsewhere, substantially affect.., interstate commerce." 
112
Moreover, under a conceptual framework that views gun-control
legislation as a mechanism for reducing the "demand-side" of the market,
a specific regulation of gun possession in schools can be said to be a
smaller component of the larger regulatory scheme of "stopping com-
merce in handguns with juveniles nationwide"" 3 (after all, most students
in schools are juveniles), which itself is a smaller component of the
larger regulatory scheme of to help control crime. This is essentially the
approach taken by Congress with the Juvenile Delinquency Act (regu-
lating possession of handguns by juveniles) reviewed and upheld by the
Ninth Circuit in Michael R. 1
14
Just as the provision of the Juvenile Delinquency Act regulating
possession of handguns by juveniles reviewed in Michael R. (section
922(x)(2))1 15 was found to be "part of a larger, more comprehensive
regulation to curb the bustling underground market in firearms and
drugs,"' 116 a provision regulating the possession of guns in schools ar-
guably is part of the same "larger, more comprehensive regulation.""' 7
Extrapolating from the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Michael R. that "pos-
session of a handgun by a juvenile implicates interstate commerce
through the manufacturing process and by its deterrent effect on inter-
state travel,""' 8 and that regulating the sale, transfer and possession of
111. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 603 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(italics added).
112. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
113. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
116. U.S. v. Michael R., 90 F.3d 340, 344 (9th Cir. 1996).
117. Michael R., 90 F.3d at 344.
118. Id. at 345.
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handguns by juveniles is substantially tied to Congress' efforts to curb
the illegal flow of drugs and firearms in interstate commerce, the regula-
tion of gun possession in schools can be said to be a component part of
those arguments. Finally, there's no reason to believe that Congress' ob-
servation that "violent crime and the use of illicit drugs go hand-in-hand,
and attempts to control one without controlling the other may be fruit-
less" 9 applies any less in the school setting than it does elsewhere, a
supposition that lends additional support for the proposition that Con-
gress would be constitutionally justified in regulating the possession of
guns in schools.
The foregoing "smaller component of the larger effort to curb vio-
lent crime and drug use" and market-based "demand-side" arguments,
together with the additional congressional purpose of seeking to mini-
mize the threat and recurrence of acts that amount to domestic terrorism
in schools, coupled also with a requirement that the guns (or some com-
ponent part, raw material or ammunition thereof) must have traveled in
interstate commerce, all bolster the case for the constitutionality of a
regulation prohibiting gun possession in schools. All of these factors
combined serve to neutralize the "slippery slope" concerns 20 raised by
the Lopez Court-i.e., legislation with these components does not give
rise to the possibility whereby Congress would use the legislation as a
springboard for, for example, (1) using a "cost-of-crime" rationale to
justify "regulating not only all violent crime, but all activities that might
lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate
commerce"; (2) using a "national productivity" rationale to justify
"regulating any activity that it found was related to the economic pro-
ductivity of individual citizens" such as family law (including marriage,
divorce, and child custody)"; and (3) using an "adverse effect on learning
environment" rationale to justify "mandating a federal curriculum for
local elementary and secondary schools because what is taught in local
schools has a significant 'effect on classroom learning,' and that, in turn,
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce."'12' In other words, school
gun control legislation based on the factors described above would be
adequately circumscribed and discrete so as to assuage the Court's con-
cern that Congress is in some way opening a Pandora's Box of over-
reaching legislation.
3. Distinguishing Lopez
In elucidating the current parameters of the commerce power in the
course of striking down the Gun Free School Zones Act in Lopez, the
Court made several important qualifying statements that "left the door
119. Id. (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 390-91 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1858, 1859).
120. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
121. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995) see supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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open" to the possibility that it would uphold similar legislation under
different circumstances. For example, the Court commented that:
We do not doubt that Congress has authority under the Commerce
Clause to regulate numerous commercial activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce and also affect the educational process.
That authority, though broad, does not include the authority to regu-
late each and every aspect of local schools.
22
Moreover,
Admittedly, a determination whether an intrastate activity is commer-
cial or noncommercial may in some cases result in legal uncertainty.
But, so long as Congress' authority is limited to those powers enu-
merated in the Constitution, and so long as those enumerated powers
are interpreted as having judicially enforceable outer limits, congres-
sional legislation under the Commerce Clause always will engender
"legal uncertainty.". . . Congress has operated within this framework
of legal uncertainty ever since this Court determined that it was the
judiciary's duty "to say what the law is.". . These are not precise
formulations, and in the nature of things they cannot be. 123
Finally,
[Here, r]espondent was a local student at a local school; there is no
indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce, and
there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm have any
concrete tie to interstate commerce.
24
One can conclude from these statements that the Court, at least im-
plicitly, believes that (1) Congress does have the authority to regulate
some aspects of local schools (i.e., those aspects involving commercial
activities substantially affecting interstate commerce); (2) because the
process of determining whether a certain aspect of local schools does or
does not involve "commercial activities substantially affecting interstate
commerce" is not a "bright-line" legal test, such determinations should
be made on a case-by-case basis, and categorical statements should be
resisted; and (3) if facts exist where there is an indication that a student
subject to a school gun-possession statute had recently moved in inter-
state commerce, and if the statute does require that the possession is tied
in some concrete way to interstate commerce, the statute may well sur-
vive constitutional scrutiny. 12
122. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565-66.
123. Id. at 566 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 177 (1803)).
124. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
125. Indeed, following the Court's decision in Lopez, President Clinton proposed the "Gun-
Free School Zones Amendments Act of 1995", which provided the jurisdictional element for the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990: "The legislative proposal would amend the Gun-Free School
Zones Act by adding the requirement that the Government prove that the firearm has 'moved in or
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Moreover, the Court's statement in Lopez that "[t]he possession of a
gun in a school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might,
through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate
commerce"' 126 must be considered in light of the Court's immediately
preceding comments concerning "legal uncertainty, "127 and accordingly
should be read so as to apply to the facts as they existed in Lopez , but
not necessarily as a categorical statement that the act of possessing a gun
in a school zone will never amount to an economic activity substantially
affecting interstate commerce. It is unlikely that the Court, in literally the
next sentence after speaking of the uncertain and imprecise "nature of
things" in formulating legal determinations, would intend to issue an
immutable categorical conclusion of this sort.'28
It is necessary therefore to consider the individual law at issue in
determining whether Congress has or has not acted within its constitu-
tional authority in promulgating legislation governing the possession of
guns in schools. As the Court notes, "the question of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause 'is necessarily one of degree"', "'29 and
"any possible benefit from eliminating this 'legal uncertainty' [e.g., by
issuing rigid categorical statements] would be at the expense of the Con-
stitution's system of enumerated powers."'
' 30
In short, based on the unhappy developments of the last year
spurred by and epitomized by the horrific events at Columbine, Congress
should be able to establish sufficient justification 3' to withstand "rational
basis" review by the Court.
32
the possession of such firearm otherwise affects interstate commerce.' The addition of this
jurisdictional element would limit the Act's 'reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that
additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce,' as the Court stated in
and thereby bring it within the Congress' Commerce Clause authority." H.R. DoC. No. 104-72
(1995). Congress never acted on this proposal.
126. Lopez 514 U.S. at 567.
127. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
128. Indeed, in his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy describes his reasons for believing the
holding should be limited: "The history of the judicial struggle to interpret the Commerce Clause
during the transition from the economic system the Founders knew to the single, national market still
emergent in our own era counsels great restraint before the Court determines that the Clause is
insufficient to support an exercise of the national power. That history gives me some pause about
today's decision, but I join the Court's opinion with [certain] observations on what I conceive to be
its necessary though limited holding." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 555 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
130. Lopez. 514 U.S. at 566.
131. As implied by the Court in Lopez, such justification is all-but-required whenever
Congress attempts to regulate an activity that lacks an intuitively-obvious link to interstate
commerce. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 110 and accompanying text for discussion of standard of review.
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CONCLUSION
The events at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado on
April 20, 1999 forever changed the contours of the national discussion
about youth violence and guns in schools. This Article has argued that
the events of Columbine and its aftermath should spur Congress to enact
legislation to ban the possession of guns in schools. Such legislation is
constitutionally supportable as a proper exercise of Congress' commerce
power, despite the Supreme Court's 1995 Lopez v. U.S.133 opinion strik-
ing down the 1990 Gun Free School Zones Act. With Columbine, school
attacks have crossed the threshold whereby they now potentially affect
interstate commerce in a substantial sense. Indeed, some such attacks
actually constitute acts of domestic terrorism, thus justifying federal leg-
islation to ban the possession of the major instruments of those attacks-
guns-in schools. To borrow from Justice Stevens' dissent in Lopez,
"Whether or not the national interest in eliminating [the market for pos-
session of handguns in schools] would have justified federal legislation
in [1995], it surely does today."'"
133. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
134. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 603 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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MORE THAN ZERO: THE COST OF ZERO TOLERANCE AND
THE CASE FOR RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN SCHOOLS
WILLIAM HAFT*
The author Tracy Kidder documented a year following the life of an
extraordinary elementary school teacher and her fifth-grade class at a
public school in Holyoke, Massachusetts.' During that year, the teacher,
Chris Zajac, had a particularly troublesome student named Clarence. For
much of the year, he completed little work, was constantly disruptive,
frequently started fights, and often hurt other students.' Finally, in March
of that year, Zajac faced the decision of whether to keep Clarence in the
class or send him to a special "Alpha" class for difficult and even violent
children.3 Zajac was torn between the harm that she feared Clarence was
likely to suffer by being separated from the mainstream students and the
harm that Clarence continued to inflict on those mainstream classmates:
Was it fair to let one child's problems interfere with the education of
nineteen other children, many of them just as needy as Clarence?
When she looked back and imagined herself saying, "No! I don't
want him taken away," she imagined herself feeling just as guilty as
she would have if she'd said, "Yes, by all means, Alpha." In retro-
spect, sending Clarence to Alpha seemed like a decision to accom-
plish something that was probably right by doing something that was
4probably wrong.
This passage characterizes the dilemma posed by disruptive students.
For Clarence, it was probably wrong to send him to a class filled with
troublesome students. Frequently, such students will benefit most from
an orderly, mainstream classroom. However, for the rest of Zajac's stu-
dents, it was probably right to have Clarence leave. His presence dimin-
ished and constantly threatened to destroy the very learning environment
from which he was most likely to benefit. Ultimately, the little consola-
tion Zajac took from a committee's decision to assign Clarence to the
. Note: The author is an associate at Hogan & Hartson LLP, Washington, DC, in the
Education and Government Relations practice groups. He would like to acknowledge the efforts of
Kristin Angus and Kelley Southerland-Francavilla in defining the Symposium's broad scope. In
addition, he appreciates the substantial efforts of the Law Review staff in preparing this piece for
publication.
1. See Tracy Kidder, Among Schoolchildren (1989).
2. Id., passim.
3. Id. at 166-67.
4. Id. at 167.
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Alpha class was that she had tried "everything possible" before sending
him away from her class.'
INTRODUCTION
There is a trend in public education of treating the dilemma posed
by the Clarences of the classroom as a single-sided coin. That is, it fails
to recognize the cost of exclusion as a sanction. This trend finds its most
explicit expression in so-called "zero tolerance" policies. 6 Zero-tolerance
policies are designed to suspend or expel students from public schools
for a single occurrence of a proscribed conduct. In their extreme form,
the policies mandate permanent expulsion for actions ranging from pos-
session of a weapon on school grounds to conviction of serious crimes.7
In the fall of this school year, enforcement of a multi-year expulsion
against students under such a policy in an Illinois public school gained
national attention.8 Some supported the strict response to the boys' un-
doubtedly violent and destructive conduct. 9 Others, including the Rever-
end Jesse Jackson, sided with families of the expelled students who ar-
gued that the punishment was excessive and destructive to the boys' edu-
cation."'
This trend can be viewed largely as a response to increased youth
violence in light of recent events such as the Columbine High School
tragedy." .Although, concern about violence existed well before Colum-
bine, 2 it is likely that the numerous recent school shootings have further
5. See id. at 168.
6. See, e.g., Margaret Graham Tebo, Zero Tolerance, Zero Sense, ABA JOURNAL, Apr. 2000,
at 41.
7. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1311 (mandating permanent expulsion for
students found in possession of a weapon on school grounds and for students found guilty of arson
or rape).
8. See Clarence Page 'Zero Tolerance,' Zero Thinking, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 1999, at 21
(describing the replaying of the videotaped brawl on national television). The students were involved
in a brawl in the bleachers of a high school football game.
9. See, e.g., Kathleen Parker, Coddling Not Allowed: Pendulum Swings Back Toward
Discipline, Responsibility, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 24, 1999 at 17 (asserting that Americans are fed up with
"victimology" and praising school board's decision to expel the boys).
10 See, e.g., Eric Zorn, Chance at Change Must Outweigh All Else in Decatur, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 11, 1999 at I (arguing that expelled students should be returned to mainstream classes as soon
as possible).
II See Barry C. Feld, Rehabilitation, Retribution & Restorative Justice: Alternative
Conceptions of Juvenile Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE HARM OF
YOUTH CRIME 24 (Gordon Bazemore & Lode Walgrave eds., 1999); see generally Developments in
the Law, Alternative Punishments: Resistance & Inroads, Ill HARV. L. REV. 1967, 1968-71 (1998)
(discussing punitive trends in criminal law as a whole).
12. The issuance of the Safe School Study Report to Congress in 1978 is often identified as
the "formal recognition of a serious national concern with the increasingly crime-ridden, unsafe
conditions of American public schools." Julius Menacker & Richard Mertz, State Legislative
Responses to School Crime, 85 ED. LAW REP. 1 (1993). See also Page, supra note 8, reporting that at
least four out of every five high schools in the United States has been subject to a zero-tolerance
policy since at least 1997.
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concentrated attention on problems of violence in schools and have has-
tened the trend toward expulsion as a proactive measure. Indeed, in De-
cember of 1999, Governor Owens proposed a zero-tolerance policy for
weapons, drugs, and violent behavior in schools. 3 In addition, he urged a
"three strikes and you are out" policy for "disruptive" behavior.'
4
In terms of educational policy, this trend can be justified by the im-
plicit or explicit recognition that security must be a fundamental concern
for public schools. 5 In other words, schools must be safe places for chil-
dren to learn. The importance of security to the integrity of public
schools cannot be gainsaid or minimized. So-called "zero-tolerance"
policies are consistent with trends away from lenity in criminal law and
with restrictions on constitutional rights that courts have found appropri-
ate in the public school context.' 6 Expulsion is a necessary tool for
achieving and maintaining security. However, this article also contends
that the growing reliance on zero-tolerance responses to misconduct runs
directly counter to a fundamental purpose of public education-the pur-
pose of preparing children to live in a democratic society. 7 It suggests
that the decision to exclude or ostracize individuals from an institution
specifically designed to prepare them to be productive members of our
society is a grave one. As a result, exclusionary policies should be en-
forced as a last resort rather than as a first response.
Finally, this article proceeds from the premise that a particular strat-
egy can be a last resort only if there are intermediate responses available
to teachers and administrators. One response the author advocates is to
apply principles of restorative justice more aggressively to the school
setting. In particular, victim-offender mediation offers a response to vio-
lence or threats of violence that has proven to be effective in the criminal
law context and, for reasons discussed in Part II, has even greater poten-
tial in the context of a school community.
13. See Governor Bill Owens, Announcement of "Putting Children First: A Plan for Safe &
Excellent Schools," available at:
http://www.state.co.us/gov-dir/govnr dir/ ChildrenFirstRemarks.htm.
14. See id.
15. See, e.g., Todd A. DeMitchell, Security Within the Schoolhouse Gate: An
Emerging Fundamental Value in Educational Policy Making, 120 ED. LAW REP. 379, 382 (1997)
(arguing that security now joins equity, efficiency, liberty, and quality as a fundamental educational
value).
16. See Bill 0. Heder, The Development of Search & Seizure Law in Public Schools,
1999 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 71, 114 (discussing restrictions on constitutional rights of school
children); Dan Lungren, Three Cheers for Three Strikes, POL'Y REV., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 34
(discussing effectiveness of three strikes law in California).
17. Incidents prompting proposal of such policies are likely to affect not only offenders, but
all students in a school community through the narrowing of students' rights, particularly
constitutional rights such as those protected by the Fourth Amendment. See Heder, supra note 16 at
113-14 (predicting that the substantial intrusions on student Fourth Amendment protections found
permissible in recent Supreme Court decisions will only accelerate in light of drug and weapons
incidents).
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Following this Introduction, in Part I, the article considers the in-
creasingly restrictive, punitive trends in both public education and in
criminal law and questions whether, while u nderstandable in the face of
recent events like the Columbine tragedy, they will diminish the likeli-
hood of subsequent incidents. These policies often fail to address the
underlying causes of school violence or, more importantly to give public
education an opportunity to fulfill its purpose for those most in need of it.
Part II discusses the principles of restorative justice, which has re-
cently been recognized as a neglected element in our mainstream ap-
proach to criminal law.18 It describes the process of victim-offender me-
diation as one means of implementing those principles. It suggests that
victim-offender mediation offers an intermediate response to violence or
threats of violence that is not only more consistent with principles of
public education than expulsion but also more likely, in many cases, to
reduce violence effectively. This Part also briefly distinguishes victim-
offender mediation from more commonly recognized school peer-
mediation programs which, while serving a valuable purpose in schools,
have limitations that make it inappropriate for the types of conflict for
which victim-offender mediation can be most effective. The central pur-
poses of this article are to 1) identify generally accepted restorative jus-
tice principles and processes that have such potential for application in
the school setting; 2) note the positive effects that restorative justice pro-
grams have had in other contexts; and 3) identify particular qualities of
the public school environment that make restorative justice programs
particularly appropriate and likely to be effective.
I. REPRESSION & RETRIBUTION - THE PREDOMINANT RESPONSES TO
YOUTH VIOLENCE
Legislative awareness of and responses to trends of violence in
public schools did not originate with the most recent spate of incidents.
For at least thirty years, the issue has received legislative recognition. At
the federal level, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1970 was an early effort to make public schools safer by making it
a federal offense to sell drugs in or near a public or private elementary,
secondary, vocational, or post-secondary school. 9 Such sales became
subject to double the prison sentence applicable to identical sales in a
non-school setting.E° Subsequently, in 1978, Congress commissioned the
18. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note I I (discussing trends in restorative justice
such as alternative sentencing as well as the political resistance to approaches that emphasize
rehabilitation over punishment); Katherine L. Joseph, Victim-Offender Mediation, I I OHIO J. DisP.
RESOL. 207 (1996); Daniel W. Van Ness, New Wine & Old Wineskins: Four Challenges of
Restorative Justice, 4 CRIM. L.F. 251 (1993).
19. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention & Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513 § 419
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 860 (1994)).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 860 (1994).
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National Institute of Education's Violent Schools-Safe Schools study.2'
This study indicated that crime and violence represented serious prob-
lems in schools during the 1970s, but also expressed optimism that the
problem had peaked.22 In 1986, the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and
Communities Act authorized grants to states and to national programs to
provide substance abuse and violence prevention activities.23 In 1999
alone, the Safe and Drug-Free Schools program has disbursed over $100
million in federal aid to schools in an effort to help schools provide a
more disciplined, orderly and safe environment for teaching and learn-
ing.
The Supreme Court ultimately thwarted one subsequent congres-
sional attempt to reduce school violence. The Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990 made it a federal crime for any individual knowingly to pos-
sess a firearm in a school zone. 24 The "zone" extended to any area within
1000 feet of a public or private school campus.' Congress asserted its
authority to enact such legislation under its broad Commerce Clause
powers, but the Supreme Court in Lopez found that the legislation's al-
leged relationship to interstate commerce was too tenuous or ill-defined
to regulate in this realm of traditional local control.26
The Lopez decision represents a rare judicial limitation on legisla-
tive or administrative authority to regulate conduct in or around schools.
Typically, courts have been extraordinarily deferential to legislators and,
even more so, to school administrators with respect to school policies
that have a direct bearing on the educational environment of the school.27
A prominent example of this trend can be found in recent search and
seizure decisions. The Supreme Court has approved random suspicion-
less drug testing as a prerequisite to participation in school athletic pro-
grams.28 The Court found, among other things, a diminished privacy in-
terest for student athletes and a substantial government interest in pre-
venting drug use.29 Not only did the Court make it clear that children
have diminished rights in comparison to adults, it also found that chil-
dren's rights are not the same in the school setting as they would be
elsewhere.3° As one commentator summarized the trend, "courts are
21. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION, VIOLENT SCHOOLS - SAFE SCHOOLS: THE SAFE
SCHOOL STUDY REPORT TO CONGRESS (1978).
22. Id. at iii.
23. Safe & Drug-Free Schools & Communities Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570 § 4102 et
seq., 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
24. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4844 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994)).
25. Id.
26. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1994) (holding the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990 unconstitutional).
27.
28. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665-66 (1995).
29. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665-66.
30. See id. at 655-56.
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struggling to empower school officials to effectively address rising
threats to children. 31
In general, the principal of judicial deference to school administra-
tors for decisions implicating educational policy seems appropriate for
achieving the purposes of public education. Yet, this deferential judicial
role heightens the responsibility of educational administrators to consider
the social and educational consequences of the policies. Reliance on the
legality of a policy to determine its educational efficacy would abdicate
educator's responsibility to make educationally sound decisions. The fact
that a policy can be enforced from a legal perspective begs the question
of whether it ought to be enforced from an educational standpoint. This
question must be answered in light of the school's alternatives. That is,
the decision whether or not to implement a restrictive policy or to expel
an individual child can be answered only (1) in the context of its demon-
strable effectiveness and (2) in relation to available alternatives for re-
sponding to violent or potentially violent behavior.
Although efforts to address concerns about school violence have
been ongoing, they have undoubtedly become more repressive and puni-
tive in recent years. This trend has been particularly evident at the state
and local level. One such effort has been in the area of dress codes. 2
Implementation of public school dress codes is perhaps the most concrete
reflection of the notion that lack of discipline and uniformity is one of
the causes of declining educational performance in general, and school
violence, in particular. Educators who support dress codes often assert
that they encourage discipline, enhance self-esteem, and promote unity in
the school setting.3 As a result, some states allow public school districts
to mandate school uniforms.'
Scholarly analysis of the school uniform concept has devoted sub-
stantial attention to whether such policies violate student rights.35 The
central legal question has been whether dress codes infringe unconstitu-
tionally on students' rights of expression.36 An equal or greater concern
for educators, however, is whether such policies are likely to achieve
31. Heder, supra note 16, at 113.
32.- See generally Amy Mitchell Wilson, Public School Dress Codes: The Constitutional
Debate, 1998 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 147; Note, Dena M. Sarke, Coed Naked Constitutional Law: The
Benefits & Harms of Uniform Dress Requirements in American Public Schools, 78 B.U.L. REV. 153
(1998).
33. See Wendy Mahling, Secondhand Codes: An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Dress
Codes in the Public Schools, 80 MINN. L. REV. 715, 719-20 (1996).
34. See Alyson Ray, A Nation of Robots? The Unconstitutionality of Public School Uniform
Codes, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 645 (1995).
35. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 32, at 169-70 (discussing possible outcomes of constitutional
determination based on balancing of students' expressive interest with government's interest in
providing safe educational environment); Ray, supra note 34, at 645 (arguing that public school




their disciplinary and educational goals. Will these restrictions on student
expression have a positive effect on the learning environment and the
ultimate goals of public education? At the moment, there is little data on
which to evaluate the efficacy of school uniforms apart from anecdotal
accounts of improved school climate.37
School uniforms represent a proactive effort to improve school cli-
mate. However, a more common legislative response to concerns about
violence has been reactive. Numerous state legislatures have enacted
zero-tolerance statutes in recent years.38 In California, for example, a
student must be recommended for expulsion from school for acts in-
cluding possession of certain dangerous objects, robbery, and sale of any
controlled substance.39 The legislative popularity of such policies mirrors
increasingly punitive trends in criminal law characterized by so-called
"truth in sentencing" legislation or "three-strikes" laws.4° Whether one
agrees with the efficacy of the laws, such treatment of adults is rational,
at least, from a culpability perspective. Our notions of criminal law are
based on the premise that adults have the necessary state of mind to be
fully accountable for their actions.4'
For children, however, zero-tolerance policies flatly contradict the
traditional premise that children have diminished capacity to develop the
requisite intent for criminal conduct.4 2 Instead, they assume both an inju-
rious intent and an injurious effect based on a single incident, sometimes
of possession alone.43 As a result, the zero-tolerance mindset has pre-
dictably led to cases of rigid, overinclusive punishment of children. One
such case involved an eighth grade student in Omaha, Nebraska who
37. See Mahling, supra note 33, at 718-20 (reporting that educators who support dress codes
have asserted an improved educational environment as a result of enhanced discipline, self-esteem,
and classroom unity). One notable exception is the documented experience of the Will Rogers
Middle School in Long Beach, California. The school reported a 32% drop in suspensions and a 36%
drop in crime as well as a significant jump in its statewide ranking on a standardized algebra test
See Wilson, supra note 32, at 149.
38. See, e.g., CALIF. EDUC. CODE § 48915, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1311, and NEB.
REV. STAT. § 79-283.
39. See CALIF. EDUC. CODE § 48915(a).
40. President Clinton hailed his 1994 crime bill with its three-strikes provision as "one of his
lasting achievements." Stephen Glass, Anatomy of a Policy Fraud, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 17, 1997,
at 22. Recent crime reduction in both California and New York City has been attributed, in part, to
three-strikes policies in those states. See Lungren, supra note 16; but see Editorial, Crime is Down
All Over, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1997, at A26 (suggesting that crime reduction may be a result of
demographic changes).
41. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5, at
30-40 (1986) (discussing theories of punishment).
42. See, e.g., Owens, supra note 13 (asserting that "[e]veryone knows you do not bring a
weapon anywhere near an airport .... Children must know without any doubt that the same rules
apply to everyone."
43. See, e.g., See CALIF. EDUC. CODE § 48915(a)(2), MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 380.1311(2), NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-283(3), (4).
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carried a pocketknife on a school bus.44 He showed the knife to another
boy, poked a hole in the seatback in front of him, and poked a hole in his
own shirtsleeve.45 The Nebraska legislature had previously given school
districts the authority to expel students for two semesters for possession
of a dangerous weapon at school." Pursuant to this legislation, the
Omaha Public Schools had designated all knives as dangerous weapons
and mandated a two-semester expulsion as the automatic penalty for
violation of the rule.47 In Kolesnick, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld
the boy's year-long expulsion, finding that it did not violate his federal
substantive due process rights.48
Regardless of the limits on the child's due process rights, the zero-
tolerance response was overinclusive from an educational standpoint
because it ostracized a child who had no intent to injure anyone and who
caused little disruption of the school environment. His crime was slight
property damage to a school bus seat--damage of an extent that one sus-
pects most children cause to school property at one point or another in
their educational lives. Yet, the consequence was his expulsion from the
educational community for a year. One must question how the educa-
tional aims of a public school have been achieved by denying education
to a child on such grounds.
Another example of overly rigid disciplinary policy, this one in the
context of harassment, received prominent popular attention a few years
ago when a North Carolina school suspended a six-year-old boy from
school after he kissed a classmate.49 Public schools must treat harassment
concerns seriously, and respond promptly to incidents of alleged harass-
ment in order to develop responsible and educationally sound policies
and practices and maintain legal standards." Lines of accountability must
exist, even for children who may not be old enough to understand the full
implications of their actions; however, in the North Carolina case a
chasm existed between intent and accountability, injury and punishment.
44. See Shaw ex rel. Kolesnick v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 558 N.W.2d 807 (Neb. 1997); see
also Minooka Boy's Knife Tests School, After-Hours Quarrel May Bring Expulsion, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 17, 1999 (reporting eighth-grade boy's possible one-year expulsion for carrying a pocket knife
on school grounds).
45. See Koles.nick, 558 N.W.2d at 811.
46. See 1994 Neb. Laws 1274, 1281-82 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-283).
47. See Kolesnick, 558 N.W.2d at 811.
48. See id. at 813-14.
49. See George F. Will, Six-Year-Old Harassers?, NEWSWEEK, Jun. 7, 1999, at 88.
50. See id. (mentioning that public school liability for sexual harassment has received
significant attention from the Supreme Court in recent years). A jury awarded a former public school
student in Alexandria, VA, more than $1,000,000 for his sexual abuse by a teacher. See Patricia
Davis & Ann O'Hanlon, Alexandria Schools Liable for Sex Abuse; Jury Awards $1 Million To
Victim Of Teacher, Washington Post, Mar. 11, 2000, at AO1. The jury found that the school principal
and other school officials had ignored reports of previous abuse by the teacher and signs that he
might have been abusing the particular student. See id. See also Tamar Lewin, Kissing Cases
Highlight Schools' Fears of Liability for Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1996, at 22-23.
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Although the retributive net might occasionally be cast too broadly,
such extraordinary occasions, taken alone, should not be the basis for
evaluating a general policy. Uniform draconian responses to misconduct
in schools might be justified if such policies demonstrably achieved their
ultimate goals with limited concomitant costs. The efficacy is doubtful,
however, and the costs are numerous and varied, including the potential
economic costs of providing alternative education for expelled students.5
Moreover, the long-term costs, both to the child and to society, of deny-
ing an individual the benefit of a traditional education, may be great. 2
The purpose of public education, traditionally, has been to prepare chil-
dren to live as productive members of a republican society. 3 Such pur-
pose can hardly be achieved by refusing to educate those who have the
most difficulty understanding or accepting the expectations of such a
society.
The assumption that punitive responses to juvenile offenders will
deter antisocial and potentially violent conduct runs counter to demo-
cratic, inclusionary principles of public education. Furthermore, it con-
flicts with goals and incentives for future conduct. Alienation and isola-
tion from the community are potential sources for violent conduct, as
evidenced in the backgrounds of Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris follow-
ing the Columbine tragedy. 4 Punitive responses to juvenile offenders
serve to weaken bonds with the school community and make reintegra-
tion less likely. This pattern of response is problematic in light of our
understanding that a sense of isolation from community is one of the
causes of juvenile offenses.56 Expulsion from the community for a single
51. See Lisa Petrillo, Zero Tolerance At Schools: One Strike & They Were Out: Was the
Punishment Fair? You be the Judge.. ., SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 24, 1995, at B I (reporting
that California's mandatory expulsion rule had resulted in punishment of children for carrying nail
clippers, Swiss Army knives, and bottle openers, and that the state estimated the cost of expulsion at
$20 million).
52. The negative effects of repressive policies tend to extend beyond the individual child and
to the school community as a whole. See infra note 56 and accompanying text. See also Chicago's
Alternative Schools Run Out of Room: Night Classes Slated to Keep Overflow Students in System,
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 23, 1999 (reporting that it would be nearly impossible for Chicago Public Schools
to offer any additional troubled students a second chance to complete their education).
53. See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, THE AMERICAN COMMON SCHOOL: AN HISTORIC
CONCEPTION 70-71 (1951) ("'It may be an easy thing to make a Republic . . . but it is a very
laborious thing to make Republicans."' (quoting HORACE MANN, TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, TOGETHER WITH THE TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY
OF THE BOARD (Dutton & Wentworth, Boston, eds., 1849)); see id. at 59 ("'[T]he spirit of common
schools - schools where the rich and the poor meet together on equal terms, where high and low are
taught in the same house, the same class, and out of the same book, and by the same teacher - is a
republican spirit. And this is a republican education."') (quoting J. Orville Taylor, Common School
Assistant, Vol. n (1837)).
54. See Colorado Comes Together, DENV. POST, Aug. 15 1999, at F4.
55. See Roger J.R. Levesque, The Right to Education in the United States: Beyond the Limits
of the Lore & Lure of Law, 4 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 205, 248 (1997).
56. See id. (citing Florence M. Stone & Kathleen B. Boundy, School Violence: The Need for a
Meaningful Response, 28 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 453, 454. 456 (1994)). See also Gordon Bazemore,
After Shaming, Whither Reintegration: Restorative Justice & Relational Rehabilitation, in
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offense in the name of zero tolerance is merely the most obvious exam-
ple. Its effect might be to make the community appear safer in a superfi-
cial sense; yet, expulsion provides little hope that those in positions of
authority will recognize or attempt to mitigate the community isolation-
ism that seemingly encourages criminal acts.57 In general, repressive
policies damage the educational environment and fail to reduce the
problems they are designed to remedy. 8 Some commentators suggest
that such policies make schools more effective at creating delinquent
students than at controlling or reforming them.59
II. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE - A MISSING LINK
A. Defining Restorative Justice
Retributive responses often repress and isolate, not only the offender,
but also the victim and the surrounding community. In contrast, restora-
tive justice principles hold offenders strictly accountable for their con-
duct while seeking to repair and restore the integrity of the school com-
munity after an offense has occurred. Restorative justice, as a model,
requires a distinct shift away from the current emphasis on punishing the
offender.
The current political climate, stressing retribution at the expense of
rehabilitation, magnifies the degree to which criminal justice must be
reconceived. 6 Core principles of restorative justice demand a focus on
restoration of the community. That is, the primary goal in responding to
RESTORATIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE HARM OF YOUTH CRIME 165 (Gordon Bazemore
& Lode Walgrave eds., 1999) (stating that "[sianctions that degrade and isolate the offender ...
weaken bonds that foster reintegration and ultimately heighten risks to public safety."); Pedro N.
Noguera, Preventing & Producing Violence, 65 Harv. Educ. Rev. 189, 192-207 (1995) (arguing that
"get tough" approaches fail to create safe environments because coercive strategies disrupt learning,
increase mistrust, and encourage resistance to learning).
57. See Levesque, supra note 55, at 248 (citing ROBERT M. REGOLI & JOHN D. HEwrrTr,
DELINQUENCY IN SOCIETY 313-23 (3d ed. 1997)).
58. See id. (citing David C. Broterton, The Contradictions of Suppression, 28 URBAN REV.
95, 99-113 (1996) (concluding from a two-year study of gangs in inner-city high schools that typical
suppressive responses were futile and had unintended negative consequences for goals of democratic
education)).
59. See id. (citing ROBERT M. REGOLI & JOHN D. HEWITT, DELINQUENCY IN SOCIETY 313-23
(3d ed. 1997) (arguing that tracking systems and conduct codes, among other repressive policies,
contribute to delinquency)).
60. See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1967-70 (discussing punitive
trends in criminal justice); Feld, supra note 11, at 24-25 (discussing punitive trend specifically with
respect to juvenile justice system as reflected in trying juvenile criminals as adults); Gordon
Bazemore & Lode Walgrave, Restorative Juvenile Justice: In Search of Fundamentals & an Outline
for Systemic Reform in RESTORATIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE HARM OF YOUTH CRIME
59 (Gordon Bazemore & Lode Walgrave eds., 1999); Van Ness, supra note 18, at 257 (attributing
trend to societal emphasis on maintaining security and public order); cf LAFAVE, supra note 41, at
30-40 (1986) (identifying six theories of punishment: prevention, restraint, education, deterrence,
retribution, and rehabilitation).
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reparation for the injuries the offense has caused.6 This perspective re-
quires that the justice process devote as much attention to those injured
by crime-both individual victims and the community-as to the of-
fender.62
The "justice" to be achieved following a crime is to "make things
right., 63 In other words, justice requires solutions that hold the offender
strictly accountable, not for the purpose of punishment, but in order to
reconcile, repair, and reassure those violated by the offender's actions.
64
Thus, justice mandates a response at three levels: to the offender, to the
victim and to the community.65 The process has been summarized as "the
effort to heal the three parties that may be injured by crime." 66 Although
this article emphasizes potential benefits with respect to offenders, the
restorative paradigm for justice is oriented to the victim and to the com-
munity as well. Recent support for restorative justice derives largely
from the disservice to victims' interests and needs, characteristic of cur-
rent retributive criminal processes:
We may invoke [victims'] names to do all sorts of things to the of-
fender, regardless of what victims actually want. The reality is that
we do almost nothing directly for the victim, in spite of the rhetoric.
We do not listen to what they have suffered and what they need. We
do not seek to give them back some of what they have lost. We do not
let them help to decide how the situation should be resolved. We do
not help them to recover.67
Restorative justice has followed a variety of paths into contemporary
society with programs developing out of sources as diverse as commu-
nity policing groups and indigenous or tribal dispute resolution proc-
esses. 68 Its roots are historically deep, and its origins are as varied as the
historic legal codes of the Middle East, the Roman Empire, and Euro-
pean polities.69 Furthermore, its current applications are culturally di-
verse.
70
61. See Bazemore & Walgrave, supra note 60, at 48.
62. See id. at 49, 164; HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES: A NEW FOCUS FOR CRIME &
JUSTICE 181 (1990); Van Ness, supra note 18, at 259.
63. See Zehr, supra note 62, at 181.
64. See id
65. See id. at 188; Van Ness, supra note 18, at 259.
66. Bazemore & Walgrave, supra note 60, at 55.
67. Zehr, supra note 62, at 32 (concluding that "[t]his, then, is the ultimate irony, the ultimate
tragedy). Those who have most directly suffered are not to be part of the resolution of the offense
[because] ... victims are not even part of [society's] ... understanding of the problem." Id.
68. See Bazemore & Walgrave, supra note 60, at 45.
69. See Van Ness, supra note 18, at 253-55; see also Zehr, supra note 62, at 139-142
(discussing the Biblical notion of justice as one of making things right and moving toward
"shalom").
70. See Van Ness, supra note 18, at 255-56 (noting restorative grounding of Japanese justice
system and discussing the shift away from restorative justice in the British system).
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Introduction of restorative justice into contemporary society from
different sources inevitably creates different practical definitions, im-
ages, and iterations of restorative justice. In fact, some experts in the
field would question whether one can.fairly discuss "restorative justice"
as a unified concept.71 Nevertheless, the phrase connotes common forms
and elements that have strong potential for application in the educational
setting.
B. The Process of Restoring Justice
Restorative justice has been defined as "a process whereby all the
parties with a stake in a particular offense come together to resolve col-
lectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offense and its implica-
tions for the future. Victim-offender mediation is one of the "clearest"
processes employed in the name of achieving restorative justice.72 As the
name implies, the core component is mediation between the crime victim
and the criminal offender. 73 Typically, the process also includes members
of the victimized community who can speak to the impact of the of-
fender's actions on the community and who can help construct appropri-
ate restoration or restitution.7 4 The model process involves face-to-face,
non-adversarial, informal and voluntary meetings in a safe
environment.75 The voluntary nature of the process is particularly im-
portant.76 To establish voluntariness the mediator often meets with par-
ties individually in preparation for the face-to-face meeting.77
71. See Bazemore & Walgrave, supra note 60, at 47-48 (discussing range of definitions and
understandings).
72. Mediation workshops and programs are already familiar concepts in school communities
nationwide. See, e.g., Glenda L. Cottam, Mediation & Young People, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1517,
1522-24 (1996) (discussing various schools that employ mediation workshops and programs); Kelly
Rozmus, Peer Mediation Programs in Schools, 26 J.L. & EDUC. 69, 81-83 (1997) (discussing
evaluations of existing programs); William S. Haft & Elaine R. Weiss, Peer Mediation in Schools, 3
HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 213, 213 (1998) (reporting estimates ranging from 5,000 to 8,500 for
number of existing peer mediation programs in the United States). There are substantial differences
between the restorative justice mediation process discussed in this article and the peer mediation
process already common in schools. The most important distinctions relate to the seriousness of the
offenses addressed through the process and the commensurate demands on mediator skill and
training. These distinctions make peer mediation programs a generally inappropriate forum for
addressing the potential range and seriousness of offenses for which victim-offender mediation is
designed. See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text; See MARK S. UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS
OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & MEDIATION 5 (1994).
73. See UMBREIT, supra note 72, at 5.
74. See Bazemore & Walgrave, supra note 60, at 49 (defining "victim" to include the
"victimized community").
75. See Bazemore & Walgrave, supra note 60, at 51-52.
76. See John Braithwaite & Christine Parker, Restorative Justice is Republican Justice, in
RESTORATIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE HARM OF YOUTH CRIME 115-16 (Gordon
Bazemore & Lode Walgrave eds., 1999) (stating that, in the criminal justice context, "victims and
offenders should always have a right to walk out of a conference and go to court").
77. See UMBREIT, supra note 72, at 7-8. In addition to ensuring that the parties are willing
participants, these meetings give the parties an opportunity to become familiar with the process and
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When the parties do meet, the initial focus is on the offense.78 Vic-
tims have an opportunity to express directly to the offender their feelings
about the offense and its impact.79 In addition, they are often eager to ask
the offender questions in order to understand why and how the events
occurred.8° The victim frequently describes the offense's impact on his or
her life.8' Both parties can express feelings, elaborate on facts, discuss
consequences, and pursue a resolution, including discussing specific res-
titution to be made by the offender in order to repair the harm. 82 The
resolution itself is often memorialized as a formal a written agreement.
83
The restorative justice process has three important substantive ele-
ments: 1) identifying needs of the parties involved; 2) informing and
empowering the parties; and 3) establishing accountability for past con-
duct and future intentions.' These elements combine to promote repair,
reconciliation, and reassurance.85 Each of these elements comports with
the goals that a responsible educational system should have for all of its
students, particularly those whose isolation is becoming destructive;
namely, instilling accountability, instilling a sense of the concrete effect
actions have on others in the particular community, and demanding con-
structive participation in such community. These goals become particu-
larly important with respect to those whose isolation threatens to become
destructive.86
C. Positive Effects of Victim-Offender Mediation
Data evaluating victim-offender programs are limited; however,
available research, primarily in the context of juvenile justice programs,
indicates that victim-offender programs have had positive results. One
study of four U.S. juvenile justice victim-offender programs reported
to understand their roles and responsibilities. See id. They also give the mediator(s) an opportunity to
establish rapport and to become familiar with the issues that the mediation will need to address. See
id.
78. See id. at 8.
79. See id.
80. See id. In court-annexed restorative justice processes, it is usually a prerequisite
for referral that the offender acknowledge responsibility for having committed the offense. See id. at
7 ("Many programs accept referrals after a formal admission of guilt has been entered with the
court.").
81. See Harry Mika, The Practice & Prospect of Victim-Offender Programs, 46 SMU L. REV.
2191, 2197-98 (1993).
82. See id.
83. See id. at 2198; see, e.g., UMBREIT, supra note 72, at 61-71 (characterizing
restitution agreements from mediations in four U.S. victim-offender programs according to
categories of financial restitution, personal service, and community service).
84. See ZEHR, supra note 62, at 191-204.
85. See id. at 181.
86. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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high levels of victim satisfaction with the fairness of the process.8 7 Sub-
stantively, victims are more likely to receive promised restitution if the
obligation arose through victim-offender mediation.88 In other words,
offenders who commit to some form of restitution through the mediation
process are more likely to follow through on their commitment than if
they are ordered to pay restitution as part of more traditional adjudica-
tion.89 Regarding recidivism, the data are particularly limited, but there is
some evidence both that recidivism rates are lower for juveniles whose
offenses are addressed through victim-offender mediation than through
the traditional juvenile justice system. 9' The benefits to victims are
equally important. In a study of Indiana programs, victims who met with
their offenders could get answers to their questions about the offender,
the crime, and their victimization.9' In addition, the victims typically
valued the opportunity to describe the offense's effects directly to the
offender; furthermore, victims were more likely to value the offender's
apology, and less likely to remain upset about the offense or to fear re-
victimization by the offender.92 Effects on the community are more diffi-
cult to quantify and, to the author's knowledge, have not been meaning-
fully assessed to date.
D. Applying the Process to the School Setting
Whatever benefits have accrued from existing programs within ex-
isting legal systems should be magnified in the school setting. This hy-
pothesis should hold true for two reasons. First, programs within the ex-
isting legal frameworks work at odds with contemporary retributive no-
tions of justice.93 By contrast, the goals of restorative justice comport
with the aims of public education: both strive to prepare children to be-
come capable and productive members of a republican society. 94 Re-
storative justice models, in general, and mediation, in particular, contrib-
ute to these goals by emphasizing accountability, restitution, and restora-
87. See UMBREIT, supra note 72, at 83 (finding that 83% of victims in study reported that
their case was handled fairly as compared with 62% for victims whose cases were not referred to
mediation).
88. See id. at l09-111.
89. See Mara F. Schiff, The Impact of Restorative Interventions on Juvenile Offenders, in
RESTORATIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE HARM OF YOUTH CRIME 331 (Gordon Bazemore
& Lode Walgrave eds., 1999).
90. See id. at 333; UMBREIT, supra note 72, at 115.
91. See UMBREIT, supra note 72, at 17.
92. See id. at 22.
93. See JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR., No ESCAPE: THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 66-67
(1991). (suggesting that deeply iooted incarcerative sentiments of the American public will make it
difficult for alternative programs to gain support).
94. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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tion of the community, including the offender.95 In other words, a pri-
mary function of the process is to reintegrate the offender as a productive
member of the school community, rather than further exiling the student
and thereby increasing the potential for separation, resentment, and re-
peated offenses.
Second, the school provides a setting in which injury to the commu-
nity can be defined and appropriate restitution formulated. This injury to
community is often difficult to define or measure in the context of the
legal system, because it is not often clear how the community, separate
from the individual victim(s), should be defined or compensated. Resti-
tution commonly takes the form of "community service." 96 But in the
broader, ill-defined community the service required can become easily
attenuated from the effects of the specific offense and, as a result, from a
victim's sense of accountability or duty to remedy a particular problem.97
By contrast, the school context makes it easier to identify members
from that community who can play a positive role in the restorative jus-
tice process.98 In addition, a harm that occurs within the school commu-
nity has impacts within defined community boundaries, providing estab-
lished community norms by which conduct can be evaluated and pa-
rameters by which parties can define appropriate restitution.99 Further-
more, school communities are not subject to an important criticism of
victim-offender programs established in the context of the legal system:
that a one-time intervention of several hours is unlikely "to have a dra-
95. See generally Braithwaite & Parker, supra note 76 at 103-22 (arguing that goals of
restorative justice, including justice through face-to-face action, are consonant with fundamental
republican principles of non-domination).
96. See, e.g., Susan Guarino-Ghezzi & Andrew Klein, Protecting Community: The Public
Safety Role in a Restorative Juvenile Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE
HARM OF YOUTH CRIME 204-05 (Gordon Bazemore & Lode Walgrave eds., 1999) (discussing
community service component of restorative justice program in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania).
97. See Bazemore, supra note 56. at 174 (stating that "[u]nlike conventional adults, most
youths lack this sense of 'connectedness.' They do not hold positions of responsibility in work,
community or family groups that allow them to make meaningful contributions.").
98. See id. at 168-69 (reporting that "sanctioning processes are more likely to enhance
rehabilitation/reintegration when they involve family, victims and key members of the offender's
community directly in the process"). Bazemore also notes that students' primary "connectedness"
occurs through their identity as students in the school environment; accordingly, "this reality puts a
great deal of pressure on educational institutions to forge a link between the 'moratorium'
experience of adolescence and productive adult life in order 'to allow youths to identify with new
roles of competency and invention."' Id. at 174 (quoting ERIK ERICKSON, IDENTITY, YOUTH, &
CRISIS 138 (1968)).
99. Cf Feld, supra note 11, at 37 (posing the question: "If restorative justice envisions
informal enforcement of 'community' norms, who defines the 'community' or the 'norms'?"). The
Decatur, Illinois incident, discussed supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text, provides a concrete
example of where a defined injury to the community might have been addressed through restorative
justice. As part of the fallout from the fights, classes were cancelled for a week; the students lost a
week of their educational lives but the offenders' expulsion provided no remedy for this injury. See
Bob Greene, Who'll Say 'I'm Sorry' to the Other Decatur Students? CHI. TRIB., Nov. 22, 1999, at I
(noting that most of the students were guilty of nothing but they too were kept out of school).
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matic effect on altering criminal and delinquent behavior" in which other
ongoing factors are present."° Schools most likely have more complete
information regarding background factors relevant to a specific incident.
They also have inherent capacities for ongoing supervision and interven-
tion that traditional justice systems seldom can provide following resolu-
tion of a particular offense.1'
In sum, victim-offender mediation within the school setting facili-
tates identification of relevant and influential community members; it
provides definite boundaries for determining appropriate, relevant resti-
tution; and, it has a supporting framework of continuous contact between
the offender and the community to make it an effective component of
ongoing intervention.
E. Limitations of the Process in the School Setting
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the detailed
means by which a restorative justice program can or should be imple-
mented in a particular school, it is important to identify at least three
essential components without which such a program is less likely to suc-
ceed. Each of these components draws important distinctions between
victim-offender mediation and peer mediation programs that have be-
come common components of dispute resolution processes in schools."0 '
The first limitation relates to the mediators themselves, a critical
component of any type of mediation. It is, after all, the mediator who
manages the dynamic between the parties and shepherds the process. The
mediator's effectiveness is often crucial to whether the participants con-
sider the process to be effective or the outcome to be one that serves jus-
tice.' 3 The mediator's role in the victim-offender context is more chal-
lenging than traditional peer mediation programs, partly because of-
fenses, by definition, may constitute serious criminal acts."° Victim-
100. See UMBREIT, supra note 72, at 117.
101. See Van Ness, supra note 18, at 271 (arguing that restorative justice requires greater
cooperation between communities and civil government in order to be successful). See also Guarino-
Ghezzi & Klein, supra note 96, at 195-96 (discussing ways in which traditional justice systems
create rifts between law enforcement officials and the communities that they are seeking to protect);
Russ Immarigeon, Restorative Justice, Juvenile Offenders & Crime Victims: A Review of the
Literature, in RESTORATIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE HARM OF YOUTH CRIME 313-14
(Gordon Bazemore & Lode Walgrave eds., 1999) (stating that particular models of restorative
justice, such as "family group conferences" have shown particular promise).
102. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
103. See UMBREIT, supra note 72, at 77 (observing that, in at least one program reviewed,
"frequently the victim's satisfaction was directly related to the mediator"); see also Cottam, supra
note 72, at 1538 (discussing how the mediator should give a victim special attention); Stephanie A.
Beauregard, Note & Comment, Court-Connected Juvenile Victim-Offender Mediation: An Appealing
Alternative for Ohio's Juvenile Delinquents, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1005, 1020 (1998)
(noting importance of high-quality mediators to the success of court-annexed programs).
104. See Haft & Weiss, supra note 72, at 237 (peer mediation typically responds to disputes
that would not implicate anything beyond petty criminal offenses and are characterized as "he said,
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offender mediation has been used effectively to address serious crime
ranging from burglary, to sexual assault, to vehicular homicide"°5 and
attempted murder."°6 Students should not be expected to have the experi-
ence or perspective needed to work with such serious subject matter, and
they generally should not serve as victim-offender mediators.
In addition, the nature of mediations between a defined "victim" and
a defined "offender" creates significant power balance concerns. One
obvious component of this problem is with regard to the victim. For a
victim to face the offender requires great courage. One who demonstrates
such courage and is willing to confront the inherent risk must not be
subject to the process having the effect of victimizing him or her a sec-
ond time.0 7
Conversely, a second power-imbalance concern must be for the stu-
dent-offender, particularly in mediations that include representatives of
the community. The traditional justice system has numerous procedural
and substantive safeguards to protect offenders' rights.0 8 Victim-offender
mediation diminishes the formal safeguards inherent in such a system,
including rights to representation, rules of evidence, statutory limits on
punishment, and judicial review. Community pressure might easily
dominate the voluntariness of an offender's participation. The risk is not
only violation of legal rights, but also coercion into agreements that vio-
late principles of voluntariness and diminish the sense of responsibility
and accountability that is crucial to a successful result. Thus, a mediator
must be attuned to, and adept at, recognizing subjective assessments of
culpability and acceptance of blame in a manner that may not be either
voluntary or substantively just."°9 These concerns are significant for any
mediator, and school administrators should not assume that students will
ordinarily be capable of taking on such responsibility with their peers.
Another limitation that distinguishes victim-offender from peer me-
diation programs again relates to mediator competence. It is the need for
mediators and school administrators to be aware of the legal implications
she said" gossip-based conflicts). But see id. at 238 (noting that in at least one instance, more
sophisticated programs have evolved to address violent conflicts, arising from racial tensions).
105. 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 26, 1999) (describing mediation between drunk
driver and victim's family).
106. Attempted Murder: Confrontation (HBO television broadcast, Feb. 4, 1991) (describing
mediation between convicted attempted murderer, Tommy Brown, and the victim, Gary Smith).
107. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A
Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1275-79 (1994) (arguing that the inherent structure of the
mediation process forces victims to de-emphasize their own emotions caused by the offense and
instead pressure victims toward forgiving the offender). One dissatisfied participant of a victim-
offender mediation characterized the additional burden as "like being hit by a car and having to get
out and help the other driver when all you were doing was minding your own business." ROBERT B.
COATES & JOHN GEHM, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: AN EVALUATION OF VICTIM-OFFENDER
RECONCILIATION PROGRAMS 9 (1985).
108. See Brown, supra note 107, at 1288.
109. See id.
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of an offender's actions. This concern is relevant to the power imbalance
issues discussed above, but it also requires distinct consideration.
Awareness is necessary both from the standpoint of possible criminal
consequences for an offender's actions and from the standpoint of pro-
tecting an offender's procedural rights.
Finally, a third qualification was recognized at the outset of this arti-
cle. Not all conflicts should be mediated and not all offenders should
receive an opportunity to remedy their actions through mediation.
Phrased one way, "[t]here will, of course, always be a need for a differ-
ent relational response to more chronic and violent offenders."" 0 Phrased
more concretely, there will always be "Clarences" for whom everything
short of exclusion has been tried and nothing has succeeded.11' For these
types of offenders, expulsion and alternative schools may be the only
viable recourse from the standpoint of both the school and the student.
CONCLUSION
Because "zero-tolerance" policies, by definition, exclude students as
a first response, they are likely to undermine the ultimate goals of public
education. Still, an exclusionary policy can be reserved for a last resort
only if intermediate responses are available. If a school is to attempt
"everything possible" before sending away its "Clarences," then it must
have other available strategies and processes. One such process should
be victim-offender mediation. Victim-offender mediation and the over-
arching principles of restorative justice are more commensurate with the
values of public education and more likely than zero tolerance to help
schools instill those values in the children who most need to develop
them. It is true that, as Governor Owens has decried with respect to dis-
ruptive students, at some point there must be a third strike. 2 Neverthe-
less, we should make certain that, before the third strike is called, a
school can assure itself and the larger community that it has provided a
student all available resources for reaching base safely. Such assurance
can be forthcoming only where, before ostracizing an offender, the
school endeavors to achieve justice through the offender's acknowledge-
ment of, accountability for, and reparation to redress the injury caused to
individual victims and the community.
110. See Bazemore, supra note 56, at 181.
111. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
112. See Owens, supra note 13.
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